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ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL IN ETHIOPIA

By

YOHANNES GEDAMU

Under the Direction of Carrie Manning, PhD

ABSTRACT

After the fall of the military regime (the Dergue) in Ethiopia, that had ruled for seventeen
years, the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front) coalition and some former
liberation fronts took control of the state and the systemic political transformation of the country.
The impact they made on the state stability, political and economic questions however, invite further investigation. Considering the historical preludes, understanding today’s political landscape
and lingering political and economic questions, this dissertation examines an institutional solution
introduced by EPRDF led government in Ethiopia, i.e. Ethnic Federalism. The post-1991 politics
and EPRDF’s coalition however, are highly dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front

(TPLF) with a political base of roughly six percent of the total population. Nonetheless, the coalition, while challenged by fractured coalitions of political opposition and intra-party struggles, remains stable and in control. Hence, the dissertation provides a broader analysis on how the EPRDF
coalition survives amid such challenges and remains in hold of political power while the overarching majority opposing its domination of the political landscape. As such, I focus on whether the
federal arrangement, introduced as institutional solution to address grievances of diverse groups
created mechanisms that enabled the regime’s political survival. In doing so, through diverse methodologies such as the use of comparative historical analysis and process tracing, elite interviews,
case studies and use of secondary sources, I argue that Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism has effectively
served the incumbent elites by providing the platform and mechanisms that ensured success of
authoritarian survival. Overall, this dissertation in its first part discusses the continuity of culture
of elite interaction that served as the foundation to survivalist politics in the country. Secondly,
through careful investigation of the federal setting, the dissertation concludes that such federal
arrangement is designed with the survivalist agenda in mind. As such, through patron-client relations, use of institutional arrangements that targeted group right promotion agenda in the political
as well as economic schemes, the coalition navigated the political landscape quite skillfully
thereby guaranteeing its survival for well over two decades and half.
INDEX WORDS: Ethnic Federalism, Authoritarian Survival, Political Culture, Neo-Patrimonialism, Clientelism, Democratization, Institutional Designs, Elite Strategies
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PART ONE

2

1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Sub Saharan African countries share lots of commonalities. Among their shared attributes,
majority of states in this region have suffered from yoke of colonialism, administrations that followed the colonial era mostly become authoritarian regimes, under-development and the ensuing
poverty became a characterizing feature in most of these states, and most importantly the history
of conflict and brutal civil wars became another common feature. In a positive note however, we
find that abundance of diversity, cultural richness, more or less similar paths of history of state
formation, and the people’s societal norms also make these states very much comparable. However, there also some anomalous historical attributes that could define and explain a certain SubSaharan African state more than the other. When looking at the evolution of the modern state of
Ethiopia for instance, we find a state that kept its independence from colonial rule after defeating
and surviving imperial Italy’s historically ambitious attempt of creating a larger colonial empire
in Eastern part of Africa.
Regardless of peculiarities like the ones mentioned above however, the fact that the prospects and successes of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa are limited and the presence of
long serving dictatorships, regardless of how much is written and said about, remains a situation
that still deserves the attention of scholars in comparative politics. Attempting to further explore
why such states fail to democratize and or understanding how the political regimes in this part of
Africa succeeded to survive the many challenges posed against their rule is therefore essential. Or
simply put, understanding how could such regimes preserve their hold on political power albeit
their ineffective governance and continuing increase in popular resentment of their rule is very
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much a relevant course in research directions that we should sustain in our comparative political
research pursuits.
Understanding the reasons behind the political survival of authoritarian regimes in SubSaharan Africa in comparative perspective, I believe therefore is very vital contribution. However,
the fact that tackling such a task demands bigger resources and time means, I have limited this
project to only studying a single case study of Ethiopia, with the goal of explaining authoritarian
survival from varied lenses and approaches that are primarily used in the study of authoritarian
survival as well as democratization. In this study therefore, I look at how a minority ethnic clique
with a strong control of a political coalition, that holds more of the political, economic, military
and security might of the Ethiopian state was able to survive and remain in hold of political power
despite the country’s two major ethnic groups (the Oromo and Amhara, who constitute about 65%
of the Ethiopian population) as well as other ethnic groups’ continuing grievances of political as
well as economic exclusion remain ever present. Before delving deep into an effort to address the
research question and studying the politics of contemporary Ethiopian state however, I argue that
it is crucial to look at three important historical realities that help shape the debate on the question
of assessing how authoritarian regimes (in the past or present) in the Ethiopian state survived the
challenges against their political dominance in their particular periods of administration.
Firstly, the political landscape in Ethiopia today is a result of the historical making and
unmaking of the state in so many different ways by different regimes that had control of political
power in dissimilar political eras. As explained earlier, this fact is regardless of the historic truth
that the country is one of not many states in the developing world that had never been administered
by a colonial power in its entire history, which I believe is a reality that helps or leads to avoid the
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debate on the legacy of colonialism altogether at least when it comes to studying the case of Ethiopia in general and the survival of the current authoritarian rule of more than 25 years in particular.
Hence, looking at other pervasive historical preludes of the state becomes very vital. The Haile
Selassie I regime ruled the country for over four decades until it was overthrown by the Dergue
regime in 1974. The Dergue regime itself was overthrown in 1991 after ruling the country with
iron fist for seventeen years. Here, I argue that it is crucial how these regimes structured their
governance, managed the center-periphery relations (relations between the regional states and the
central government), and effected their political survival for the long haul. Because, researching
and understanding the underlying reasons, by relying on cultural, institutional, economic as well
as strategic approaches on identifying the causal explanations for the survival of such regimes for
the long period will have a huge contribution to the field on its own.
Secondly, today’s Ethiopia, in its current formal name, The Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia (FDRE), is a state with an institutional design of ethnic federalism as a form of government structure, which is different in comparison to many others federal cases in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Thus, this dissertation also looks into studying what guides the political and economic
relationships between regional states and the central government in this type of federal setting. It
is mostly perceived that the current regime in power since 1991, constituted the Ethiopian state
through ethnic federal arrangement due to its goal of expanding rights to many groups with the
goal of creating economic and political equality, which many argue never been the case under the
previous political administrations. Despite the existence of other African states with federal structures (Nigeria, South Africa, to name a few), the Ethiopian example remains anomalous mainly
because of the country’s federal arrangement is devised based on clear ethnic and linguistic lines
or classifications resulting in clear departure from the Pan-Ethiopian nationalist political regimes
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that preceded the current incumbents. Hence, understanding the broader ramifications in terms of
the consequences of having this type of federal arrangement on the political survival of the current
political regime is significant not only to our knowledge of the current state of politics in the country, but also with regards to its contribution to the field of comparative politics in general. Moreover, its contribution in further adding to our broader understanding of the politics of federalism
and devolution of powers in a Sub-Saharan African state like Ethiopia in particular is also enormous.
Thirdly, the Ethiopian protracted civil wars that preceded the formation of a transitional
council in 1991 with the coming of the EPRDF coalition into the helm of political power remain
crucial in how such a historical episode shaped the course of events that followed. Such wars that
started during the 1960s and mostly ended in the early years of 1990s had involved many rebel
organizations with many of them representing different ethnic grievances as their political agendas. For such rebel groups, exploiting such ethnocentric agendas happened to be extremely important towards their attempt to achieve some form of recognition for the political grievances they
embraced upon raising arms. While some of these rebel organizations fought to realize their PanEthiopian nationalist agendas along ideological lines, some others paid huge price for their unsuccessful secessionist bids, with the exception being the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (here after
EPLF), that later succeeded in achieving independence and establishing the State of Eritrea. The
commonality in most of these former rebel movements that waged armed struggle during this era
was their ambition for the expansion of group rights by ending what they termed ‘the domination
of one or two major ethnic groups’ in every sphere of political and economic life in the historic
Ethiopian State. These rebel groups were also the ones that would later put their ethnic agenda
ahead of the national political agenda when opportunities to take political power emerged. Such
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groups and the individuals who inspired the formation of the various rebellion forces desired that
all ethnic groups in the country enjoy equal political representation and economic opportunities.
For them, addressing such issues would limit potential opposition to their rule and solves historic
questions of inequality. Adding to the commonality of the very elites from the radical left wing
era, the leaders of these groups were also once part of a very active students’ movement in the
1960’s that among others contributed to the downfall of the long serving political regime led by
Emperor Haile Selassie I.
These groups of individuals constantly debated the issue of identity and competing ethnic
nationalism and grievances that they thought were created as a result of the domination of all
minorities in the country by what they referred as the mostly Amhara-Tigre dominated political
culture1. In light of the broader comparative politics literature on the recurrence of civil wars, it is
clearly stated that the probability of a return to civil war is highly likely given experiences of a
history of conflict2. The literature also asserts that even though ethnic fractionalization could not
be blamed for the outbreak or recurrence of civil wars, in a situation that a minority ethnic group

1

In a small paper written by a student movement leader named Walellign Mekonnen, (which can

be accessed at: http://walilegnfordemocracia.com/onationalqu.pdf) we find an influential piece that instigated debates of political representation and inequality in the country in the sixties.
2

For the recurrence of civil war in countries with history of conflict, look at: Sambanis,

Nicholas. "Using case studies to expand economic models of civil war." Perspectives on Politics 2,
no. 02 (2004): 259-279, and Call, Charles T. Why peace fails: the causes and prevention of civil
war recurrence. Georgetown University Press, 2012.
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dominates the political space, ethnic fractionalization could well serve as the cause of civil war.3
This indeed is also confirmed by recent literature that put the issue of ‘creed’, among others, as
part of the overall explanation for the emergence of conflicts as well as in the sustenance or duration of such wars (Zartman 2005). Here, it is important to note that the overall aim of the project
is not centered around understanding causations of conflict or recurrence of it. However, given
those who control political power came to achieve that through a violent civil war necessitates to
bring issue at some point or another for its relevance for our understanding of authoritarian survival
could not also be debated.
Hence, this fact explained above also begs the question in that how a political regime,
which is supported by a minority group that effectively dominates the political, military, security
establishments while controlling the command of economic spheres of influence in Ethiopian politics survives political opposition for well over two decades without facing a strong rebellion, opposition or various forms of popular movements against its rule. Because, even the presence of
periodic political upheavals also failed to deter the regime from its survivalist bid and that I argue
that must be explored with regards to what the literature says about the potential for recurrence of
civil wars and popular movements. Nevertheless, this project mainly this project explores how
ethnic federalist arrangements were critical to the political survival of the ruling elite on top of the
ruling EPRDF coalition.

3

For more on the litearute, look at: Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity,

insurgency, and civil war." American political science review 97, no. 01 (2003): 75-90.
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Such realities of recent past history (briefly mentioned above) and many others that this
project attempts to address make the question of democratic transition and authoritarian survival
in the Ethiopian state a very complex one. In fact, following the collapse of a military socialist
regime in 1991, many had hoped that the new transition could usher in a much better hope and
prospect for democratic governance in the country. Unfortunately, the historic political and economic solutions put forth to pave the road for the emergence of democratic Ethiopia did not materialize. Instead, it created winners and losers. Important to note however, such solutions of power
sharing, in the form of ethnic federalism, led to considerable stability. The solutions that were
introduced in terms of institutional designs with expectations of answering historical grievances
of the various groups (that were formerly represented by various ethnic rebel factions) that went
through the protracted civil wars are among others the issues that this project assesses in more
detail going forward. However, given list of failures of such institutional solutions, which I will
extensively present in the dissertation, it necessitates an effort to disentangle the prospects as well
as the challenges of an arrangement such as ethnic federalism. In that respect, given that the democratization process is not a success and we as researchers, I believe are left to deal with our
efforts to understand the survival mechanisms of such a political regime in the case of Ethiopia.
Therefore, it also now becomes very important to look closely at the current Ethiopian regime’s
mechanisms for political survival in more detailed fashion.
As it is clear from the many instances, especially from the notoriously failed examples in
the case of Eastern European states, institutional solutions such as constituting a state in the form
of ethnic federalism is mainly introduced as a way to control the state and create a sense of stability
while attempting to address questions of political representation and other questions of grievances
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that arise from diverse groups within such states. Because, for such regimes devising the institutional solutions of this kind, the elites are convinced that doing so is the most critical step for the
purpose of gaining the level of political legitimacy that they seek. Understanding whether this form
of institutional solution was designed with such similar goals in mind when it comes to the Ethiopian case therefore becomes an essential question.
1.1

Purpose of the Research
Given what has been mentioned thus far, this dissertation project serves two important

purposes. First, it involves the assessment of the Ethiopian case alone. In that regard, the purpose
of the research is structured in a way that helps us understand the overarching dynamics of varying
authoritarian regimes in the Ethiopian state’s modern political history. Hence, by marrying the
historical narrative that the project develops with the current of assessment of the state of politics
in the country i.e. the model of ethnic federalism in the country and its evolution, I believe that we
will be served better in studying the topic in hand. Hence, firstly, it is important to look at the
historical evolution of the modern Ethiopian state in general and the mechanisms utilized for political survival that by each of the regimes in their efforts to keep hold of political power in their
respective eras. I argue that despite the fact that the two political regimes (the Imperial Regime
under Haile Selassie I and the Socialist Military Regime, the Dergue) are mostly different from
each other across many important issues, the political culture under which their political rule were
manifested through remained similar in systematic ways. Such a political culture, as we could later
see from different perspectives, will be brought back to the political fold with the coming of the
EPRDF led regime and remain embraced and further cultivated in unique ways to benefit the survival ambitions of those at the top of the political regime in power since 1991. The dissertation
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therefore, in its Part One explains the ramifications of the political culture as well as institutional
designs of the prior political regimes and today’s incumbents. In doing so, it puts greater emphasis
on how such combined factors served the survival interests of the elites at the center of political
power in their respective political eras. Here, it is important to note that the dissertation’s invoking
of political culture is not primarily to frame it as the main causal explanation for the question of
authoritarian survival. However, I argue that the persistence of political culture throughout the
modern political period is clearly evident and therefore should not be ignored. Moreover, I also
argue that although the continuity of political culture is an essential feature, the regimes in power
in different eras had also engaged in the remaking of the state in one way or another, which necessitates the study of political culture as the foundation to our understanding of the institutional and
strategic mechanisms that I argue are more appealing to explain authoritarian survival in the case
of Ethiopia.
The second and most substantive part of the project involves understanding the consequences of the institutional design of ethnic federalism in terms of its contribution to the survival
of the current political regime in the country as well as the challenges that needs a further explanation in understanding the case of Ethiopia in particular. Thus, simply put, my dissertation project
attempts to identify the mechanisms within which ethnic federalism served the survival interest of
the political elite at the top of current political regime in the country, i.e. the EPRDF coalition.
Moreover, besides looking at the ethnic federal arrangement extensively, this part of the dissertation also presents important junctures of historical magnitude that shaped the current state of politics in the last two decades, while also indicating what to expect moving forward to the next period
awaiting the Ethiopian state in its chapter on conclusion and policy implication. The research
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therefore touches upon three important approaches in the study of democratization that I am relying to help us understand the mechanisms of authoritarian survival in the country from the old
times to the very our time. Besides political culture, I therefore assess both institutional solutions
and the strategic interests of the rational political elite in the making of the causal analysis in the
study of authoritarian survival in Ethiopia. While the first part of the dissertation mainly presents
the political culture in the political history of modern Ethiopia and the assessment of its ramifications towards today’s realities, the second part of the project mainly focuses on the institutional
design of ethnic federalism and the role of the political elite in cultivating and implementing creative political and economic mechanisms for their survivalist agenda.
1.2

The Research Plan and Methodology
The methodology employed in this dissertation is qualitative in nature. Hence, comparative

historical analysis across various regimes in contemporary political history of Ethiopia are discussed in detail. In doing so, I have identified crucial points in history that have influenced the
nature of authoritarian survival in the country by mostly discussing patterns of interaction among
the political elite through out the periods investigated. Such patterns of interaction are what I also
dubbed as the political culture which persistently defined the course of politics in the country.
Moreover, consistent with such analysis used, substantive chapters also include the discussion of
further critical junctures that I found useful in our understanding of authoritarian survival in Ethiopia. In addition, in both part one as well as part two of the dissertation, I have utilized great deal
of information that I collected through my extensive field research. Throughout my field work that
occurred from January 2017 to July 2017, I have interviewed more than fifty individuals. The
interviews were conducted mostly in person, some through telephone conversations and few via
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email exchanges. The field work has taken me to diverse sets of places in the United States, Europe
and some of the interviews were also conducted with individuals who reside in Ethiopia via telephone interviews. Due to the need to protect the identity of the interview subjects, in part per my
commitment with the individuals who participated in the interviews and with Georgia State University’s institutional review board, and importantly because of the understanding that some of the
information could adversely impact the safety of my interview subjects, I have not included names,
and detailed personal information of the participants. Instead, I have included information about
when and where most of the interviews were conducted. Next, I discuss the research plan while
also explaining what methodological avenues were employed in each chapter included in the project.
With the goals of understanding the research question explained from the outset, the dissertation chapters are outlined as follows. The literature review (chapter two) builds on the debates
on authoritarian survival in contemporary comparative politics literature while keeping in mind
how that relates with regards to the Sub-Saharan African context. The chapter also reviews the
federalism literature with a large emphasis on ethnic federal arrangement by drawing on the experiences of numbers of countries with a federal setting that have put ethnic identity at the center of
their political discourse.
The theory (chapter three) also focuses on theoretical explanations that the political elite
relied on in adopting the institutional design in the first place while further develops and analyzes
the strategic interest of rational political elites and how they attempt to make sure the delivery of
popular political and economic demands ensures their effective control of the state. Moreover, in
the theory section, I also further attempt to show how the elite used the debate on individual versus
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group rights in devising different forms of policy directions as well as their implementations,
which again serve instrumental to the political survival goals of the very elite who devised the
institutional frameworks that enabled the ruling elite’s effective control of the Ethiopian state for
well over two decades. In this section, I also focus on how such ill conceived solutions that were
considered in alleviating the problems of political representation and economic equality among
diverse groups in the country further decapitated the growth of democracy in the country but instead ensured the regime’s political survival. Thirdly, I will also attempt to show how elite’s maneuver of economic reform plans focus on nothing but the political goals of the elites themselves
by providing an in-depth explanation drawing practical examples that add to the theoretical claims.
Chapter Four of the dissertation, which is entitled ‘The Making and Unmaking of the Ethiopian Modern State: Political Culture and a Historical Overview of Authoritarian Regimes’ Methods of Survival in Contemporary Ethiopia’ pays a close attention to three very important historical
periods in Ethiopia, which represent three different political regimes. Such regimes are the Imperial regime led by Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930 -1974), the Socialist Military Regime, known
as the Dergue under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974 – 1991) and the
current political regime that the EPRDF coalition controls in post-1991 political period. While I
also provide brief overview of the political regimes even before the imperial regime of Haile Sellassie I, more focus is given to the first two historical periods that indicated above given the third
one remains in hold of political power today. Therefore, as explained in the purpose of the research
earlier, the dissertation focuses on how the many attributes of the Ethiopian political culture remained persistent across such historical periods and remain a significant factor in shaping the political fortunes of the Ethiopian state in our time. As I argued earlier, all the three regimes lack
much resemblance to each other in terms of the way their political systems were devised. While
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the imperial regime under the leadership of Haile Sellassie I relied on more of semi-capitalist but
mostly feudalistic rule, the Dergue leadership led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam focused on
socialist party machine in imposing its authoritarian rule. Both of these regimes, however, had
used Pan-Ethiopian nationalist tone to subvert the opposition that could be armed or unarmed.
Besides the nationalist approach however, again, the level of political participation and representation of citizens as well the economic policies in service of their national agenda also varied
greatly among these regimes. The current regime under the leadership of the EPRDF coalition is
very much different and emerged with the anti-thesis to what had transpired in the few historical
decades of rule of the two political regimes.
However, the political culture at the heart of each political regime speaks louder in terms
of how each regime’s clientelistic political networks and strategies helped the survival of the governance systems. Therefore, by studying how the regimes’ political practices, economic policies
and institutions served their political goals of survival, the broader influence of the country’s political culture in its modern institutional characters (for instance from the old patrimonialism and
clientelistic neo-patrimonialism to political party ideologies) and assessment of state institutional
designs, this dissertation’s contribution in its focus on the assessment of the historical episodes are
extensive. Therefore, by relying on the comparative historical analysis of these political regimes
across time and describing the peculiar regime characteristics and by interviewing the political
elite that served across these different political eras, I attempt to draw causal explanations in how
the regimes’ political practices, economic policies and institutional designs served their political
goals of survival. Moreover, understanding the political explanations behind the downfall of the
first two regimes that I presented in detail, I believe that much could be learned since that serves
as clear indicator of the continuing cycle of political culture in the country, which the chapter
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explains in much more detail. In general, this chapter identifies and analyzes important events or
trajectories of historical significance, which reiterate the important roles of the political elite as
well as the institutional frameworks that they devised while showing the continuing recurrence of
the similar problems in contemporary Ethiopian politics at large.
Chapter Five of the project entitled, ‘The Making and Unmaking of the Ethiopian Modern
State Under the Military regime and the Emergence of TPLF Led EPRDF political Coalition’ also
continues the discussion and analysis that chapter four focused on and directly addresses the relevant historical questions that are presented in the dissertation while again showing the cycle of
politics in contemporary Ethiopian politics in recent decades. Chapter five concludes part one of
the dissertation, which is mainly designed to provide the literature reviews, the theoretical explanations and the historical foundations in which the overarching argument are primarily based.
The first chapter in part two of the dissertation, Chapter Six, entitled, ‘Emergence of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism: Structural Frameworks as Mechanisms for Authoritarian Survival’ sets
the tone for most of the discussion in this part of the dissertation. Earlier, I have indicated that in
a post-1991 power sharing in Ethiopia, the previous rebel factions and their leadership constituted
most of the new leadership in the emerging political elite in the country and chose to restructure
and shake the political system by devising a new federal structure along mostly ethnic and linguistic lines. In doing so, the new institutional structure created new autonomous regional states and
bestowed the right to self-government to many ethnic groups, prioritized promotion of group rights
over individual ones, promised fair representation at the federal government level, and so on. However, not only many argue that such promises are never fulfilled, but remain intrigued on whether
such reforms were designed to serve the interest of the political elite to extend their hold of political
power. Therefore, this chapter investigates such failed promises very broadly. While the crucial
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contribution of the chapter is adding important knowledge to the tenets of federalism and decentralization in a sub-Saharan state, like Ethiopia, the following variables are furthered explored and
assessed in more detail in chapter seven and eight of this part of the dissertation. The level of
freedom the newly created regional states enjoyed in the last two decades and half in administrative
autonomy (vis-à-vis their relations with the central government), electoral politics in regional
states vis-à-vis the center (the federal government) and candidate selection mechanisms, and the
assessment of the independence of bureaucratic system more broadly. The emergence of new challenges and their impact in the regime’s policies and ethnic federalism at large are also discussed.
At the heart of such variables, understanding the co-optation mechanisms of the ruling elite
at the central government take center stage. Simply put, the dissertation broadly examines federalregional state relations from the perspective of ranges of issues. In that regard, the main goal remains to understand how all such variables play out in reinforcing the current political regime’s
rule and ensure the elites’ survival. The Methodological choice in use will focus on processes
tracing to identify important trajectories with huge potential to explain the question at hand. However, the elite interviews that I conducted played a very important role in providing detailed insights across the issues I attempted to investigate in the chapter.
Chapter Nine of the dissertation, entitled ‘Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism and State-Centered
Economic Paradigms: A Further Analysis on the Anatomy of Survivalist Party-State’, further continues the essentials of what are presented in part two of the dissertation. The chapter hence, focuses on how the ethnic federal setting helped the political elite maneuver the economic programs
they envisioned and implemented to their goals of survival. More broadly, this chapter assesses
post-1991 economic paradigms and policies in Ethiopia. The political elite in Ethiopian government at first believed such policies and economic plans serve in both the development as well as
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promotion of diverse groups’ rights towards economic equality. Nonetheless, despite the registration of reasonable level of economic progress, the people still suffer from historic levels of economic inequality and the very institutional design of ethnic federalism that aids the success of such
economic programs that the political elites thought would address economic inequality of the various formerly oppressed groups on the basis of the promotion of group rights did nothing but served
as a ploy for authoritarian survival. The chapter at large therefore investigates how such economic
policies failed to deliver the economic opportunities that the people deserved as well as attempts
to identify and explain what has led to such failures as the policies were implemented in the newly
arranged federal state. The issue of property rights in the last couple of decades, the impact of
interventionist state-centered economy on individual and group rights, the state controlled economic enterprises and party owned endowments will be assessed more broadly and the impact in
their contribution to the regime’s political survival will be explored. Moreover, the growing role
of the Ethiopian military in the economic sector the ruling elite’s dependence on the military will
be examined in light of the newly emerging challenges that are yet to be researched given they are
evolving. The chapter of course, gives a bigger emphasis on how such state centered economic
policies transpired in Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement and again ties that to how they contributed to the political regime’s effective control of the state resulting in the survival of political
coalition that has led the country for over two decades and half. This chapter also shows how such
economic policies and the growing in strength of the regional political elites is shaking the political
power at the center and how that could impact the political fortunes of the state moving forward
again in light of the new challenges. The elite interviews I conducted significantly contributed to
interesting insight this chapter. Moreover, the limited cases I studied, by which some archives are
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investigated for mostly primary and secondary sources also made significant contribution in shaping the chapter.
Finally, in the ‘Conclusion and Policy Implications’ chapters, I assessed the goals of the
research and what the dissertation achieves in terms of the contribution to the literature in authoritarian survival in general while also giving a due attention for my work’s limitations. Moreover,
I also explained how this project contributes to the general understanding of politicians, policy
makers, consultants and the general academic and non-academic reader. I will make a case about
the broader implications of my research and attempted to point out what ‘corrections’ could be
considered to turn the nation’s recent journey into a formidable effort towards democratic governance and the break-up of authoritarian survival strategies.

2

CHAPTER TWO: THE LITERATURE IN AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL AND
ETHNIC FEDERALISM: LITERATURE REVIEW
Why authoritarian regimes elect to design some seemingly democratic institutions or adopt

to attributes that make them look a democratizing state while their authoritarian tendencies and
characters remain intact is a question that is highly entertained by considerable number of scholars
in comparative politics. However, further attempts towards full fledging explanations need to be
encouraged. Beyond this assertion however, there is already substantial but not yet complete account of comparative politics literature that explains what leads to the survival of political power
of authoritarian regimes’. In the first section of this literature review, I therefore look at several
contemporary and popular works that contributed to the understanding of the politics of authoritarian survival by employing various methodological avenues. From most of these works, we learn
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that two crucial things stand out in the most part. While the idea of institutional solutions as mechanisms employed by governing elites or political parties come first, the elite centered politics and
the mechanisms utilized in different form of power sharing mechanisms among the ruling elite is
the other. In lieu of such observation, I discuss the literature on authoritarian survival with the
notion that this work adds to further our understanding of how the political elite’s maneuver of
ethnic federal institutional setting might have contributed to decades old survival of today’s incumbents in Ethiopian politics.
Among the many I discuss here after, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s (2010) recent
work in particular assesses such ‘competitive but authoritarian’ states with substantial theoretical
detail. The authors’ attempts put forth the rationale for political survival by utilizing both domestic
as well as international variables. Their main argument is that states with close relations with the
developed and democratic world (the Western countries) tend to democratize while states with
strong and oppressive structures tend to remain authoritarian. In fact, relating such an assertion
with that of Ethiopian history, we find that the notion that the Dergue dictatorial regime that ruled
the state from 1974 until 1991 and its relations with the soviet empire might have reinforced its
authoritarian characters could be more amenable. The fact that a scholarly work such as Levitsky
and Way’s work could explain the survival of that certain regime given the political and military
support from the Soviets until late 1980’s does not however, mean that it captures the whole story.
The fact that that certain regime had not had competitive electoral setting, among others, is one
issue that we have to consider. Moreover, looking at the many historical attributes of the regime
in a broader sense is another important factor that brings about the whole story. The current political regime led by EPRDF indeed showcases electoral politics albeit not fairly contested either. In
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fairness to Levitsky and Way’s argument, today’s EPRDF led political coalition with the dominance of the TPLF elites also enjoy wider level of western support although it remains authoritarian
and devoid of conducive playing field for electoral competition and other needed democratic attributes. Although the author’s argument on the use of coercive powers of the state in helping
authoritarian survival could also explain the case of Ethiopia, its contribution however, will be
limited since the factors helping EPRDF are in fact much more than its domination of the country’s
security apparatus. Regardless of what such seminal works contributions for our understanding of
authoritarian survival therefore, it remains imperative that we learn more of those different cases
that do not fit into Levistky and Way’s explanation while also attempting explanations designed
upon different methodological avenues that I hereby attempt to explore.
In continuing the discussion of the contemporary scholarship, in their work, Levitsky and
Way define Competitive authoritarian regimes as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic
institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which
incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.
Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to seriously
contest for political power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed
in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.”4 Their definition is a comprehensive
attempt on the topic and still concurs with the notion of lack of democratic competition or as they
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said the presence of ‘skewed competition in favor of the ruling political parties’. However, I reiterate that despite their comprehensive theoretical contributions, the work still fails short on addressing various political regimes that have closed the level playing field for political competition
in more broad ways. The case of Ethiopia, I argue can be one of these examples. In the six periodic
elections since 1992 in the country for instance, both the processes leading up to the voting and
then counting of the election results were challenging to the prospect of the participation of the
political opposition given their big doubts of the electoral process that they consider lack any attributes of what an equal playing field should be. Here, it is crucial to keep in mind that Levitsky
and Way’s explanations are still centered on the idea of democratic institutions and the elite’s
maneuver of such seemingly democratic institutions for their goals of political survival, which is
also an argument that I use by reminding that elites’ strategic interests as well as the institutions
matter in equal measure’.
In another seminal work entitled, ‘Voting for Autocracy’, we also see that Beatrize Magaloni’s (2006) work that mostly focused on Mexico’s Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party’s
(PRI) successful and prolonged hold of political power in the country, whereby the author argues
that the importance of electoral fraud as an explanation for authoritarian survival comes with serious doubts. Instead, Magaloni states that the PRI was effective in making sure no one at the top
stratum of political power in the party dominates clientelistic rents, which became effective in
creating ‘opportunities’ to all members of the top party brass due to the decentralized distribution
of rents across many individual party members who hold political power across the country. Moreover, the author also mentions Barbara Geddes’ (1999) work that explains authoritarian survival
based on the elites’ propensity to stay together given the higher costs of defection, and argues that
autocratic parties’ domination of popular support, which then could be reinforced by effectively
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deceiving voters through the cover up of the political party’s dictatorial attributes and by using the
seemingly democratic institutions and simple electoral maneuvers.
Assessing Magaloni’s work in light of the Ethiopian case, and deriving similarities out of
it seems quite possible given the nature of the current coalition led regime in the country and its
cleintelistisc networks at the top level party brass. But we find that in the case of Ethiopia, the
rents that the elite collect remain within mostly the political elites’ top brass. And that is mostly
possible because the institutional maneuvers that the ethnic federal arrangement made possible did
not also create any possible checks on party leaders. I argue that that is mainly due to the lower
level EPRDF officials strictly follow what is referred as the ruling coalition’s party discipline, as
we would see in the discussions in part-two of the dissertation. It also has kept the lower party
officials out of the riches that come with being part of the party on top of a ruling regime. The
catch in the Ethiopian case is that however, the middle and lower level party members receive their
rents in the form of administrative corruption at the lower levels of local governments that they
are in charge of administrative duties, of which the party elites at the top looks at with blind eyes
and deafen ears. Regardless of the departure of the author’s explanations compared with the Ethiopian case, Magaloni’s effort is indeed exemplary in its attempt to study history in the evaluation
of the PRI and the theoretical richness it possesses. However, firstly, I still believe that when applied to broader sets of cases, it comes short of explaining authoritarian survival in multi-ethnic
states that are mostly the cases within Sub-Saharan Africa, an area where variables from history,
political culture, conflict, the role of the state, structural factors, and institutional issues have a lot
to explain about. Secondly, the fact that Magaloni’s work, despite its richness in its summary of
the literature and theoretical considerations, its main argument is formulated based on a single case
study, that is not quite a multi-ethnic state, contrary to most Sub-Saharan African states that are

23

quite heterogeneous. Therefore, although it remains a significant piece that shows how incumbent
political parties could effectively use the institutional systems they design and establish to prolong
their political power by delving deep in assessing the PRI, Magaloni’s attempt remain inadequate
to travel further in helping our understanding of authoritarian survival in a broader sense. Here, I
would like to reiterate that Magaloni’s work, like Levitsky and Way’s also looks at the institutional
patterns of interaction within the PRI, which the authors asserted contributes immensely in reinforcing the importance of institutions for the purpose of understanding authoritarian survival.
When we also look at another contemporary work that focused on the Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, which possess not just limited similarities to some African states, Michael
Herb’s (1999) work shows us that the gulf monarchies in the region that have centralized political
power among the royal family and close relatives of the ruling elite were successful in ensuring
their survival for a long haul while other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa
struggled to maintain their rule given their experiences of periodic (although prolonged) revolutions and regime changes at different times. From the perspective of this project, since the Ethiopian regime in particular is also blamed for concentrating political power along ethnic lines, and
given the Tigrayan elites’ successful maneuver of the institutions in the Ethiopian state leading to
the concentration of Tigrayan elites in many of the most important ministerial portfolios and important institutions, Herb’s work creates another important parallel to further understanding the
puzzle of authoritarian survival in broader sets of cases.
Here, while Gulf monarchies concentrate power along family and to some extent clan lines,
we see that the ruling political regime in Ethiopia, which is highly dominated by the TPLF hierarchy, garnered most political powers by effectively dominating the military and security institutions
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as well as command of the economy while also making sure most important cabinet posts remain
in the hands of a single ethnic group as I stated above. This definitely begs the question that in a
multi ethnic state like Ethiopia, how is it possible for a political regime to stay in power for over
two decades despite the fact that its wide support comes out of just a single minority ethnic group
in the country, which of course is a question that this project aims to provide answers for. More
broadly however, Herb’s work clearly identifies the patterns in power succession mechanisms in
Middle Eastern monarchies and beyond, which again provides a perspective for my discussion of
political succession mechanisms in Ethiopia in the last couple of decades, which we find deeply
entrenched along family and ethnic lines that are hugely influenced by just one political party
(TPLF) that has asserted its absolute dominance within the governing political coalition, EPRDF
in present times and while same goes in describing the old patrimonial regimes in the Ethiopian
state.
As I attempted to explain thus far in light of few of the contemporary works in comparative
politics, institutions and strategic interests of the elite remain the most compelling explanations to
our understanding of authoritarian survival while political culture entrenched within the cases discussed still playing important role of providing foundational causal arguments. Nonetheless, to
add to the most important works reviewed briefly above, Milan Svolik (2012) presents us a further
fascinating explanation to the politics of authoritarianism and survival mechanisms in this type of
rule. Svolik argues that the explanation on the topic is primarily centered on two items, i.e. the
politics of the ruling elite as it pertains to the ruled ‘masses’ and the politics of the elite vis-à-vis
each other.
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The author’s overall argument in his seminal work and contributions to the literature when
looked at from the perspective of studying African politics is even more significant. Svolik argues
that, “whether and how dictators resolve the problems of power-sharing and control is shaped by
two distinctly dismal features of authoritarian politics. First, dictatorships inherently lack an independent authority with the power to enforce agreements among key political actors, especially the
dictator, his allies, and their repressive agents. Second, violence is an ever-present and ultimate
arbiter of conflicts in authoritarian politics. These two intrinsic features uniquely shape the conduct
of politics in dictatorships. They limit the role that political institutions can plausibly play in resolving the problems of power-sharing and control, and they explain the gruesome manner in
which so many dictators and dictatorships fall.”5 As I explained earlier about the violent history
of the Ethiopian state in terms of decades old civil war, ruling political elites are highly concerned
first addressing the challenges they have among themselves given politics of power sharing being
an ever-present dilemma to each other’s survival. I argue that once such an issue is addressed via
mechanisms such as inter party agreements and coalition politics, the elites will turn towards addressing the popular demand for political and economic equality, which is the case as to the explanations towards the Ethiopian state. Regardless of the weaknesses due to some parsimonious explanations in his work, the overall contributions however, help provide a different lens to look at
sub-Saharan states like Ethiopia by analyzing the political elite and how they are able to design
ways of mitigating dangers that challenge their political dominance.
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Despite the presence of overarching explanations for authoritarian survival in the sea of
literature in comparative politics thus far, I opted to focus on select cases above not because they
are in line with the arguments I henceforth provide in this project, because most simply don’t while
some have a lot to learn from and help shape my arguments. Instead, the select texts I analyzed
above not only present compelling account of theoretical foundations, but they happened to also
have much greater influence in my training when it comes to understanding authoritarian survival
in the broader sense. However, given the goals set for this project, in part two of the dissertation,
I assess the institutional solution of ethnic model of federalism in Ethiopia and how that exactly
aided the political elites’ quest for political survival. In that regard, I hereby present the literature
in ethnic federalism below. Moreover, it is important to note that after the discussion of the political elites’ maneuver of the institutions they designed for political survival (in light of ethnic federalism) and the discussion of the debate on individual rights and group rights that I present in the
theory chapter, the chapters that follow focus on the historical analyses of the making and remaking of the Ethiopian state and show the persistence of political culture in the country, which is very
important to our understanding of how one regime type’s legacy somehow shapes one that follows.
2.1

Ethnic Federalism: Literature Review
So far, I have presented select contemporary explanations to our understanding of author-

itarian survival out of the many and showed that institutions as well as the strategic and rational
choices of the political elite matter in equal measure. Here after, I will closely look at the literature
that primarily explains the topic at hand with regards to studying the Ethiopian state. However, I
also argue that before delving deep into exploring the role of the ruling political elites in how they
orchestrated a method for political survival in the country by designing an institutional framework
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i.e. ethnic federal arrangement, it is essential that we explore how the regime was able to satisfy
(if any) of the diverse interests of many ethnic groups to ensure its goal of creating stability and
effective control of the state as well as the power sharing mechanisms among each other. As we
could see as this project unfolds, for the political elite, ethnic federalism, firstly addresses the
problems in the past with regards to the question of inequality. And secondly, it successfully leads
to an emergence of political mechanism that ensures the survival of a minority elite. To that end,
this project extensively focuses on the Ethiopian ethnic federal arrangement and its merits as well
as challenges in light of the research question. I believe that ethnic federalism is a central explanation under which the political survival of a political coalition that is heavily dominated by a
minority ethnic clique could be understood. Given such an assertion, it is important to broadly
discuss what the literature has to say about ethnic federal arrangement across spectrum of topics
in ethnic studies and ethnic nationalism in some respect. Before detailing the comparative politics
literature in ethnic federalism, it is also essential to explain the concept of federalism in general as
well as the definition of ethnic federalism in particular.
Federalism implies the distribution of power across the levels of government with sets of
principles that range from checks and balances to separation of power; with some guarantee of
such autonomy of each level of government in its own sphere (Riker 1964; Clarck 2001; Verney
1995; Filipov et al 2004; Bulman-Pozen, 2012). Federalism could take different shapes and forms.
In fact, many forms of federalism have been mentioned and one certainly is ethnic federalism.
Spiro (2007) defines ethnic federalism as ‘an attempt to create a territorial solution to ethnic conflict by acknowledging the need to grant some degree of autonomy to ethnic groups within a state
but attempts to do so without complete secession (Spiro 2007: 329).
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Therefore, first I explain the literature on the pros and cons of the institutional design of
ethnic federalism in the following part of the literature review given it is what the ruling elite
starting from early 1990’s considered as the only institutional design with solutions for the overarching questions in their relationship with the ruled as well as the political elite who took upon
themselves the title of legitimate representatives of their constituencies. Second, I will then explain
how the elites maneuver such an institutional design to lead them to an effective monopoly of
political and economic power in the country at large by ensuring their survival thus far, in the
theory chapter of the dissertation. My explanations of the literature on ethnic federalism therefore
focuses on the earlier points that I mentioned, it most importantly also indicates the rationale behind the regime’s adoption of such a federal model in the first place. My review of the ethnic
federalism literature focuses among others on few topics such as the issue of national unity, solutions to ethnic conflicts, political representation, and economic equality, with a focus on the diverse
explanations of why ethnic federalism is applauded or criticized. In the last section of this review,
I also assess few cases of similar federal designs that we find in other states for the sake of sharing
instances of broader understanding on the topic
Firstly, the regime in Ethiopia considers ethnic federalism as a corner-stone towards establishing a political unity. Those who argue ethnic federalism is good for constructing or reconstructing national unity argue that ethnic federal arrangement indeed serves as a solution to put an end
to “the suppression” of ethnic diversity in multiethnic states while it also leads to the culmination
of major ethnic group dominations over minorities. Hence, for such scholars, in such a line of
thought, ethnic federalism discourages ordered or ‘hierarchical’ relationships among various ethnic groups. Therefore, they argue that as it addresses ethnic oppression by providing solutions in
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the form of self governance, it also paves a way to build strong national unity and national integration (Fisseha, 2010; Agbodike, 1998; Aalen, 2006; and Jinadu 2002). In their assessments of
multiethnic federal states such as Ethiopia and Nigeria, Fisseha and Agbodike in particular, argue
that for most ethnic groups, ethnic federalism also offers a credible way to maintain national unity
in the face of ethnic division. Additionally, a further emphasis is reinforced in that ethnic form of
federal system contributes to ethnic groups’ way of preserving their own identity while creating
political legitimacy as well as strengthening their commitment to national unity (Fisseha, 2010;
Gagnon, 1993). The problems in the Ethiopian case as presented broadly in the chapters in part
two of the dissertation, we find that not only the ethnic groups with their allotment of self governing rights are not able to exercise their administrative rights, but also we find that the administrative
units created in the ethnic federal setting are serving the interests the political elite at the center as
platform for their survivalist agenda.
However, Rotimi Suberu (2001) offers support to to the notion that ethnic federalism does
not support the process of building political unity as he argues that it is almost impossible to give
every minority ethnic group the right to self-administer their own state or region just for the purpose of ending one’s perceived ethnic dominance over another. He contends that an ethnic minority
might still face suppression by a majority ethnic group in the same regional state in cases of states
with multi-ethnic societies. Furthermore, Suberu also stresses that the continuation of ethnic suppression endangers efforts to strengthen national unity and he believes that to form a federal structure that is instrumental in building a unified nation, the creation of geographically organized subnational states as opposed to ethnic based federalism is important. Furthermore, he also argues that
in a nation with ethnic federalism as a form of government, political elites in federal states disrupt
principles of national unity by placing bigger emphasis on ethnic and religious differences in order
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to get the support and trust of ethnic groups they represent and receive the most support for their
rule. Such trends by political elite affects the level of tolerance between ethnic groups as well as
challenges the ‘equilibrium’ between unity and democracy that is necessary for the federal structure’s survival (Stevens, 1977; Ibrahim, 2003). Moreover, Valerie Bunce (2004) also argues that
ethnically arranged models of federalism in fact could enhance nationalist or secessionist movements in the long term that could in turn negatively impact efforts to support the growth and revival
of some level of national unity.
Secondly, the current regime in Ethiopia also considers such a federal model as a way to
decrease economic inequality across ethnic groups given the assumption that the one or few groups
that had political dominance and which had been perceived to control most of the wealth in the
country. In that regard, I also attempt to examine the literature to see what explanations are available with regards to ethnic federalism and questions of economic equality. As multiethnic states
attempt to address issues of economic inequality and wealth distribution among different ethnic
groups, their newly constituted governments consider among others ethnic form of federalism.
Such ethnically organized states consider ethnic federalism as a solution to narrow the already
existing gap in development and economic growth that exist among various ethnic groups and
localities that these groups occupy. Hence, by planning symmetric and fair development strategies
for ethnically formed regional states, they believe reducing economic inequality could be achieved.
Here, it is vital to note that those who plan such economic reforms are mainly not the newly minted
regional states, say in the Ethiopian case, but the federal government at the center that remains the
most powerful political entity. Scholars in this line of thought, however, argue that ethnic federalism is also a way to assist and encourage the different levels of government in multiethnic states
to develop their regions and have their own initiatives for economic development and growth.

31

Besides, according to them, ethnic federalism will also increase central and regional governments’
capacities to carry out their responsibilities more effectively than what a more centralized form of
government structure could achieve (Keller, 2002; Kelly and Witko, 2012).
Moreover, by taking Nigeria as an instance, G.D. Olowononi (1998) ties the growing inequality between different ethnic groups to rising inter-group tensions and among main causes of
ethnic conflict. They believe that ethnic federalism helps ensure equitable wealth distribution and
provides minorities to receive a fair share of revenue allocation from the nation’s breadbasket that
will in turn assist in decreasing inter-ethnic tensions. Fisman and Gatti (2002), who studied a
Large-N study of federal states also argue that federalism encourages decentralization in government outflows and development programs. This economic decentralization, however, according to
them, is significantly associated with lower levels of corruption and higher economic growth and
equality among different groups.
However, bringing the issue of political ideology in developed federal systems into fold,
Kelly and Witko (2012), by mentioning United States’ effort to reduce inequality state that ideological divides make it difficult for central governments (with federal systems) to fight inequality.
Because, in established democracies with federal structure (like United States), political parties
possess ideological divides and present why the central government or state governments should
have stronger political powers. However, according to them regional governments will benefit
from the devolution of power to put efforts in reducing inequality. Here, looking at the arguments
above in favor of federalism as it pertains to decreasing economic inequality is not immune from
criticism. Rotimi Suberu (2001) for instance, suggests that given most regional states do not have
the capacity to undertake development or governance efforts on their own, their dependence on
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the central government will remain substantial to some level. For him, ethnic federalism therefore
will not spark economic growth nor creativity.
Rotimi Suberu (2006) also further explains that ethnic federalism does not necessarily lead
to economic equality due to administrational ineffectiveness, corruption and political patronage at
regional state levels. By taking Nigeria as an example, he argues that higher levels of differences
that exist among different states in terms of capacity building, bureaucratic inefficiency and levels
of corruption of different forms could influence the central government to centralize the country’s
economy even further and taking away the ethnically arranged administrative units’ capacity in
having a say in developing and implementing economic programs. Hence, he stresses that the
probability and reality of relying on a sub-nationally led economic planning that will correct discrepancies which federalism creates is very important. In addition to administrational challenges
at local levels, Daniel Treisman (2000) also notes that ethnic form of federalism could indeed be
more corrupt and it creates a huge challenge in terms of the central government’ efforts to control
rent seeking problems that are tied to political patronage. Merera Gudina (2003), who looked at
elites’ quest in forming the ethnic federal arrangement also argues that the notion that such federal
design helps efforts of the state in wealth distribution is flawed. According to him, the way the
Ethiopian regional states are designed based on ethnic and linguistic lines shows that part of a
population in a given ethnic state could somehow be detached from other populations from different ethnic groups that it has historic and economic ties that featured in the long eras of inter-ethnic
relations.
In further adding to the criticism of the ethnic federal arrangement in terms of its attributes
towards helping economic inequality, by relying on his case study of Ethiopia and also concurring
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to Gudina’s argument, Alemante Sellassie (2003) also argues that in order to evaluate ethnic federalism’s effectiveness in lowering economic inequality, we need to look at how it affects economic development first. He argues that ethnic federalism has the potential to restrict citizens’
mobility (which according to him restricts the labor market), flow of goods, services and capital
across subnational localities that are devised according to ethnic and linguistic lines. He contends
that as a result of such restrictions, this form of federalism in fact undermines the economic notion
of common market. Furthermore, Selassie also stresses that in ethnic federal structure, vast differences in human and natural resources separate ethnic groups that now could self-administer their
regional states on their own. Hence, while some ethnic groups may be well endowed with petroleum or diamonds, or reside in economically important cities or ports, other ethnic groups could
well lack these economic resources or elements. Therefore, he concludes that ethnic federalism
has a potential to widening inequality among groups and not narrowing it. In fact, the breadth of
cases that this project presents in its second part, we see that the central government in Ethiopia
interferes handily in the the so called ‘developing’ regional states by stating the fact that such
administrative units lack the administrative capability they they need to essentially administrate
themselves in an effective manner. Of course, the interference of the political elites at the center
in regional states’ political affairs is constant across all regions. However, although assisting the
so called developing states in terms of helping them build capacities could very well be understood,
the fact that such ‘supportive effort’ can be witnessed even after two decades raises so many questions.
In continuation of the literature review on ethnic federalism across other aspects, the third
objective that the EPRDF coalition had in mind in constituting the Ethiopian state along Ethnic
and linguistic lines was the thinking that ethnic federalism could serve as a solution in diminishing
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ethnic conflicts. Although mentioned as a third rational by the political elite in adopting the ethnic
federal model to constitute the Ethiopian state, the issue of addressing a violent past and ending
such potentially recurrent conflicts within the diverse groups of ethnicities evidently was not
achieved. That could of course, be seen in the various conflicts that were witnessed within the
Southern regional state (formally known as Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional
State) and the recurring conflicts between the Somali and Oromia Regional States, which at times
are considered incited by those political elites at the center for certain political gains that the dissertation explains in more detail in the second part. On the notion of diminishing ethnic conflicts
via ethnic model of federalism however, I hereby provide the explanations for and against the
argument within the literature on the topic.
Of course, another question in studying ethnic federalism is whether it helps reduce ethnic
tension or violence and the probability of conflicts in multiethnic states. When it comes to this
aspect of ethnic federalism, Rotimi Suberu (2006) despite his criticism of the model in other areas,
here, he credits ethnic federalism in helping reduce ethnic violence despite some flaws in a multiethnic state like Nigeria that he extensively studied, which is a country that has hundreds of ethnolinguistic groups. He argues that, “Ethnic federalism has emerged as the primary organizing principle for conceptualizing and promoting collective interest in Nigeria” (pp. 277). Furthermore,
when administrative power is in the hand of minority ethnic groups with the central government
promoting the collective interest, he states that there is less risk of enmity towards each other.
In most ethnically diverse states, the goal in preferring ethnic federalism to other forms of
government is to balance and accommodate diverse interests of all ethnic groups thereby diminishing the emergence of ethnic conflicts that arise from political oppression of a certain group by
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another (Agbodike, 2006). Among other factors that are associated with ethnic federalism’s role
in conflict reduction is the decentralization of authority to regional states. Moreover, some also
explain that the political empowerment that comes with decentralization policies could serve as a
basis for power sharing between different ethnic groups, which helps to lower political tension and
hostility and substantially reduce ethnic violence. Such scholars in this line of thought, stress that
under ethnic federalism, previously suppressed ethnic minorities will also obtain rights of selfadministration with all the rights and duties that come with it, which guarantees their group rights.
In addition, they contend that this form of federal structure raises the level of awareness about the
need to inter-group tolerance that is very instrumental in restraining those groups from being attracted towards ethnic conflicts (Lijphart, 1977; Rotimi Suberu, 2006; Dawn Brancati, 2005).
Contrary to the facts mentioned above, however, other scholars suggest ethnic federalism
does not help reduce ethnic conflicts. They argue that the political and economic power reinforcement that comes with ethnic federalism influences ethnic federal states to legislate laws and take
actions that discriminate against other ethnic groups. While this is partly because of the nature of
ethnic federalism in giving power for ethnic political elites that prioritize self-interests as well as
advance particular interests of their group, it is also due to the emergence of competition among
ethnic groups to control the power of the central government and its decision making process
(Sambanis et al, 2013; Ciepley, 2013; Jinadu, 1985; Ramesh Dikshit, 1975). In addition, others
also argue that such economic and political empowerment of ethnic groups will also induce secessionist agendas by some ethnic groups leading to instability and ethnic strife between those ethnic
groups who seek national unity vis-à-vis secessionists. In affirming the notion that federalism
encourages secessionist conflicts, they also mention the case of Indonesia that has linguistically,
ethnically and religiously fragmented societies but its citizens have anti-federalism views due to
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their memory of secessionist ethnic conflicts at the end of the Dutch colonial rule and their first
test of federalism (Erk and Anderson, 2009).
Finally, the regime in Ethiopia also uses the rational that ethnic federalism ultimately will
help the growth of democratic governance. When we look at the literature from that perspective,
Diane Orentlicher (1998) reflects on two basic views of democracy that will help legitimize ethnic
federalism. The first view is that this form of government most likely secures the interests of majority of people that are under the federal government’s administration. In that respect, Orentlicher
further states that ethnic federalism offers the best institutional framework to collectively answer
questions that are reflected in the interests of the members of an ethnic group (more focus on group
right) and for promoting democratic governance. I believe that the author’s argument could be
understood better when we think of a multi-ethnic state and the presence of diverse political interests, that will be better served through federal arrangements that provide self-administration rights.
The second view of democracy according to Orentlicher, is that the idea of republicanism that
offers support to ethnic federalism. According to this view, ethnic federalism creates an enabling
environment whereby citizens can consider the commonalities within their inter-group relations
and in their public deliberations. According to the author, republicanism calls for the protection of
people’s unalienable rights from being voted out or dominated by majority groups.
In that regard, ethnic federalism provides a fitting framework for promoting the necessary
debates, and achieving consensus about the common good at the subunit level. The fact that a
certain ethnic group in its regional state, and the citizens in such a defined territory share similar
history, values and traditions implies that, based on such a federal arrangement, the government
could more easily extend such same rights across various groups. The other claim that attempts to
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legitimize ethnic federalism is the belief that an individual citizen is more likely to participate in
the affairs of his or her community or ethnic group than in the affairs of the national community
and that increases political participation more effectively (Alemante Sellassie, 2003). I believe that
Alemante Sellassie’s argument, in particular, could be attributed to the highly entertained notion
in the Ethiopian political discourse that most ethnic groups’ political participation in the past was
very much limited mainly because of the imposition of the central government’s powers on the
diverse people. However, through such a federal arrangement, both individuals and groups could
have a political say in governance matters.
In a different view that also considers ethnic federalism as appealing for democratic ideals,
some also argue that to determine whether any form of federalism will be suitable for democracy,
we need to look at the concept of federalism in general and its historic effect in politics in particular. From its inception in the modern times, federalism has answered the question of representation in the U.S. after the American Revolution. Federalism’s effect in politics in terms of its limitation of the scope of governmental action, the fact that it increases the number of veto players, its
creation of multiple avenues for political organization and mobilization, and how it distributes
power between regions and political actors are also what among others make this form of government conducive to democracy (Edward Gibson, 2004; Samuel Beer, 1978).
Nevertheless, some others still contend that federalism is not necessarily democratic. For
instance, Allan Blakeney (2011) argues that states form themselves into federal systems because
they do not wish those groups with majority in certain states from prevailing in the ethnically
arranged administrative units’ political governance and decision-making process across many issues. Hence, Blakeney argues that ethnic federalism harms the voice of the majority in political
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decision-making process because of federal administrative frameworks give equal emphasis to all
represented groups. As a result, in a messy politics, the majority interest could be very much limited, which is against the very notion of the concept of democracy. In another argument which
dampens the role of ethnic federalism with regards to democratic consolidation, Alvin Rabushka
and Kenneth Shepsle (1972) also argue that federalism devised according to ethnic arrangement is
not effective for efforts towards building democratic institutions. According to them, in multiethnic societies whereby ethnicity is an ever-present question, democracy becomes less feasible or
practical. According to them, this eventually and inevitably impacts democratic consolidation significantly mainly because government’s efforts to build inter-ethnic alliances to meet various political, economic and social objectives will face difficult challenges.
However, along the lines of whether ethnic federalism is conducive to democracy promotion or not, there are also others who looked at how its adoption could help alleviate many ethnic
groups’ grievances of lacking political representation that they aspire to enjoy in the process of
democratization. Regina Goodnow and Robert Moser (2012) assess federalism’s effect in representation of different groups in Russian politics and argue that the electoral system is more critical
for the level of minority representation than the type of federal form of government that is in place.
They further assess whether ethnic federalism could also increase the votes that a minority candidate receives or even encourages minority turnout, and find out that majority-minority districts are
more important than forms of federal structures in place. Therefore, they contend that ethnic federalism does not necessarily translate into ethnic minorities gaining equal representation unless the
electoral design is created in a way that empowers the minorities in the first place.
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Sonia Alonso and Ruben Ruiz- Rufino, (2007) and Fisseha Assefa (2010) also concur with
the above argument in that the most direct way to make parliaments more accessible to ethnic
minorities is to establish proportional electoral systems that will maximize their chance of representation while also paving the way for coalition building. The pluralist first past the post electoral
mechanism in federal Ethiopia, in that regard, fails to provide such groups the voices they deserved
in the most part.
In fact, the arguments above are not without contention, as some argue that ethnic federalism and or proportional representation often exacerbate the problem of political representation.
According to them, the fact that ethnic federalism is in place would lead to highly ethnic-centered
electoral campaigns that further could lead divisive politics to emerge as a difficult challenge.
Hence, they suggest that political representation that reflects demographic composition in electoral
districts and constituencies in regional states is preferable than proportional representation (David
Ciepley 2013; Donald Horowitz, 2002). There are also arguments that legitimize ethnic federalism
for purposes of political representation as foundation for democratic governance. Some argue that
strong regional autonomy with empowered minorities not only is the ideal strategy to avoid ethnic
conflicts but also it is very instrumental to achieve a measure of democracy by increasing group
representation. Besides, ethnic federalism as a form of government in a multi ethnic state and
proportional representation as its electoral system offers a platform to equitable representation in
state and federal governments (Van der Beken, 2009; Huber, 2012). Of course, reconciling such
differences could be possible although the major problem remains whether there is a political will
that addresses such issues via genuine political reforms could be available. In the case of Ethiopia,
as we could see later in depth, seem less promising.

40

In general, the sample of literature I presented thus far shows that there is a remarkable
debate ensuing over the significance of the forms of federalism that are mainly constructed along
ethnic and linguistic lines. And here, as I further attempt to study how Ethiopia’s model of ethnic
federalism has played out since its inception in the early 1990’s, I argue that despite the fact that
ethnic federalism could indeed help in answering demands of self government by addressing the
question of group rights in certain ways, it might also be costly when it comes to the issue of
democracy given it could lead to the reinforcement of clientelistic politics on one hand and paves
the way for the every elite who designed the institutional setting to survive and thrive within the
political system on the other hand.
However, the most important take away remains that such a federal setting could lead to
bolstering chances for authoritarian political survival, a perspective that is not picked up by many
in comparative politics research on the topic thus far. Now that I have presented some of the debates on the merits of ethnic federalism given its pros and cons with regards to ranges of issues, it
becomes essential to understand what role it also plays when it comes to state stability, and whether
the Ethiopian political regime’s political survival primarily depended on this federal arrangement.
And if so, how? Such a question will be further explored in the theory section where I explore the
rational which the political elite exploited for coming up with the designing and implementation
of this form of government. In that regard, what the government documents help describe and how
the realization of the ethnic federal arrangement might have impacted political survival of the political elite in practical terms, provides us with the theoretical foundations that explain how such
an arrangement ensured the survival of the political elite, as we could later see more broadly.
Before discussing the rationale behind the institutional design in the case of Ethiopia more broadly,
however, it becomes imperative that we also look at instances of established federal states and how
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such states entertained the issues of rights (political or economic and group or individual centered)
in the institutional setting they created. Although the project focuses solely on the case of Ethiopia,
mentioning cases across the spectrum could indeed broaden our understanding of the topic and
how it plays out in practice. Such discussions with regards to the choice made by the political elites
in constituting the Ethiopian state via federal arrangement will be discussed in the theory chapter.
Efforts to understanding the workings of most established federal states show that besides
fulfilling the desired objectives of the very reasons in newly constituting a given state with a federal setting, the political elite have usually effectively managed to impose their political agenda
along those very arrangements they shape. Such imposition of their political will could be attributed in a constructive or a less constructive way. What stands out however, is that the literature
in that regard needs to also evaluate how such political goals of the elite transpired in the decentralization schemes they devised regardless of whether the federal arrangement involves ethnicity
and linguistic characteristics or not. Jan Erk’s (2008) assessment of the Austrian case, for instance,
shows that despite the fact that federal structure was devised to accommodate the societal fragmentation within the state, “Pan-Austrian” nationalist agenda of the elite emerged as a uniting
force within the political spectrum leading to further reinforcement of Austrian nationalism to the
satisfaction of the political elite that desired the nationalist agenda as a way to affirm their legitimacy. Doing so, however, had transformed the Austrian state from what the federal design initially
thought to accomplish, which was a high level of devolution of political powers into the federal
states. Today, such a phenomenon effectively makes the Austrian state more of a unitary centralist
state than a federal one6. And such an example from Austria shows that federalism could also help
6

Jan Erk’s assessment of the case of Austria shows that the political elite at the center effectively used the
media and the education system to push the nationalist agenda. This appear in clear contradiction when
compared with the Ethiopian case, where we find the nationalist programs were censored and considered
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in efforts to build political unity as it was possible due to the political will from Austrian elites. In
this case, we see that although the case mentioned shows the change in how federalism played out
in Austria, the genuine interest of the political elite in keeping the question of Austrian nationalism
together with their democratic agenda as a commendable effort in that case. Reiterating the argument, although institutions matter in equal measure just as the strategic interest of the elite, the
latter’s influence is much stronger. Even looking at federal cases such as Nigeria, India and to
some extent, South Africa, whatever levels of political unity and relative political stability that are
exhibited in those countries are made possible mainly through the will of political elite that strive
to amend historical problems through a new beginning and genuine political reforms.
As in the case of Austria, it is also very important to look at cases such as India and how
the federal relations in the country works vis-à-vis other federal cases from a comparative perspective. Of course, doing so here would challenging given the scope of the project. However, by taking
into account the relative success of federal relations between the national government and the
states in India, asking for detailed explanations becomes very much important. In that regard, we
find that in the case of India, the political elite at the national government understood if they are
about transforming the national economy and improve the lives of ordinary Indians, it is important
that the state governments enjoy a level of independence in managing the needed economic reforms so that all member states of the federation would be able to identify their economic advantages to compete in the age of globalization. Such trusting of the national government even
was too relaxed since it even allowed that states some level of foreign relations powers in terms of

as anti-group rights agenda of the EPRDF. For more, look at Erk, Jan. Explaining federalism: state, society
and congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany and Switzerland. Routledge, 2007.
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advancing the states’ economic interests (Nirvikar and Srinivasan 2002). Whether in the case of
Austria or India, one factor, however, becomes apparent, i.e. the genuine interest of the political
elite at the national government level.
In sum, we see that ethnic federalism is in fact a very contentious form of federal arrangement among the many types of federal systems that are debated in federalism studies. Nonetheless,
I also argue that what matters most in whether a certain institutional design works better in addressing an issue or another mostly depends on the intentions of the political elite that are behind
the design of it in the first place and most importantly whether such elites that manipulate such
institutions have genuine interests in the success of the very solutions they come up with in addressing the very crucial ideals that I presented in the pervasive debates presented in this section.
In the next chapter, I present the debate that was highly entertained in the Ethiopian political discourse in the last couple of decades and that serve as a foundation for the introduction of such form
of federal structure in the Ethiopian state, i.e., the discussion on individual rights versus group
rights. Because, the political elite in post 1991 Ethiopia, adopted the notion of promoting group
rights in the design of the federal arrangement and the various policies that targeted economic as
well as political equality among the diverse groups in the country were also designed as such.

3

CHAPTER THREE: THEORY-INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE IN AUTHORITARIAN ETHIOPIA: THE
QUESTION OF RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA
To recall the research questions in broad ways, as I presented in the first two chapters, the

goal of the dissertation focuses on understanding whether ethnic federalism as an institutional solution for lingering questions of political and economic inequality, history of conflicts and ethno-
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national questions, served the purposes it was designed to deliver, or it just served the strategic
interest of rational political elites who are more focused on their survival ambitions. At the center
of efforts in constituting the Ethiopian state through ethnic federal arrangement, we find the issue
of individual and group rights that the new ruling coalition in post-1991 Ethiopia attempted to
address as it strives to correct the problems evident in the past political regimes. However, I argue
that what looms large in our understanding of how such institutional solutions evolved show that
the political elites had their survivalist agenda ahead of the political promises they presented.
Hence, for the elites to succeed with their political goals, such institutional solutions must be maneuvered. In that regard, this theory chapter explains the why the post-1991 political regime
seemed to have prioritized the issue of group rights over individual rights and how that enabled
them to better manipulate the very federal arrangement they established.
When looking at the most vibrant history of the evolution of the American states as an
instance, the constant debates on the issue of rights that started at the outset of the evolution of the
American state temporarily culminated with the writing of the first ten amendments to the U.S.
constitution that guaranteed civil liberties to all (at least to what were referred as citizens in that
period). Some of the debates on the rights of groups on the basis of ethnicity, racial identification,
socio-economic status, sexual orientation and much more however, remain ever-present. These
debates we see in the history of the United States or similar cases in the evolution of rights in other
western nations also played the most important role in laying out the foundations for democratic
discourse in those countries and beyond7. Ethiopia is not any different. As a country with five
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In a presidential address, Reynolds Bradford noted that while both individual and group

rights can be complimentary, in the evolution of rights in the U.S. however, they could be used to
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major national groups and over seventy-five smaller ethnic groups, even after the secession of
Eritrea with more than ten other ethnic groups, the question of rights remains one that is still at the
center of a heated political debate. As mentioned briefly in the introductory part of this project,
with the fall of the Dergue regime in Ethiopia in 1991 and the coming to power of the Ethiopian
Peoples Revolutionary Democratic front (EPRDF), and the establishment of the Transitional Government that included many former rebel groups with the most notable being the Oromo Liberation
Front (hereafter, OLF) and Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), one major aspect that most
rebel groups agreed upon as they declared their democratic intentions was the expansion of rights
to those many groups, which had questions that ranged from the quest for self administration to
the recognition of their grievances that emanated from underrepresentation, lack of economic opportunity and from history of domination from those ethnic groups that such groups perceived
controlled the political discourse in the previous regimes. As a result, many of the institutional
mechanisms from the introduction of ethnic federalism to the series of economic policies and arrangements emerged as a way to address the grievances and advance equality on the basis of group
rights.
The question however, becomes whether the emphasis given to group rights was able to
advance democratic rights of all groups in the country. If not, the other subsequent and most important question becomes investigating whether we could assume that the promotion of group
rights is just a ploy to advance a certain political regime’s interest in the name of advocacy for
also infringe upon each other’s rights. For more, look at: Reynolds, William Bradford. "Individualism vs. group rights: The legacy of Brown." The Yale Law Journal 93, no. 6 (1984): 995-1005.
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every group’s right to self administration, representation in the central government and economic
opportunities. In doing so, the regime secures the kind of political legitimacy it seeks to exert the
political dominance it craves and protect its interests, that are nothing but survivalist agendas. It is
my belief that assessing the phenomenon more carefully through this research undertaking could
help in developing this theory further and puts some light on our understanding of the question at
hand.
As I have already stated, the post-1991 political regime in Ethiopia, with its plans of advancing the group rights agenda to address questions of political and economic grievances primarily looked at the idea of constituting the Ethiopian state by introducing a new federal structure as
a basis for power sharing and by extending the rights of groups to administer themselves, as a
result of such institutional solutions. But first let me explain and reiterate how the idea of federalism accommodates the interest of diverse polities based on the literature on the topic and then
continue to explain how the current regime in Ethiopia attempted to address the issue of rights
within the federal structure it designed and implemented.
Popular classic comparative politics scholars such as William Riker (1975), as well as recent works by Alfred Stepan (2005) had all pointed to the service of constituting polities under
federalism as a better solution for the emergence of stable democratic governance. However, after
analyzing the Rikerian models of federalism, Stepan in particular, contends that in understanding
federal governments and the distribution of political power from the center to the sub-units, it is
important to carefully understand how this institutional design affects the issue of individual rights
vis-à-vis group rights. According to him, the fact that the United States federalism blossomed and
became the strongest most enduring federal arrangement, despite some criticisms is attributed to
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the emphasis given to the protection of individual rights. He asserts that the fact that representation
in the upper house is “too constraining” of the populace’ voice is what had helped the protection
of those same individual rights from the bill of rights8. According to Stepan, “Whatever rights the
national sub-units may possess, they cannot constitutionally or politically violate the rights of individual citizens. The enforcement of individual rights ‘in fact’ can be an obligation of both the
center and the subunits, but the center cannot completely delegate responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of democratic rights and continue to be a democracy” (Page 9). Here, it is
important to note that certain institutional mechanisms that a certain polity adopts could play either
a supporting or infringing role to the protection of either rights. The answer to the question of how
that happens primarily is embedded in the implementation of such institutional solutions and the
evaluation of the results in scientific research.
When it comes to looking at the case of Ethiopia under its new constitution that was formally adopted in 1994, the government bestows extensive minority rights in the name of the expansion of group rights. Article 39, Clause 1 of the constitution states that “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to
secession”.9 According to Kjetil Tronvoll (2008), such a statement (especially the addition of “including the right to secession” in the mentioned article) in the constitution was designed to serve
as a check on possible violations of such rights by the central government. This notion of granting
ethnic groups that have now ‘achieved’ some level of independence in self governance and the
8

For more look at pages 6-9 of: Stepan, Alfred. "Federalism and democracy: Beyond the

US model." In Theories of Federalism: A reader, pp. 255-268. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005.
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Look at page 13 of the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
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fact that if they perceive the self administrative rights they have now received are not satisfying
and thus they should secede, however is extremely controversial.
Moreover, the fact that there is also a clause in the constitution that has the ability to check
the federal government’s powers does not mean that an authoritarian central state could not attempt
to violate either the autonomy of states or individual rights whatsoever. Tronvoll further argues
that, “regardless of constitutional protection of collective group rights, the Ethiopian government
is still being criticized for massive and widespread human rights abuses”10. This begs a further
question in that it is important to note that the Ethiopian government seems to adopt such rights
issues as its own core values so it could enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of domestic interests as well
as the international community at some level and ensure its control of the state for a prolonged
time could very well be the case.
There is credible evidence that point to this theory of elite’s maneuver of institutions that
they design to achieve their goals of prolonging their political power. Lovise Aalen and Kjetil
Tronvoll’s (2009) article, for instance points to the fact that the ruling coalition, EPRDF has
amassed unprecedented level of methods to skew public opinion in its favor and clear the road for
electoral fraud as it seeks to make sure its political dominance remains stable. The authors mention
that the ruling EPRDF coalition has effectively used aid money and international aid packages and
its distribution mechanisms via government institutions to achieve these political aims. The puzzling explanation for the survival of a minority supported political regime in the country therefore
could highly be linked to the ruling coalition’s maneuvering of the institutional mechanisms that
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Look at page 50 of Tronvoll, Kjetil. "Human rights violations in federal Ethiopia: when ethnic identity is
a political stigma." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15, no. 1 (2008): 49-79.
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it had created for its benefits although such solutions it had introduced targeted the notion of promotion of group rights. Aalen and Tronvol, in explaining the clampdown on protests and election
fraud in post 2005 elections, for instance mention that:
“During field visits to Southern region, people in both rural and urban areas consistently confirmed that the sub-kebele (Ethiopian lower level local government) structures
had been established during the year of the 2005 elections. In interviews with party officials
at regional and local level in Southern region in May 2005, it was apparent that they had
been established by an initiative from the upper party structures. The official aim was ‘to
make service delivery at local level more efficient and to mobilize people for development
work’. In areas where the population relies on relief, these local governments were responsible for distributing aid through the UNDP and World Bank-funded ‘safety net’ programs,
which in some areas included the distribution of funds to purchase fertilizer, seeds or oxen,
while in other areas it was payment in cash for community work or food for work. Although
the ruling party presented these structures as purely public administrative organs, it is apparent that the sub-kebele was used for election purposes in an attempt to secure its victory”11
I argue that while the Transitional Government (1991-1995) that was set up after the fall
of the Dergue regime and the stakeholders of this transition had made their democratic intentions
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clear from the start.12 The proceeding events that started with the introduction of ethnic federalism
and series of economic policies that followed all indicate that such efforts, which they used to
‘answer’ popular group grievances from previous political eras served the interest of the ruling
elite and were crafted as tactics of the newly emerging Tigrayan political elite to stay in power and
safeguard their effective control of the state for many decades to come.
So far, I have attempted to show that in the name of the ruling party’s plans to use institutional mechanisms to protect group rights, important role players in the ruling political coalition
enjoyed more political power that reach beyond the confines of what are enumerated in the constitution of the state. Moreover, the economic development plans and series of economic policies
that were designed to empower different groups in the country that were also supposed to help
create and promote economic equality also failed mostly because such institutional structures that
should have served as foundations to distribution of wealth and economic opportunities have also
served the interest of those same political elites and their supporters. Here, the invoking of the role
of the political elite’s rational interests is very important in that the fact that the institutional mechanisms failed to deliver reinforcements for democratic progress is attributed to the elite’s reluctance towards keeping the promises they made to focus on democratic governance and or economic
development that brings about equal economic opportunity across the board. However, as we could
see later, such intentions did not accomplish any of such plans. Despite the democratization literature, for instance, boasts an impressive list of scholars that discuss the role of the political elite in
the making of democracy or regression back to authoritarianism, I argue that we still need to ex-
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plore certain cases more deeply so our understanding of the mechanics of how the elite use institutions for their survivalist agenda could come clearer further. The case of Ethiopia, in that regard,
could help show how elites could use institutional frameworks as mechanisms of authoritarian
survival provides the opportunity to our understanding of the topic at hand in more detailed fashion.
Here, it is vital to note that those political elites in the Ethiopian state who played such
roles from the designing of these new institutions to overseeing the implementation of those policies in the large part emerged from former rebel groups that formed the EPRDF coalition, a coalition that was highly dominated by the TPLF as the transition unfolded. The longtime chairman of
the TPLF and the ruling coalition EPRDF, former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who first served
as the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991-1995, and continued to
serve as Prime Minister from 1995 until his sudden death in 2012, was considered the architect of
the new Ethiopia for better or worse. His comrades in the armed struggle (within TPLF) with
gradual additions of loyalist leaders of EPRDF affiliate political parties such as Amhara National
Democratic Movement (hereafter ANDM), Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (hereafter
OPDO), and Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (hereafter, SEPDM) remain holding government positions for extended period of time, some for more than two decades and counting. Such political elites representing diverse interests, however, as we could later see in part of
the dissertation, are highly co-opted and lack the political power to assert such interests. Even the
‘retirement’ of some of the elites who had held important cabinet positions to lead a way for what
the Ethiopian regime claims to pave the road for the emergence of new generation of leadership is
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a joke given those retired elites still are serving as ambassadors in very important diplomatic missions and ‘advisory’ and mentorship roles to the new individuals in the political landscape of the
state13.
After all, such political parties and the historical background to the emergence of these
political parties itself warrants further research. Regardless of that however, besides the rolling out
of ethnic federalism as an institutional mechanism that guides center-regional state relations, the
economic plans and ideological dogmas that the EPRDF coalition led government adopted also
plainly rejected the neoliberal school of thought for economic development and growth by opting
to use economic paradigms that advocate or call for heavy state involvement in the economy,
which effectively created a further opening to the political elite to use their heavy handed approach
in the development agenda. The first series of economic development and growth strategies in the
country were shaped after the new political and economic development paradigm that they referred
to as “Revolutionary Democracy”. This view, as could be seen from the governing documents of
the EPRDF coalition, prioritizes group rights over individual rights. The fact that the coalition
carries such a goal when it comes to making sure the political representation as well as the autonomy of groups within their administrative regions might not sound threatening on its own. However, beyond putting groups over individuals, it becomes clear that proponents of such a view
within the regime are against individual liberty altogether as could be seed more broadly in part
two of the dissertation.
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Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, a former rebel within the TPLF and a long serving foreign minster has now retired
to become an Ethiopian ambassador in China. Mr. Girma Biru, who had served for almost two decades in
various important cabinet positions has now retired to become the country’s ambassador to the United
States, Canada and Jamaica all at the same time. Many more examples can be mentioned.
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For example, in a document published by Amhara National Democratic Movement,
ANDM (which is a member of the EPRDF coalition), the party’s development manifesto clearly
claims the communist agenda of anti-wealth accumulation as its own and argues individuals’ efforts of economic growth mostly comes at the expense of groups and mostly minorities that the
ruling coalition refers as the unfortunate classes.14 For the ruling coalition in Ethiopia, to make
sure group rights are protected even if it comes with costs of negatively impacting individual rights,
the issue of property rights (with land rights being the most important one) becomes the focal
point. Under such a plan that the government adopts, the issue of land rights and the fate of the
peasants who rely on their wealth of only property of land would fall on the hand of the highly
dominant party owned state, which is highly interventionist. Many have written about the failures
of the “Revolutionary Democracy” paradigm and its damaging legacies on democratic as well as
economic development of the country while arguing it could pave the way for the survival of the
authoritarian elite. This project therefore attempts to assess thoroughly and provide the causal explanation that could explain the puzzles of whether such institutional solutions (such as the ethnic
federal arrangement) that were designed to address issues of rights and historic political and economic grievances played a role in the survival of the minority political elite, who devised such
institutions in the first place.
When looking at the regime’s track record on how it manipulates the institutional frameworks and economic policies it designs to its goals of survival, amongst the major instances we

14

The Revolutionary democracy document and the statement mentioned above can be ac-

cessed at: http://www.aigaforum.com/documents/Abyotawi-Democracy-Hidar-Magazine.pdf.
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have, what happened after the major split within the TPLF leadership in 2001 can be a prime
example. In the aftermath of the famous intra-party conflict that had shaken the government following the brutal war against Eritrea, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi produced new writings
on the “Revolutionary Democracy” economic and political paradigm to the EPRDF coalition council members. The coalition’s council members easily signed off on such new plans by the then
prime minister, who had also served as the main political and economic ideologue of the party, the
coalition immediately put the plan into practice and decided that properties (mainly land) would
be used to support supporters and punish those who were perceived as opposition supporters and
would be opposition (especially, those who were suspected to be former regime backers or antagonists to their rule). The regime also used land and property policies to punish former civil servants
instead of the mere protection of group rights that they had claimed first, which affirms that the
institutional mechanisms that were put in place were designed to eventually serve the interest of
the elite who effectively manipulate and use the system to create winners and losers and prolong
their political rule through their control of the state and its institutions on many fronts.
In the year 2008, the regime replaced the Revolutionary Democracy with another interventionist state economic development and growth paradigm known as the developmental state economic model15. According to Befekadu Woldegabriel (2013), the idea of adopting the developmental state economic development and growth approach in Ethiopia was again initiated by none
other than the late Prime Minister of the country, Mr. Meles Zenawi, who ruled the nation from
1991 - 2012. In an unpublished paper that Zenawi presented at conferences, he discussed the failure
of neoliberal economic paradigm to transforming not only Ethiopia’s but Africa’s economy and
15

Part of the essay on the emergence of the developmental state approach in Ethiopia and its initial implementation I indicated next was taken from another unpublished small article I wrote in 2014.
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how the liberals in the west failed to support continuing economic growth in a way that benefits
Africans. Wolde Gabriel states that Zenawi argued, “the fundamental nature of the neo-liberal
paradigm has thus led Africa into another economic dead end and into a fragile unstable democracy
that is not only incapable of evolving into a stable and mature democracy but actually hinders the
development of an alternative path of democracy that leads overtime to such a mature and stable
democracy.”16
The political coalition in Ethiopia, then led by Prime Minister Zenawi, also enacted such
reforms not only on the basis of economic development strategies for the country alone, but to
primarily make sure that they continue the promotion of group rights in terms of expanding opportunities that they previously attempted through the implementation of the strategies derived
from their Revolutionary Democratic economic and political programs. The question at heart remains however, what role such political solutions of ensuring various groups’ questions of representation as well as economic opportunities did play in strengthening the political reign of the
governing coalition in power17. If so, understanding how the regime manipulates the ethnic federal
arrangement in making sure it strengthens its political rule and maintains its dominance is very
much important. It is my belief that in the economic programs attempted in the last two decades,
we see that the institutions designed to facilitate such programs of economic development and
empowerment of historically underprivileged ethnic groups, are merely serving as platforms that
the elite maneuver to achieve their political goals. The fact that ethnic model of federalism still
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affiliated.
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permitted the most important powers to remain within the federal government also shows that the
ruling coalition and its disciplined and well crafted party organization is able to embark on the
implementation such programs with a goal of achieving nothing but political survival.
In general, in any of these economic reform programs (such as the revolutionary democracy
economic political paradigm or the developmental state approach), the state has magnified its superiority in charting considerable levels of economic progress, which are recognizable across some
levels. Moreover, the fact that the state has a goal of promotion of group rights is not also a problem
in its own. However, as I attempted to show thus far, the way the government addresses the question of political as well as economic equality mostly reflect the interest of the political party and
its affiliates in political power, which might have contributed to the regime’s effective control of
the state and political survival amid the many challenges the dominant coalition party faces. Here,
we see that the elites, with their rational strategies of manipulating the institutions they devised,
are able to hold on to political power by effectively controlling the state and ensuring stability in
most of their political reign. The theoretical explanation I presented thus far shows that while the
debate that centered on individual rights versus group rights was a healthy part of the discussions
in the political discourse of the state, the fact that ‘winning idea’ of the promotion of group rights
is exploited to create winners and losers, to reward regime loyalists and supporters and punish
those perceived opposition and critic, as evident in the explanations from part two of the dissertation, show that the elites’ maneuver of the very institutional solutions they provided for their survivalist agenda is very clear.
Before moving on to my explanations of ethnically arranged federal Ethiopia and the mechanisms of authoritarian survival in the country however, the next two chapters, I hereby present
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help us understand the historical evolution of the modern Ethiopian state, the missed opportunities
by varying political regimes and the political elite at the helm of political power within those regimes. And most importantly, the cycle of political culture that also serves as the most crucial
aspect of elite centered politics in Ethiopia is discussed more broadly. Careful understanding of
the following chapters indeed presents the persistence of the political and economic questions, the
varying priorities of the different regimes that are discussed, the solutions provided by such regimes for the lingering political and economic grievances and at the heart of all the survivalist
agendas of the political leaders that defined their respective eras. The following two chapters hence
will also discuss the patrimonial and neo-patrimonial past of the state and how such important
aspects of political culture that are also prevalent in much of Sub-Saharan Africa still remain large
in the state of politics in the country to this day. The historical comparative analyses presented in
discussions within the chapters finally culminates with the emergence of the EPRDF coalition and
its entrance to what Ethiopians refer as the Menelik Palace, named after one of the strongest and
influential leaders of the Ethiopian state in the modern era and the introduction of ethnic federalism
as the new face of the old nationalistic and or Pan-Ethiopian political discourse in post-1991 Ethiopia.

4

CHAPTER FOUR: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE ETHIOPIAN MODERN STATE: POLITICAL CULTURE AND A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES’ METHODS OF SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY
ETHIOPIA (1930-1991)
To carefully understand causes of lack of democratization or why certain authoritarian re-

gimes survived longer than they should under challenging circumstances in Ethiopia is critical to
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what this project attempts to achieve at the end. However, it is important to note that attempting to
elucidate the problems within the state of Ethiopian contemporary political history is such a demanding scientific endeavor that such a meagre experiment to fill a bigger void would not be
adequate. Nevertheless, it does not mean that possible avenues that assist our further understanding of the problems are non-existent. With that in mind, I argue that we need a careful understanding of the modern history of the country at large. Of course, attempting to delve deep into historical
explanations alone is not ideal given the constraints of time and resources and given the grand
interest in this chapter is to look at the historical explanations, by which the Ethiopian state’s failures and the vicious legacies could be further explored.
The most appropriate way, therefore is to study each important political era in the modern
history of Ethiopia so that our understanding of the development and evolutions of issues that we
crave to learn about are explained in orderly fashion while also making sure the possible theoretical
foundations and explanations that we rely to draw causal arguments are well built and play an
imperative contributing role in future research undertakings. Throughout the presentation of such
historical narratives, however, the political culture embedded in the Ethiopian state looms large
and cannot be ignored. In this chapter, therefore, first I look at the political culture in the Ethiopian
context and how that also serves as an approach that help us understand the democratic failings
and most importantly how the political elite in their respective eras are able to survive the challenges that come from voices of reform and critics alike.
4.1

The Political Culture in the Ethiopian Context: The Literature
In the movie entitled ‘Imperfect Journey’ and produced by Haile Gerima (1994), the story

begins by showing a speech given by one of the most decorated foreign officers and former foreign
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ministers of Ethiopia, Ketema Yifru, to an audience of African foreign ministers in the old Organization for African Unity (OAU). Yifru says, “We started having coup d’état here and coup d’état
there. A lieutenant taking over power here. And then you say to yourself, ‘what’s going on?’ A
lieutenant, or a major or a colonel for that matter replacing a certain leader, a colonel replacing
‘one leader’ or some general replacing Nkrumah and then we had a Major replacing Haile Sellassie….and so, here we are as we have lost our compass, as if we have lost our objective, as if we
have nothing to live for. And that is what really bothers a person like me, who was there from the
beginning and still alive to witness to what depth of this attitude that Africa has come through?
What happened?”18
Of course, regardless of the role played by Mr. Yifru at the times of his service to the
country and the political regime and the era that he served, his words in fact speak volumes.
Whether it is the absence of institutions, the role of the strategic interest of the rational elite, or
other well equipped approaches that look upon the issue very closely, I argue that learning the
political culture of Sub-Saharan African states in general and primarily the case of Ethiopia at hand
is foundational to our broader understanding of authoritarian survival, regime changes and democratic progresses, if any. Many scholars who specialize in Ethiopian political discourse contemporarily have also focused on relying on the political culture in the Ethiopian state by going as far
back as the beginning of the country’s modern era (Donald Levine, 1965; DL Donham, 2001; Jon
Abbink 2000; Vaughn and Tronvoll, 2003).
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Vaughn and Tronvoll’s (2003) effort in particular, by relying on the argument that Donald
Levin had previously stated, argue that the current ways to study the the Ethiopian state in fact
moves in the direction of seeking to understand questions “beyond the constitutional developments, and formal structures which provide the waxen form of politics in Ethiopia, to illuminate
its ‘golden’ alternate: the relations and systems of power and convention which underpin and give
it life and meaning”19. The authors in fact were seemingly and or openly interested in the complexities of understanding the Ethiopian intellectual literary development, which most of the natives describe in the form of what is known as a ‘wax and gold’ of the Ethiopian literature. In wax
and gold, the meanings of writings on topics of anything Ethiopian are extremely challenging
given such scholarly works usually lack transparency in sharing direct meanings to those who
attempt to understand the texts without the experience of learning the secretive meanings underpinned in literary forms of the wax and gold tradition. Because, in wax and gold literary tradition,
messages are often coded and require not only high level fluency of the Amharic language, but
also experts of that tradition and their help in solving some of the puzzles that are out of reach to
the many who attempt to study Ethiopia. Regardless of the ambiguities in this literary tradition
however, scholars who study the Ethiopian political culture and its foundational influence over
politics of old and current times have made a substantial progress in their efforts.
Paulos Milkyas (2009) argues that the fact that the political culture is so pervasive and far
reaching in Ethiopia, our understanding of it signifies our research in identifying the explanations
in regime change and or our understanding of the underlying workings of political exercises within
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the political elite across many of such regimes is of a paramount importance. In making an analogy
of how political culture is essential in that regard, he states that, “the divine right to rule that Haile
Selassie had put in place and his modernization of autocracy which was guided by an absolute
monarchy was challenged when the clash between an archaic feudal system and a new political
culture of modernization brought down the regime.”20 He also further explains that what eventually
replaced that regime was in fact another form of “subculture of junior military officers forming the
Dergue, which was fundamentally authoritarian”.21 As I stated earlier, the reason for a focus on
the historical analysis that I discussed in the last two chapters of part one pf the dissertation is that
it helps the scholarly efforts in understanding the ramifications of the different patterns of elite
interaction, which is embedded in the political culture Ethiopian state while also contributing to
the making of the causal argument in a broader sense.
Besides the historical underpinnings, the current state of politics in post introduction of the
ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia is found to be very much similar to the old times. The
‘recognition’ of age old ethnic grievances and the larger emphasis given to group rights, the old
ways of interaction, questions of ethnic identity and history of conflict that defined inter-group
relations that are entrenched in the country’s political culture all remain large. In fact, those who
study the politics of ethnicity in Ethiopia thus far explain that ethnicity and ethnic relations in the
country are carbon copies of the political culture in the historic as well as political sense (Jon
Abbink, 1997). In fact, the politics of Ethiopia as we later see is highly entrenched on the debates
that centered on ethnicity, ethnic grievances and ethnic rights. Our understanding such questions
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thus will be aided by our understanding of the political culture that is easily identifiable in interethnic relations in the past and present. For instance, Jon Abbink, in the same article, by citing the
definition of ethnicity by Claude Ake (1993) states that, the concept of ethnicity in general implies,
“a cultural interpretation of descent and historical tradition by a group of people, as opposed to
others, and expressed in a certain behavioral or cultural style.” The African Studies Center, in its
info sheet published in 2010 also explains that the complexities in ethnic relations in the country
given the political culture of old and apparent and purposeful lack of effort in correcting that is the
root causes of lack of prospect of democratization in the country and what eventually elucidate the
survival of the current authoritarian regime in power since 1991. In such an info sheet, it is explained that,
“The TPLF (which is the most dominant political party within the EPRDF coalition
and the party that controls the security and intelligence apparatus of the state) saw the nationalities question (and not the issue of class) as the root cause of Ethiopia’s political and
economic problems in in 1991 and took it as the basis of a new federal constitution that
was ratified in December 1994. Ethnic identity or ‘nationality’ was put above civic Ethiopian identity, and sovereignty was not placed in the Ethiopian people but in the various
nations, nationalities and peoples. This innovative but obfuscating formula left the federal
government in control of a largely non-negotiated political order. The concept of ethnic
identity (in the dominant local language of Amharic, behereseb) was based on a combination of cultural, territorial and linguistic criteria that were largely inspired by Stalin’s Marxist definition of nationalities.”
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The fact that politics of ethnicity is so entrenched in the political culture although remains
very much explanatory of the old and contemporary politics that the above quote attempted to
elucidate. In the terms used by Merera Gudina, (2010) the historical narratives employed to assist
our understanding of each political regimes’ and political elites’ role in the makings and remaking
of the state were nothing but the study of combination of “grand failures”.22 As a result, this project
attempts to not only present the political culture and its embedded challenges that have become a
definition of where the country has come to and what is awaiting moving forward. But also, the
project provides an in depth analysis of the historical narratives that explain the cycle of political
circus in the Ethiopian state.
4.2

The Political Culture: The Ethiopian Historical Narrative
In doing so, the first task becomes how to divide the modern history of the country and

how to identify the critical historical episodes that aid our attempt to draw causal explanations
from. The age of the nation’s history, after all, has divided mainstream historians as well as diverse
sets of scholars who look at the Ethiopian state from different lenses. Teshale Tibebu (1995), in
his work entitled, ‘The Making of Modern Ethiopia’ explains that, “it is more customary to cite
three possible times scales for Ethiopian history: (1) Ethiopian history is 3000 years old; (2) it is
100 years old; (3) and it’s 40 years old” (pp. xii). Tibebu indeed eventually explains that instead
of delving deep into arguing why a certain approach could be considered wrong than the other, it
is vital to consider the values that each approach contributes to our further understanding of the
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case at hand23. Although I concur with his peacemaking approach in general, I tend to look at the
making and unmaking of the modern Ethiopian state by closely looking at the political eras that
are associated with leaving behind the many political, societal and economic changes behind them.
As a result, the imperial regime under Haile Selassie I will be explored starting from the years that
preceded the second Italian invasion of the country in 1935. This is mainly because the first major
attempt (a practical one for that matter) in constitution writing in the country was accomplished
during that period. The socialist regime in the country, which overthrew the imperial regime in
1974 and the uniqueness of its legacy for where the country is today is also very much significant
and deserves and a great deal of attention. At last, today political regime led by the EPRDF coalition, since 1991, which offered “the synthesis of the Ethiopian state formation”24 will bring us
close to full circle of our historical understanding of the Ethiopian state. Before presenting such
historical explanations and the somewhat similar attributes of the political culture of such eras, I
also will bring in the historical discussion of the prior few regimes in the first decades of the modern era in the nation’s history given today’s elites’ debates usually go as far back to these times
especially when making arguments with respect to their groups’ history of oppression by others is
voiced.
Here, we need to keep in mind that the first part of the dissertation project so far has laid
out the literature as well as the theoretical foundations for which we can use to of understand what
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today’s sustained challenges of the Ethiopian state emanated from. Moreover, explaining the current ethnic federal setting and its proponents’ rationale in coming up with it in the first place,
deserves careful scholarly consideration in studying the historical episodes that preceded it. Using
process tracing in learning from the trajectories of Ethiopian history and identifying path dependent scenarios therefore lays out the most needed surface to build the arguments in the second part
of the dissertation, which entirely focuses on ethnic federalism and the authoritarian survival strategies that the EPRDF coalition depended upon for extending its rule in the last 26 years of its
domination of the political space. My invoking of path dependence does not actually fully indicate
that a certain political actor might have used prior’ era actors’ decisions in altering or building new
ideas. However, throughout the research, it will also be clear that each political regime’s political
elite, despite carefully attempting to undone the past, have always fallen back into using similar
political strategies for survival’s sake. In that regard, through a historical lens, the chapter attempts
to look at contemporary Ethiopian political discourse from cultural and institutional perspectives
while marrying them into the strategic interests of the political elite across different political eras.
Firstly, I argue that the continuing nature of political culture in Ethiopia outweighs every
constructive attempt of the political elite, which always vied to redefine the political discourse of
a state that is considered multi-ethnic as well as multi-national. Unlike experiences in Sub-Saharan
African states that passed via the misgivings of colonialism (and as a result their political culture
is somewhat constructed along), the case in Ethiopia is very much different.25 In understanding the
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ever present political culture in terms of the patterns of elite interaction that we witness in contemporary Ethiopia, we see how the old patrimonial political culture evolved by closely looking at
the three political eras that the chapter analyzes throughout. In such chapters, I argue that patrimonial political culture is what laid out the foundations and paved the way for the emergence of a
neo-patrimonial clientelistic state. Secondly, we see that in the evolution of the Ethiopian state,
the notion of ethnicity and competing ethnic interests that I also touched upon above, remain embedded in the political discourse, which further necessitates a closer and detailed look. Thirdly, the
role of the intellectual elite in the country and its influence is understudied. The “most celebrated”
Ethiopian student movement in the 1960’s and the products of that generation also remain very
influential to this day, which further necessitates a detailed explanation so our understanding of
the perception of the intellectual elite in Ethiopia and its significance becomes more clear. Before
attempting to explain each one of them however, our understanding of the concepts of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism is important. Thus, next I present what the social science literature
(mostly from sociology and political science) has to say about such concepts within the broader
context of such terms.
4.3

Patrimonialism and Neo-Patrimonialism: The Literature
I argue that most cultural theories of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism regime types

could explain the historical trajectories that failed the prospects of democratization in Ethiopia in
both historical imperial times as well as in laying out the foundations for our understanding of
authoritarian survival strategies in the country today. Before presenting the historical analysis (assessing the patrimonial past) of the country as well as attempting to provide current description of
the neo-patrimonial regime with respect to the failed democratizing efforts, which turned to play
out as survival strategies of the political elite, I discuss the generally accepted definitions of the
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two concepts as well as what the neo-patrimonial literature explains about challenges to the prospects of democratization in general. Because, ultimately our efforts to understand authoritarian
survival in the political science literature, although stands proudly in its own, also shares some
approaches within the comparative democratization literature at large.
Max Weber (1978) first defined the concept of patrimonialism alongside another concept,
patriarchalism.26 While patriarchalism is what Weber refers to “the individual who presides over
the communal network of obligation and obedience”27, in patrimonialism, he finds that this individual could turn to his social cleavage or ethnicity, kinship and loyalties among the ruling elite to
form and force his rule28. In his writings on ‘Economy and society’, Weber later explained that
traditional patrimonial rule exists when a ruler considers political power as his private property.29
For Victor T. Le Vine (1980), such sources of “traditional roots” of political alliance are also
critical in our study of political regimes in the African continent. According to him this political
culture is what paves the way for authoritarian leaders to go “beyond traditional limits of their
political rule”, which essentially poses a threat to the initiation of a democratization process 30.
Here, we can also infer that the fact that their ‘intent’ on democratization goes wrong eventually
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lead them to think ways that keep their political reign intact are much bigger than the contributions
they could leave to the society and state they leave behind.
In further strengthening authoritarians’ ambition of political survival, Guenther Roth
(1968), who further analyzes Weber’s explanation of the concept of patrimonialism, also refers to
patrimonial rulers as individuals who put maximum efforts to increase their grip on political power.
Roth, further argues that when such leaders face fierce challenges that threaten their authority and
control, they could “avail themselves of various political and administrative devices that transcend
the bases of their legitimacy.”31 Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) are also in agreement with
Roth in that concepts of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism are in line with “Weber’s political
sociology, which is based on domination and legitimacy.”32 Within that respect, I argue that such
patrimonial traditions and the leaders quest for legitimacy is what determines how a leader attempts to shape his regime while eventually constraining the prospect of democratization in the
process given his focus in affirming his rule takes all the priorities. Guenther Roth, who is known
for his contributions in analyzing many of Weber’s works, further argues that Ethiopian imperial
regimes of the past are “the foremost example of traditionalist patrimonial regimes”33
I argue that the definitions that I highlighted above of patrimonialism could be associated
with the reigns of both emperor Menelik II (who ruled Ethiopia between 1889-1913) and who is
considered by the northern and central Ethiopian elites as founding father of the modern state as
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well as Emperor Haile Selassie (whose reign lasted from 1930-1974 although had served the state
as a de facto leader for over a decade before his coronation as a king). Of course, these leaders
were very crucial in laying out and strengthening the foundations of the Ethiopian state as well as
known for their historical roles in shaping the political future for better or worse. Whereas, the
current ruling regime, led by the EPRDF coalition, that came to power in 1991 by overthrowing
the brutal socialist regime known as the Dergue fits the theoretical explanations of a neo-patrimonial-clientelistic regime. To our further general understanding of the concept neo-patrimonialism,
Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel’s (2006) profound definition reads as:
“A mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of domination that co-exist: namely,
patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power
relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal
relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. However,
under neo-patrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction (it is a
different matter whether this is observed or not). Neo-patrimonial rule takes place within
the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or “modern” stateness.
Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice, the separation of the private and
public sphere is not always observed”34
As we could see from the above definition of the concept, the characteristics of neo-patrimonial regimes could negatively influence the prospect of democratic efforts while also paving
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For more, see Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel’s (2006) work entitled “Neo-patrimonialism Revisited –
Beyond a Catch-All Concept” at page 18.
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the road for the political elites’ desire of survival by eliminating the lines between bureaucratic
governance and the traditional markings of the state along ethnicity and political loyalties, which
are the foundations for political legitimacy in the contemporary Ethiopian state. Moreover, it also
shows that in the guise of political democracy, leaders with authoritarian tendencies still could rule
the state with iron fist. In that regard, Jonathan Hartlyn’s (1998) definition of the concept as “a
type of political regime with important within-type variations, which can crosscut authoritarianism
and democracy (while constraining the later)” shows that neo-patrimonialism allows a seemingly
democratic regime feature that could effectively constrain a democratization process while validating the elites’ survival ambitions only serving their political, societal as well as economic base
(p. 6).
Moreover, in line with my earlier argument of the legacy of a patrimonial past influencing
present day politics, Hartlyn further argues that neo-patrimonialism shows that “some kinds of
political patterns can continue, and even be reinforced over time, in the absence of particular kinds
of sustained social change or concerted effort by political leaders from above” (p. 6). In concurrence with Hartlyn’s argument, Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle (1994) also argue that
contemporaneous political transformation in states characterized by neo-patrimonial regime type
governments are mostly “conditioned by the mechanisms of rule embedded in ancient regime” (p.
3). In the same way we saw the definition of patrimonialism earlier, and from the explanations by
the authors above, we could learn that political leaders in a neo-patrimonial regimes like Ethiopia’s, still impose their authoritarian rule, which simply is the continuation of the characteristics
of previous authoritarian regimes in a newly minted fashion. They accomplish that by showing off
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some democratic signs for the purpose of legitimizing their rule35. Here, my earlier argument explaining why the persistent nature of Ethiopian political culture outweighs the constructive attempts must be clear.
In an attempt to identify the main characteristics of neo-patrimonial regimes, Nicolas Van
De Walle (2001) argues that ‘the levels of clientelism, citizens’ access to state resources, how
much power is centralized, and the “hybridness of neo-patrimonialism as a regime type” could
give us the opportunity to predict and define such regime types more clearly (p. 118-127). As we
could see from Van De Walle’s measurements’, we could indeed operationalize this regime type
by virtue of many variables. However, we see that clientelism features in many scholarly works
that study democratic attempts in neo-patrimonial regimes (Bratton and Van De Walle 1994; Bratton and Van De Walle 1997; Van De Walle 2001; Hurtlyn, Jonathan 1998; Medard 2002; Van De
Walle 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).
Van De Walle (2001), in his explanation of clientelism that extensively features in neopatrimonial regimes, further argues that “clientelism is viewed as critical in countries with a tendency toward multiple ethnic and regional divisions, and in which few regimes can count on either
a successful economy or electoral mandates for their legitimacy” (p. 52). When we look at the
Ethiopian state, which is home to highly diverse ethnic groups36, it is apparent that the prevalence
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of clientelistic relationships could adversely impact democratic consolidation efforts, which in a
way cement the significance of survival strategies of the political elite. Moreover, in reference to
the use of state wealth by patrimonial regimes in Africa, Van De Walle (2001) also states that
“clientelism is based on the extensive use of state resources for political purposes, and clientelist
regimes almost inevitably produce highly interventionist economic policies” (p. 52).
Of course, the economics of the political elite ruling Ethiopia today and its interventionist
state and how it hampered the very rationale that the ethnic federal setting was proposed and implemented is broadly assessed in chapters six and seven more broadly. However, given such characters of a neo-patrimonial state (as we could see with my analysis of the current regime in Ethiopia
later in the second part), I argue that when an incumbent political party of a neo-patrimonial regime
(the political party that rules) considers the wealth of the state as its own, or forms businesses that
the party crass controls at the top in addition to their political administrative duties and capacities,
it further blurs the political space for opposition political parties and harms any prospect for democratic consolidation altogether. In concluding the importance of the patrimonial and neo-patrimonial political culture and its significance to authoritarian survival schemes, Medard’s (2002)
work attests that the reason for the neo-patrimonial regime’s obsession to control the economic
and political resources of the state emanates from nothing but its sheer desire for survival.
Consequently, I attempt to show how such political culture played out in contemporary
Ethiopian political history by first delving a bit deeper into the imperial regime of Emperor Haile
Selassie I and what it left behind for the political elite that followed, which further reinforced the
neo-patrimonial tendencies of the state. In the second part of the dissertation project, mainly in
chapter six, I will also follow on how ethnic federal setting as an institutional solution, which is

73

built upon traditional ethnic and linguistic classifications also helped reinforce such a cycle of
Ethiopian politics and authoritarian survival strategies that this work broadly assesses. Henceforth,
before discussing the era of Haile Selassie I, I will also present a short overview of the political
periods that preceded his regime as it remains significant that how the Ethiopian state evolved in
the initial periods of the modern state remains relevant and indicative of the cycle of political
culture that defines the state of the country’s politics to this day.
4.4

Short Overview of Political Narratives in the History of the Ethiopian Modern State:
Patrimonial Ethiopia (1855-1930)
The Ethiopian state in the 18th and large part of 19th century was highly fragmented and

power was concentrated in four regional political centers that were dominated by four different
warlords who established quasi-sovereign independent states (Tibebu, 1995). That era in the country’s history is referred as Zamana Mesafint (in Amharic) or the Era of Princes or as some refer to
it the era of warlords, mainly because of the existence of such various strongmen leading various
regions in the northern and central Ethiopian highlands. The coming to the political realm of a
warlord called Kassa Hailu, who defeated several of the warlords one after another and latter
crowning himself as the first ‘modern’ emperor of country as Tewodros II (1855 -1867) changes
a course of warlordism and laid out the foundations for a strong Ethiopian state. His short reign
however, brought the change of fortunes for the Ethiopian state and gave birth to a process of
highly centralized state formation (Tekle Tsadik Mekuria, 1981).
The death of Tewodros II in 1868 after a battle against the British, whose anger because of
of the king’s imprisoning of British expatriates resulting in a war leading to the emperor’s downfall, led to the coming to power of Emperor Yohannes IV (1872 – 1889) who continued and added
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pace to the process of state formation with his declarations of the boundaries of the Ethiopian state
and by further centralizing the territories under his control (Bahru Zewde, 2002, Tekle Tsadik
Mekuria, 1979). Both Tewodros II and Yohannes IV attempted to modernize the country’s military, created formal diplomatic relationships with European powers and exerted a strong control
of the domestic politics. However, I argue that Menelik II (who replaced Yohannes IV) and Haileselasie I (who replaced Menelik II) were the ones that not only strengthened the Ethiopian state
in ways unseen in the past but also had possessed the opportunity to introduce the modern political
structures that are critical to the process of institutionalizing a state that prior to that only had a
primitive and backward ways of manipulating political discourse. From the introduction of a ministerial cabinet to the writing of the first constitution of the Ethiopian state, Menelik II and Haile
Sellassie I were the ones who put bold blue prints to what had followed their political reigns,
respectively. Teshale Tibebu (1995) summarized the roles that the first four modern Ethiopian
emperors played in the formation as well as modernization of the Ethiopian state as “emperor
Tewodros II initiated, Yohannes IV elaborated, Menelik II consolidated, and Haile Sellassie I completed the process of transformation from parcellized sovereignties to centralized sovereignty”
(Page 31).
Hence, although the likes of Tewodros II and Yohannes IV contributions to the political
consolidation and modernization of the Ethiopian state could not be ignored, I start the historical
analysis with brief overview of the very significant era of Menelik II who ruled the Ethiopian state
from 1889-1913. My justifications for starting the historical analysis by starting form Menelik II’s
reign ranges from the fact that Ethiopia received its current shape and form during his reign to his
introduction of many institutional and political reforms and the scope of challenges he encountered
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as a king of kings of Ethiopia in a very defining period in Ethiopian history and that of black Africa
given his legacy of defeating colonialism is what made him a hero in the continent and beyond.
As we could see from the introductory paragraph to my historical analysis, during the early
decades of the modern era (late 19th century to early 20th century), we see that the fragmented
Ethiopian state has achieved a centralized and stronger state with recognitions given to the efforts
made by emperors throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, whether
they did manage to create a political system that could entertain diverse groups that are now part
and parcel of this centralized state is what I assess henceforth. Because doing so is what leads to
our understanding of the birth of ethnic questions and grievances.
As Zewde Gabre-Sellassie (2014) noted in his writing of the political biography of Yohannes IV, both Tewodros II and Yohannes IV, as they attempted to centralize the Ethiopian state,
had persuaded local kings to remain administrators of their respective regimes. For instance, once
Emperor Yohannes IV asserted his rule as King of Kings of Ethiopia, he received the blessings as
well as humility of King Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam, while Menelik remained king of Shewa
(central Ethiopian highlands that also encompass the current capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa)
accepting Yohannes IV’s legitimacy as King of Kings of Ethiopia. However, the fact that the already centralized Ethiopian state added even more territories due to Menelik II’s ambitious expansionist policy, once he assumed political power after the death of Yohannes IV by yet the help of
another external political dynamic (i.e. the Sudanese Mahadist forces’ defeat of his predecessor),
means that the number and size of diverse ethnic groups in the country increased drastically. In
that regard, the need to form a representative state structure that accommodates the multi ethnic
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Ethiopia that had emerged as a result of Menelik II’s expansionist policy and actions became apparent. Moreover, in the words of Bahru Zewde (1991), once Ethiopia also assured of itself lasting
independence after “it stemmed the tide of colonialism”, this need of accommodating such diverse
interests with a fair and balanced political system that entertains the rights of the citizens in newly
incorporated territories became clearer (p. 84). Here, it is very important to assess how Menelik II
attempted to solve that problem.
The problem in the analysis however, how did really Menelik II tackled the varying interests of the newly incorporated states. Unfortunately, we find that Menelik II did not attempt to
devise a strategy to create a modern and fair political system that could be representative of the
several homogenous territories that his forces invaded as they expanded the boundaries of the
Ethiopian state. Instead, As Bahru Zewde argues, Menelik II imported the historical traditional
rules that had guided the relationship between the peasantry and the ruling class in northern and
central Ethiopia to the newly incorporated territories of the South, South West and South Eastern
parts of the country. Hence, given the Northern Ethiopian highlands had some what better institutional patterns for the king’s liking means that the same institutional patterns had to be imposed
on the southern newly admitted and highly fractured political entities. That system, according to
Zewde is critical since the political power in Ethiopia was mainly explained by economic foundations such as ‘tribute and surplus labor”, which are the most profound economic institutions that
defined even the prior regimes of the old Medieval period in the country’s history and even that of
the era of the princes (Bahru Zewde 1991, 87). Hence, the tributes in form of tax and the availability of free labor immediately served the interest of the huge military that had successfully protected the country’s sovereignty against colonial ambitions of an up and coming European nation,
Italy.
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That indeed led to Menellik’s strong efforts in empowering the military elites at the expense of the elites in the newly acquired territories. As a result of his policies of empowering the
military elite, that he considered loyal and deserving of political administrative duties, the newly
acquired territories therefore lost their political autonomy except some that did not challenge the
emperor’s invasion by choosing to submit peacefully. The military commanders that led Menelik’s
army in the fight against colonialism would become governors of these newly incorporated territories that they invaded. Thus, a patrimonial political culture that rewards loyalty and kinship became the norm rather than the exception. In addition, those who facilitated the new economic
system Menelik imported from the North and adapted to new territories became entrusted with
leadership roles. While assessing how Menelik II suppressed the rights of these newly incorporated
regions of the south and deprived of their rights to self-administration and representation in the
central government, an Ethiopianist western scholar, who had written extensively on the country’s
political history, Harold G. Marcus (1995) states that:
“In some circumstances the emperor upheld the positions of rulers who voluntarily
allowed their countries (traditional states) to be incorporated into the empire; in almost all
cases, however, it was expected that such individuals would rapidly acquire the mannerisms and customs of the north. The very nature of new empire mitigated against regionalism, and the emperor also worked through the central government to weaken the powers
of traditional provincial authorities. Whenever possible the emperor reduced the importance of hereditary lords; he preferred his appointees to be self-made men who were
completely dependent upon the crown for their administrative posts” (p. 2).
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In general, we could see that Menelik II’s intention was neither to recognize the right to
self-administration nor he had a political platform that could provide the citizens from newly incorporated territories an opportunity to have their voices heard at the central government. Here, I
am not expecting Menellik II of the era to be a democrat nor I think others do. However, understanding the failings of the era are certain to indicate what follows from that period and into the
repetitive cycle of the political history of the Ethiopian state at large.
Although his actions might have deprived of the rights of the newly acquired Ethiopian
territories however, it is also important to mention that Emperor Menelik II essentially attempted
to create a form of federal structure (although very central to point that neither the king nor the
loyal ruling elite had the understanding of what devolution of political power or federalism mean
in ways we understand them in political science today) by at least giving some level of political
autonomy for few of the newly added territories that had submitted peacefully, with the Kingdom
of Jimma and its king Abba Jifar being the prime example (Marcus 1995; Zewde 1991). However,
Menellik’s actions although strengthened the process of state formation that was started by his
predecessors as well as consolidated modernization schemes of Ethiopian state especially at the
center in Addis Ababa (given the amount of taxes being collected increasing rapidly). Regardless
of that fact nonetheless, he failed to instill the roots of ‘democratization’ by not creating a genuine
political system that would lead to the representation of diverse groups in his administrations
through out his reign. Rather, we see that his genius tactics of imposing his rule strengthened the
state while ensuring the survival of the political elite that remained loyal to his throne, which underscores the fact that survival strategies of the political elite of the political periods that followed
first might have emanated by taking lessons from politics of the Menelik II’s rule.
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In the latter years of his action-packed reign, we also see that Menelik II had also successfully attempted to create a ministerial cabinet for the first time in the country’s modern political
history, which was lauded as an effort that could lead to the possible representation of various
ethnic groups’ voices in the government. However, that too ended with no success as it signaled
its whole purpose was only to seek out Menelik’s successor and arrange succession plans given
his deteriorating health conditions and the advises of some western diplomats and few educated
elites of the political period, which mainly come from the Orthodox Christianity clergy. It is also
important to note that the individuals selected for cabinet positions were ‘neither men of stature
nor from the eminent families or clans’, which potentially diminishes their role in aiding to start
of a democratic process in the country, whereby political power remained entrenched in his military loyalists and political elite close to him (Marcus, 1995).
As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, Menelik’s reign over the Ethiopian state was
patrimonial in that it depended on loyalties, kinship and alliance formation (based on the willingness of some rulers of the newly acquired territories to submit to Menelik’s regime) for maintaining
his rule and of course the continuing influence of his close circle that served him and the state from
defeating colonial powers to aiding the expansionist Ethiopian state under his regime. His patrimonial political rule that depended on loyalties was in fact the reason behind the problems that
emerged when the need to arrange succession became apparent and the cabinet that he had created
and its role in aiding a successful political transition failed resulting in division within the political
elite. The fact that the emperor’s wife, Empress Taytu Bitul, had become a very influential political
figure who posed a real threat to the ruling elite that her husband considered untouchables while
at the peak of his political power in the last years of the emperor’s rule shows how the patrimonial
political culture was in shambles once Menelik’s time on the throne ultimately approached its end.
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According to a further analysis by a known historian Bahru Zewde (1991), Taytu’s political maneuvers that transpired mainly through marriage alliances were critical to her “matrimonial politics” (p. 120). However, the influence of the ruling elite, considered his close circle, finally overcame the Empress Taytu’s challenge so the successor that Menelik named could eventually took
over the state.
The successor of Menelik II was Lij Iyassu (1911 –1916). Menelik’s grandson, young Lij
Iyassu’s reign, however, was increasingly tumultuous as the whole process was filled with tension
with the same nobility who effectually reduced Menelik’s strong and charismatic wife, Empress
Taytu’s political role. When the nobility opted to support Lij Iyassu’s ambition of assuming political power as his grandfather promised, the possibility that they can manipulate his young age and
lack of experience to their gains was evident. However, the ruling elite realized that they were not
able to accomplish what they had planned given the successor’s rigidity to accept their demands
and ultimatum to get their support. Hence, they started to complain about the half-Muslim background of the successor, Lij Iyasu. Moreover, there were also conflicts among the nobility for the
prospects of becoming the regent of the new king, who at that point was a teenager and given
becoming a regent holds the possibility to have greater influence in the new regime. such internal
political problems later contributed to the downfall of the youngster through a coup orchestrated
by Fitawrari Habte-Giorgis, one of Menelik II confidents (Zewde 1991; Marcus 1994; Marcus
1995; Tibebu, 1995). Hence, the eventual successor of Menelik II’s regime, due to his short and
tumultuous reign, failed to leave any legacy when it comes to the future of the Ethiopian state.
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Besides the lack of attempt by the first few kings of modern Ethiopia to create a political
platform where by diverse groups could voice their concerns through a fair representation in government, it is also very important to mention that religious inequality was also absent. For instance,
Zewde summarizes how the emperors suppressed the Muslims of Ethiopia by going as far as the
era of Tewodros II as:
“Tewodros, a man of wide vision in many respects, was bigoted when it came to
Muslims, particularly the Muslims of Wollo. Yohannes, liberal and almost federal in his
politics (of appeasing regional kings and men of influence), was even more uncompromising on the question of Orthodoxy and Christianity. Menelik, builder of the largest empire
Ethiopia has ever seen, did little to integrate the heterogeneous entity into one nation.
Iyassu’s religious policy was the first major attempt to tackle the question of national integration, a question which has not been satisfactorily solved to this day “(Zewde, 1991,
124).
Here, from the above assessment of failed attempts of addressing the question of political
or religious equality, we learn that the reformist and the most accommodating efforts of Lij Iyasu
had to be debunked because of the fact that the political elite that remained united and loyal to the
causes of political survival were reluctant to give him any chances.
In general, the historical analysis above attests to the fact that the Ethiopian Political history
at the start of the modern period was dominated by the legacies of emperors who led the country
in a patrimonial rule, resulting in their legacies to become a hindrance to the consolidation of the
democratization process while serving as a school where future leaders and political elites could
learn the smarts and strategies of political survival. I argue that the patrimonial system of old was
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in fact more about how the ruling class was set up and how it deterred the creation of a more
representative political structure that could accommodate diverse group interests in a new bigger
and stronger Ethiopian state. However, as mentioned earlier by presenting Zewde’s summary of
religious inequality across the periods of four emperors in the modern period, we could also see
that there also existed other problems apart from political representation that could impede the
process of democratization. Of course as some argue that although inequality in different forms
might not affect the democratization process, it affects the consolidation of it37. However, the fact
that rebellions could emerge in some parts of Ethiopia because of religious inequality in the 20th
century shows us that religious inequality could in fact harm the prospects of effective representation in government (since certain ethnic groups could also identify with one religion or another)
constraining the democratization process as well. Here, this study is not about discussing the inequalities especially from religious point of view although the issue of representation that the future
self proclaimed reformist political leaders would use it as a rationale to strengthen their rule and
assert political legitimacy. Moreover, we see that the fact that the political maneuverings of the
state by the political elite depended on loyalty and kinship that align with patrimonial political
culture solidifies the important role culture played in modernization schemes as well as the survivalist agenda of the political elites in the regimes in at the start of the modern era.
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Houle, Christian. "Inequality and democracy: Why inequality harms consolidation but

does not affect democratization." World Politics 61, no. 04 (2009): 589-622. His article refutes
theories that argued inequality both threatens democracy and consolidation and agrees only with
the inequality’s negative effect on consolidation.
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4.5

The Imperial Regime Under Haile Selassie I: Political Culture and Survivalist Institutional Solutions (1930-1974)
Thus far, I have attempted to show that although Menelik II effectively led Ethiopian re-

sistance against colonialism, beckoned the country into transformations in transportation, communication and helped bring instances of modernization, he failed to contribute in the initiation and
promotion of democratic ideals and to embark the nation into the democratization process, that
might have solved the issue of the emergence of far greater scales of political grievances in the
state. In fact, expecting Menelik II to deliver in the creation of representative institutions at a time
it was even extremely difficult to find any consolidated democratic states in the western hemisphere. What I opted to see remains whether the diverse groups that are now parts of the greater
Ethiopia he built were represented in his government. To the contrary, Menelik II sustained the
political traditions of the north that depended on loyalties (such as rewarding the military elite),
ethnic ties and kinship when considering individuals for appointments to national or local offices.
Such traditions that he relied upon are what explain the patrimonial political culture that I discussed
earlier and remain relevant in explaining what follows henceforth.
Once Menelik’s political reign was over, and his successor’s role is diminished to the extent
of historical and political irrelevance and problems that emerged because of the lack of consensus
among the ruling elite, Teferi Mekonnen who later assumed the throne as Haile Selassie I comes
to the political scene as the most important historical figure in the history of Ethiopia, resulting in
the emergence of a king that defines most of the 20th century Ethiopian political history yet again.
Emperor Haile Selassie, who first received valuable political experience as a regent to Menelik’s
daughter, Empress Zewditu (who for a short period of time had become the leader of the country
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after the coup d’état that ousted Lij Iyassu), continued the modernization efforts that Menelik II
had started. Moreover, with a stronger state apparatus that Menelik had left behind and backed by
a strong military and Menelik II’s ruling elite that supported him to assume the imperial throne
and keep his legacy intact, I reiterate that Haile Selassie I emerged as the strongest Ethiopian political leader of the most vital period of the modern era.
The problem with how the political reign of Haile Selassie I started however, is that although some of his first actions seemed promising at the beginning, just as his predecessors, Haile
Selassie I had not also had the political will to recognize the interests of diverse ethnic groups in
the country by failing to establish a political structure that accommodates diverse group interests.
The emperor, who had become the first Ethiopian political leader to visit several European cities,
seemed to have learned the values of western civilization that he was keen to bring aspects of it to
his country. Not only that, without the need to actually copy the western ideals of governance, he
did not dare to bring in the democratic ideals of some of the newly incorporated states under Menelik II, such as a democratic Gada system of the Oromo of Ethiopia, which deserves big continuing
research in its own right and, which also might have benefited the Ethiopian state if had been
incorporated in tandem with modern democratic ideals in some ways (Assefa 2001; Hassan 1973;
Asmerom 2017)38.
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The Gada system is a democratic setting of the Oromo of Ethiopia that deserves to be further studied,
although some great scholarly efforts are out there. Under the Gada system, Oromo tribes of Ethiopia not
only enjoyed political rights and democratic culture that incudes term limits, but also such a democratic
culture also effectively created a horizontal distribution of political power as opposed to a top-down approach that is practiced as a norm in authoritarian regimes.
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Regardless of the perceived and clear gaps in how he started his rule however, Haile Selassie, who is now the emperor, (after the regional kings that had served to administer the seemingly federal past had gone), would later play an instrumental role in persuading himself and his
close circle to write the first ever constitution of Ethiopia. Of course, the writing of the constitution
initially received praises and raised greater expectations among the citizenry and the growing educated elite. However, it ended up being an unfortunate constitutional reinforcement of the imperial rule. As Tefera H. Selassie’s (1997) account of the 1931 Ethiopian constitution states, the
emperor attempted to create a legislative assembly with an upper and lower houses, with their
members elected by the emperor and those who owned immovable property respectively. Here,
keep in mind that those who had owned immovable property were the very elite whom the newly
drafted and enacted constitution allows him to select the members of the two houses. Nevertheless,
to borrow the words of Tefera, “His subjects had neither the right to elect nor to be elected. At any
rate, the constitution could be regarded as an important departure towards a constitutional rule in
a society where the rights and duties of the people were determined by the whims of an emperor”
(p. 37). Thus, unfortunately, the document failed to mention neither the rights of ethnic groups by
bringing in some aspects of Dahl’s procedural democratic ideals nor spelled out the limitations of
political power to his rule as well as the legislative bodies that he introduced.
Furthermore, as Teshale Tibebu (1995) states, Haile Selassie also continued Menelik’s
staunch policy of appointments and dismissals (shum-shir, in Amharic) of individuals to the point
it seemed his only function as an emperor at a certain period. Such series of appointments and
dismissals under his regime are a testament to his intent of keeping those loyal close and the suspected traitors in check. An anonymous interviewee, (interviewee number 3) whom I had an extended interview with, who also happened to serve in the Emperor’s cabinet, however, said that,
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“the emperor, to his defense, was the most forgiving leader in Ethiopia’s modern history. Although
his dismissal of the political elite was with a design to keep them in check, he did not attempt to
harm them. Rather, the emperor made sure that the dismissed cabinet member or a former influential advisor would be ordered to serve the state by becoming an appointee in a remote peripheral
region, which also ensured that the individual’s threat at the center would be diminished given he
will be far away from the political capital of the state, Addis Ababa.”
Teshale Tibebu (1995) however, further argues that the emperor created a stronger bureaucracy that helped him eventually remove the geber system (tax collected from the peasant in cash
or in kind as well as labor), which Menelik II had highly expanded when he applied it to the newly
acquired territories (by copying from the northern, usually referred as Abyssinian political practices). The creation of the bureaucracy, according to Tibebu was critical since it afforded the emperor a greater freedom to control political power by eradicating those that are not his “patrimonial
clients” or those that he no longer considered loyal for his throne (p.122). Such an important political development of the emergence of a bureaucracy that also accommodated the newly growing
and western educated intellectuals, would lead to the eventual replacement of the patrimonial political culture by a newly emerging neo-patrimonial politics, which still has the characters of the
old era in terms of the ever present emphasis on political loyalties, but also intertwined with the
emergence of a functioning bureaucracy and a well functioning stronger state.
It was while the emperor, Haile Selassie I was shaping Ethiopian politics as he pleased
however, that we also learn a second Italian colonial attempt emerged, which would become the
greatest challenge than anything he had ever faced in the earlier stage of his political reign. Whilst
the rest of the country continued the struggle against colonialism, Haile Selassie went in to exile
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after his plea to the League of Nations to avert the Italian invasion could not bear any fruit (Zewde
1991; Tibebu 1995; Marcus, 1994; Tefera H. Selassie 1997). After a hiatus of five years to his
imperial rule, the emperor ultimately returns to rule the country once the Italians were defeated
with help from the allied powers, mainly the Britons. His skilled political maneuverings however,
remained intact and the emperor continued to rule the multi-ethnic nation single handedly with the
new neo-patrimonial client (the bureaucracy) now orchestrating the show. In their book entitled
‘Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant’, Robert H. Jackson and Carl
Gustav Rosberg (1982) analyzed Haile Selassie’s post WWII period and how he still affirmed the
patrimonial nature of his political reign in that new setting. The authors assessed the second major
modification to the 1931 constitution that was rewritten in 1955 and argue that under that newly
enacted constitutional reform, “Ethiopian patrimonialism was given formal constitutional recognition” (Page 121). Jackson and Rosberg summarized the reformed and ratified constitution of
1955 as:
“In 1955 the newly adopted Constitution for Ethiopia “legalized” the traditional
principle of divine emperorship, vesting sovereignty in person of the Emperor, who alone
exercised “supreme authority” over “all affairs of the empire” (Art. 26). The patronage
(appointive) powers of the emperor over the government and the administration were extensive, enabling him to treat state affairs as exclusively his own. He was empowered to
determine the “organization, powers and duties” of all the ministries, departments, and
branches of the government, as well as appoint, promote, transfer, suspend and dismiss
“the officials of the same” (Art. 27.)” (p. 121).
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In general, as the 1931 as well as the 1955 constitution clearly show, Haile Selassie I never
had the political will to create laws as well as institutions that help at least prepare the groundwork
for emergence of solutions for representative institutions and address the lingering inequalities
across many groups. Instead, both the constitutional reforms or the occasional decrees that are
published in Negarit Gazetta (a newsletter which publishes approved legislative bills in the country), served his interest of ensuring political survival and strengthening of the imperial rule at the
expense of addressing the growing interest of the educated elite that began to demand bestowing
of political representation and new programs that provide economic equality to all ethnic groups.
Hence, just as Menelik II, who among his accomplishments, defeated colonialism at the end of the
19th century and created the modern state boundaries failed to contribute to initiating the process
of democratization, Haile Selassie I, the most key Ethiopian political leader of of the 20th century
also failed to contribute for realization of democratic aspirations of the Ethiopian people. The emperor instead left behind a legacy of political manipulation, which serves the ever present political
cycle of working for nothing but survival. The student movement and ethnic rebellions, which also
emerged as a result of demanding greater freedom and equality became a further challenge to the
regime’s legitimacy.
As a result, the imperial rule’s political powers would eventually come to an abrupt end
after a group of ranked military officers formed a committee (who referred to themselves as the
Dergue), orchestrated a successful military coup in 1974. After the military coup ousted emperor
Haile Selassie I from the helm of political power that he had held for so long, Ethiopia went deep
into a protracted civil war and civil strife (1974 -1991). The prospects for democracy became unthinkable. The new regime, led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, which created alliances with
the Eastern European political powers mainly USSR (Soviet Union), and other members of the
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eastern bloc such as Cuba and Yugoslavia, would also emerge as a political force for the worst.
This friendship with the Eastern bloc, important to note, did not help the military regime to survive,
which essentially voids the issue of foreign intervention playing any role. At the end of the cold
war, and after the conclusion of brutal seventeen years of civil war, a hastily formed political
coalition called Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) assumed political
power after their defeat of the socialist military regime.
The military regime (1974-1991), despite staying in political power for seventeen years,
the opportunities it had to wage nation wide development efforts, introduce political reforms in
most of the country were limited given the bulk of its time power was spent on war efforts except
the initial period whereby its leadership declared its famous proclamation with regards to the distribution of rural land to the peasantry thereby attempting to address the economic inequalities in
heavily agricultural parts of the country. However, although the military regime spent most of its
history engaged in war with the rebellions that it considered anti-Ethiopian unity, it is important
that we also briefly assess the Dergue’s era in terms of how the bureaucracy evolved and the cycle
of political culture continued, more broadly in the next chapter. Moreover, besides the historical
analysis of the political era dominated by the military in the seventies and eighties, I also assess
how the failings of the Dergue led to TPLF led EPRDF coalition came into the political scene,
attempted to address the ethnic question, the popular grievances of various groups and how they
also in turn used such solutions for their elites’ ultimate political survival.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE ETHIOPIAN MODERN STATE UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME AND THE EMERGENCE OF
TPLF LED EPRDF POLITICAL COALITION (1974-PRESENT)

5.1

The Dergue: Political Reforms Going “South”
In discussing accounts of the political regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, I mentioned that

his majesty’s rule, that was based on receiving political loyalty in a return for trust and power that
he bestowed on individual elites and groups left those who felt excluded to ponder what to do next.
For most groups that felt alienated, forming armed rebellions and fighting for either to win greater
freedoms to the people they represent or even to seek secessionist agendas would become the new
and ultimate solutions they relied upon. The student movement that was transformational and that
was quite an unprecedented development in the country’s history would also become a cultivating
ground for individuals with political ambitions and ideas that emanated from their desire to change
the political fortunes of ethnic groups that they emerged from. In particular, students that are primarily from the northern and historically strong part of the country were the ones behind the revolutionary ideas of toppling the imperial regime so a more equal Ethiopia emerges, mostly hoping
that the future could entail the realization of their seemingly utopian socialist ideologies that were
extremely popular conceptions due to the inspirations they drew from the socialist revolutions in
the Soviet Union’s history and Marxist teachings.39

39

The famously circulated small article by a young student, Walelign Mekonen represents a symbolic and
historic alliance of the mostly considered privileged Amharas’ alliance with the then considered oppressed
ethnic groups.

91

The rise of guerilla fighting rebellions, sizable recurrent student protests, and underground
networks of resistance would all become unbearable for the imperial regime and thus difficult to
handle. The emperor, who would later introduce reforms to appease the rising tensions at first
bestowed so much power for his Prime Minister who was able to oversee an extended cabinet,
although still most of the important political powers remained in the hands of the king. Secondly,
the pay raises that were designed to appease the broader elite, the military and some part of the
bureaucracy also failed to hit the strategic targets of maintaining the dwindling loyalty of those
very sectors. In general, everything the emperor accomplished to satisfy the demands of the growingly frustrated elite and the educated youth who raised arms failed.40 The famine that emerged in
most of Southern, North-Eastern and central highlands, and the ineffective and disappointing responses of the imperial rule to the impending humanitarian crisis would further begin to delegitimize his rule. Coupled with the stroke that paralyzed his son, Crown Prince Asfaw Wosen taking
a huge toll on the moral of the aging emperor, most of the political powers he had possessed for
so long slowly but dramatically started to slip, leaving the country’s political fortunes in the hands
of the 82 years old emperor.
The students’ uprising that carried the famous motto of “land to the tiller”, which was well
received by the peasantry and the urban educated elite would also resonate with the lower ranking
military elite as well as by small numbers of the highly ranked generals. Because, in feudalistic
patrimonial Ethiopia property rights were non-existent and those who had those rights had been
the nobility who were loyal, as patrons of the imperial regime. When the military deposed the
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According to Bahru Zewde (1991) and Harold Marcus, the emperor’s acts in raising salaries of the bureaucracy and the military could be mentioned as last ditch attempts by the emperor to appease those who
revolted. None of them would work.
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emperor in September 1974, the revolutionary movement comes to full circle. The problem, however, turned out to be, as Harold Marcus, touts it, “the replacement General of the old elite with a
new one”41. The compromising voice and the initial leadership of the Dergue, led by General
Aman Andom, who was of Eritrean origin and General Teferi Benti, as promising their leadership
was, both of them would be executed by the military and the initial hope disappears. With the
murder of such ‘reformist’ individuals for some, the military regime’s solutions to appease the
rebellion in the north, mainly Eritrea and the Tigray highlands, and the economic programs they
envisioned were also laid to rest. Here, the question of political representation and economic equality, the very reasons that had the rebellions started in most of the north and the Oromos led by the
Oromo Liberation Front in the south, further enticed students’ uprisings. Small and large scale
mutinies of the military would again reemerge, keeping the issue of lack of political and economic
inequalities as the most foundational problems that drive the quest to the new Ethiopia. The new
Ethiopia, that should emerge to everyone’s liking would remain the central question and debate
for the next couple of decades that followed.
But here, let’s see what the Dergue actually did accomplish, if any. With the eventual declaration of scientific socialism in 1976 as a guiding ideological principle of the military rule, which
quickly formed Peasant Associations (Gebere Mahibers, in Amharic), new youth and women associations that would be formed along the socialistic modes of operation, the country not only
becomes isolated from the western world that the imperial rule had relied upon for political as well
as economic support and legitimacy. But also, the land reforms that started with the nationalization
of land and its eventual distribution of the rural land to the rural households would lack uniformity
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For more, see page 189-192 of Harold Marcus’s work entitled, “A history of Ethiopia”, 1994.
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across the nation resulting in the emergence of further grievance of the disgruntled. The patronage
system of old that focused on the prior regime’s reliance on the nobility would be soon replaced
by a different form of patronage that relied on the Dergue’s newly established Ethiopian Workers’
Party’s political ideology of socialism. Membership to the newly formed mahibers (associations)
of the youth, women and the peasants would become a requirement to receive acknowledgement
of any form from the government. The various groups’ quest for recognition of ethnic grievances
would be left unanswered. Taking the once hugely growing infrastructure and modernization
schemes, from the imperial era, in jeopardy, the military regime’s subsequent decision to take the
nation’s wealth onto the war front to counter against those very ethnic rebellions that it considered
an ‘unfortunate’ challenge to the country’s unity and nationalist programs (instead of addressing
their now decade old grievances and bringing them into fold) would take the country into unchartered territories of uncertainty and a long protracted civil war that would last for at least seventeen
years.
The reforms under the military regime that mainly focused on the issue of property, despite
satisfying the peasantry, would soon be forgotten. Here, I elect not to discus the various infightings
within the Dergue, mainly the break up of ideological camps within the military and the most
damaging divisions within the military’s intellectual ideologues as well as some independent onlookers that attempted to broker dealings (which were devoid of any influence any way), for a
reason that doing so will be nothing but a mere historical narration. Nevertheless, the politicization
of ethnic tensions by the propaganda of the rebels in every direction of the country brings the so
called “competing national and ethnic interests” to a whole another level. Such developments
would also lay the foundations for the individual versus group rights debate that to some extent,
had already emerged in the previous imperial era. Because, for the political elite who were fighting

94

within the Dergue regime and for those who also raised arms to fight them, addressing the issue
of rights would be considered the only avenue to also address the issue of political and economic
inequality across the many groups in the Ethiopian state.
5.2

The 1974 Revolution
I argue that failing to discuss the historic nature of one of the most crucial events in the

country’s history, i.e. the 1974 downfall of the imperial regime, and its significance definitely
would be a disservice and hence deserves a short elaboration. The 1974 change in government and
subsequent transition event was a full-fledged revolution with historical similarities to so many of
the world’s popular social revolutions such as the French 1789 and the Cuban 1959 revolutions.
Through this revolution in 1974, Ethiopia was transformed from a feudalistic imperial state to a
socialist one within just a few years. As discussed earlier, the revolution in Ethiopia had also involved the students, the workers, the peasantry, the educated elite and of course was also acknowledged by the broader sets of political elites in the old and new regime. The revolution, as clearly
stated earlier, was of course based on widespread popular grievances. Despite containing all the
elements of arguable a true revolution however, it failed to deliver on the promises made to that
widespread popular movement, which had rising expectations. As one former rebel leader (interviewee #7) clearly stated, “the problems with the country’s political transitions is that the seeds
that enticed revolutionary movements, which also receive wider support for a hope of new beginning would soon disappear and the new political regimes emerge as worst copies of the old regime”.
Just as interviewee number Seven, I also argue that the revolution, which failed to provide
answers to such expectations, was indeed a wrong replacement that never seemed interested in
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relieving the burdens of those who were deprived of their political as well as economic equality.
Instead, the military regime induced a nationalist agenda that many consider a simple nostalgia of
creating one national agenda out of the competing ethnic interests that their differences seemed at
times irreconcilable. Moreover, the fact that the regime would also lose its potential to make
amends to its mistakes as its rule evolved would also lead to its removal from power in 1991 with
the coalition of rebellions that had successfully participated in the almost two decades old civil
war. Gebru Tareke (2009), a renowned Ethiopian political scientist, in his seminal work entitled,
‘the Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa’ sums up such a failure as, “the revolutionary
government ultimately lost because it failed to deliver on its big promises: freedom, equality, and
prosperity” (page. 2). However, Tareke also makes sure to point out that the political elite at the
center of political power were not much affected, rather explains that the top-down political maneuverings of the past were also ever present in the military socialist regime. Hence, the affected,
the people in the political ‘periphery’, kept their grievances buzzing and emerged as a force that
feed the now stronger and emerging rebellions that eventually toppled the military regime, that
had ruled the country with iron fist while relying on the socialist eastern block for military and
economic support, which was nowhere to be found given the crumbling of the eastern socialist
bloc in the last few years of the eighties and early nineties.
Such is fact that the international political dynamics in the post-cold war era had its own
huge say in deciding the fortune of the Ethiopian state. However, both the departure of Eritrea,
with the success of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and the coming together of the
Oromo nationalists, the Tigrayan nationalists and some Amhara elites that had fought the military
regime under an Ethiopian nationalist agenda led by Ethiopian Peoples Democratic (EPDM),
(which later serves as the foundation for the establishment of the Amhara National Democratic
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Movement, ANDM) as well as the emergence of other satellite PDOs (Peoples Democratic Organizations that represent various ethnic agendas) show that despite the international factors playing out among the determining factors that ended the military’s rule, the downfall of the Dergue’s
regime was ultimately based on the fact that it failed to bring about political and economic equality
to the peoples within the Ethiopian state. As a result, I believe that one writing on the political
history of Ethiopia or working to come up with a causal argument in understanding the Ethiopian
state’s democratic failings and mechanisms of authoritarian survival must present fresh perspectives on those competing ethnic tensions in the past and present.
5.3

Competing Ethnic Nationalism at the Forefront of the Political Struggle
In an effort to analyze the post 1991 democratic setbacks in Ethiopia, the role of the oppo-

sition and the issue of competing ethnic interests, Sandra F. Joireman (1997), summed the earlier
failings of the country’s political elite stating, “previous Ethiopian regimes, eager to foster PanEthiopianist feeling and break down the opposition posed by organized ethnic groups, have tried
to downplay the issue of ethnicity. But their attempts to minimize the 'nationalities question' have
been remarkably ineffective. Indeed, many of the currently legitimized political parties started as
ethnically based movements during the Imperial or Dergue eras” (page. 389). The author’s argument indeed serves us that the continuity of the ethnic agenda based on the popular grievances
born out of political and economic inequalities are the ever-present debate in the country’s politics.
Certainly, the fact that the main political actors that emerged in the last decade of the imperial rule,
the ones that flourished in the Dergue era and the newly emerging political opposition in today’s
Ethiopia are devoid of common national agenda and that I believe might have inspired Joireman’s
article that actually was entitled, ‘Opposition Politics and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: We Will All Go
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down Together” is very much telling of the complexities of what has of the Ethiopian states in the
last few decades (page 386).
5.4

TPLF led EPRDF: Welcome to a New Reality
The EPRDF coalition led by its pioneer, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)

promised democratization and eventually adopted a new constitution that made such intentions
clear from the outset. The practicality of what is written in the Ethiopian constitution (which is
ratified in 1994), however, would immediately become questionable. Inquiring ‘where Ethiopia is
going’ now became a central question. Nevertheless, I argue that as one could see from the political
history of Menelik II and Haile Selassie I and how the patrimonial political culture impeded any
prospects of democratization in their political eras, and how the Dergue’s reluctance to answer the
question of freedom and equality by prioritizing the creation and implementation of a nationalist
agenda, that are all nothing but systematization of authoritarian survival, it is clear that these previous regimes’ legacy also influenced the EPRDF led political regime to function under a political
structure that has become an obstacle to democratic consolidation efforts at present times. The
Ethiopian elites that vie to rule a state of multinational and multi-ethnic groups, a nation of more
than eighty languages and a complex history that escaped the era of colonialism by fighting together as one nation, are devoid of common national agendas and issues of consensus remain puzzling to this day.
Why the political elite both at the center of political power in various regimes and the elites
behind the political rebellion would fail to agree on the commonalities of the need for the political
and economic equality in the type of Ethiopian state they envisioned however, is not a mystery.
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The central political power in the modern Ethiopian state has always been decided by the northerners such as the Amhara and Tigray political elites whose cultural similarities, their dominant
Orthodox Christianity, and history had been at the center of their political strength. The difference
however, was that while political elites in Tigray, in particular Emperor Yohannes IV, had nationalist agendas, the elites that followed within the Tigray political block shifted from their nationalist
agenda towards a more focused agenda of the need to limit the stronger Amhara dominance that
followed the death of Emperor Yohannes IV.42 While the Amhara elite, with the exception of
growing Amhara educated elite in the era of Haile Selassie I, remain focused on the need to brokering ethnic differences by creating a centralized government structure that becomes a basis for
a Pan-Ethiopian identity and thus unity, which they also considered as an ultimate solution that
serves better in diminishing ethnic tensions and potential conflicts. The Oromos of Ethiopia, arguably a majority ethnic group in the country, with a deeply strong ethnically limited democratic
political culture, that had relied on the impressive Gada system, (which had managed diverse
Oromo political interests harmoniously), had however, been removed from the political discourse
in much of the modern Ethiopian history. Such a reality was not taken lightly by the newly growing
Oromo educated elite and as a result started to demand not only greater freedoms to this highly
excluded but extremely powerful ethnic group but the elites also made their intentions clear by
stating the fact that establishing a country for the Oromos, the Oromian state, independent of the
Ethiopian state that they considered oppressive and unrepairable, should be their ultimate goal.
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The TPLF, at the initial stages of anti-government struggle had published a ‘Manifesto’ that detailed
their political goals as they waged the armed resistance representing the political disappointments of the
TIgrayan Elite. The Document, among others, mentions the ‘Amhara’ as the enemy of Tigrayans and thus
their dominance had to be defeated. Moreover, it also chronicles that after the downfall of Emperor Yohannes IV and the coming to power of Emperor Menelik II of Shewa Amhara, the influence of the Tigrayan elites declined in the Ethiopian state. Thus, TPLF leadership insisted that that had to be corrected.
For more, see Tigray Peoples Liberation Front political manifesto published in February, 1968.
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Hence, given the political programs or ambitions among the three ethnic groups’ political
elites were difficult to mend, the Ethiopian state’s fate had to rely on miraculous political circumstances that might lead the way for one of those influential groups’ political elites to change course
in their ideological dogmas and political programs. Such a conundrum would be solved when the
Tigrayan elite that eventually dumped their separatist agenda (although the TPLF remains a liberation front, in name, to this day) by providing a new agenda of compromised Ethiopian state via
an ethnic federal arrangement with ambitions of granting equal political and economic freedoms
on the basis of a larger emphasis on group rights. An Ethiopian Oromo political opposition leader
and a renowned political scientist, Merera Gudina (2001) in fact sums up such developments as,
the Ethiopian state was initially a “political thesis” of the Amhara, which faced the growing “antiEthiopian thesis” of the Oromo, which later had to be saved by the federal “synthesis” of the
Tigray political elites 43. Here, the question becomes whether such new promises of answering the
ethnic question of political and economic equality becomes a reality.
But why did the nation get here in the first place? The neo-patrimonial political culture,
which was manifested through its rewarding of loyalty and kinship as a basis for political trusts
and opportunities in terms of how this dissertation looked at the patterns of elite interaction, might
have addressed the question and could could be an adequate answer for the failings of the state in
the eras discussed thus far. However, it is also very crucial to discuss the various political scenarios
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Merera Gudina’s work shows that despite the so called ‘grand failures’ in the varying political regimes
and the emerging road blocks remain a challenge, the creative ways of the Tigrayan elite with their understanding of the minority status in fact might have saved the nation from a possible disintegration. For more,
see: Gudina, Merera. Ethiopia: Competing ethnic nationalisms and the quest for democracy, 1960-2000.
Shaker Pub., 2003.
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that might have saved the nation from continuing ethnic tensions that kept the competition among
the ethnically organized political elite alive. Here after, I discuss the new era of TPLF dominated
EPRDF Coalition’s rule of the country and how the political culture I discussed in the large part
transforms itself in the new political era.
5.5

Emergence of Neo-patrimonial-Clientelism Afresh and Challenges to Democratic
Consolidation in a Survivalist EPRDF Coalition
There is a big consensus that democratization in Ethiopia was introduced after the military

dictatorship led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown in 1991 by a coalition called
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) under the leadership of a savvy
young politician and former rebel leader, Meles Zenawi, who also chaired the Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF) that successfully designed and implemented the construction of the
EPRDF Coalition (Abbink 2006). The ‘intentions’ in democratization efforts remains true to this
day (given the periodic elections and popular participation with involvement of opposition political
parties), that had not been the case in previous regimes in particular. However, I argue that the
EPRDF regime’s projection of its intentions still has neo-patrimonial characteristics in the guise
of democratization, which indicates that it is indeed a modern patrimonial (neo-patrimonial-clientelist) political regime.
As we earlier saw from Erdman and Engel’s definition of the concept, neo-patrimonialism
is a clientelistic relationship that overshadows the ‘constitutional rulebooks’ of the state. With a
neo-patrimonial regime in power, all signs of democratization in the country are only for show.
Moreover, the representation of Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups in government is also constrained
by the clientelistic nature of neo-ptarimonial politics, which still rewards political loyalty along
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ethnic and linguistic lines. In an attempt that seemed to solve such a problem, the EPRDF coalition
led regime, along with its institutional capacity building schemes after few years of its new rule,
did not waste time in also introducing a federal structure constituted along ethnic and linguistic
lines. Such an institutional design, which Merera Gudina (2003) had explained as the Tigray elites’
conciliatory mechanism to appease the highly divided approach of the Oromo and Amhara elites,
was primarily a brokered solution to keep the Ethiopian state intact with the exception of the departed Eritreans that went on to establish a new state after a successful but highly controversially
completed process of secession.
However, despite the clientelistic EPRDF led regime’s attempts to create highly representative government, among others it fails to clearly put separations of power between regional
governments and the central government (led by TPLF controlled EPRDF Coalition) in practical
terms despite the fact that the constitution had already emerged as a promisingly democratic federal law of the land with its Article 49 stating the powers of the newly minted regional states in
the federal design.44 In addition, the institutions that EPRDF designed to facilitate the political
representation of various ethnic groups became too narrow (Fisseha 2012). Although the subsequent chapter in part two of the dissertation explains this clientelistic nature of the new state led
by the coalition more broadly, let me briefly attempt to show what makes the federal arrangement
clientelistic in nature and thus still qualifies it as neo-patrimonial.
When we closely look at the case studies conducted on few regional states by Asnake
Kefale (2013), we see that even the ethnic federal arrangement in place seemed to have provided
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Chapter six of the dissertation assesses and explains the political clientelism in the country more broadly
and has a discussion of where the constitution went wrong.
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political frameworks for representation of minorities in the central government and bestowed some
level of regional autonomy. In practice however, the seemingly neo-patrimonial regime tightly
controlled by the TPLF political apparatus (which I stated dominates the EPRDF coalition) becomes the one that exclusively oversees the center-regional relations in Ethiopia. Kefale argues
that the fact that the federal constitution does not explain the institutional context of the federal –
regional relations in Ethiopia in clear terms has allowed the EPRDF led regime to effectively dominate the two layers of the federal structure in Ethiopia (p. 237). The author further argues that
EPRDF’s decision to establish an Office of Regional Affairs (ORA) in 1995 was to help their
agenda of effective control of the regional governments by installing advisors that are expected to
guide the day-to-day decision made by the regional governments. The role of such advisors is to
verify whether such decisions are made according to the interests of the TPLF led EPRDF political
coalition party. Such political schemes by EPRDF hampered different minority led regional governments in the Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, and Ethiopian Somali regions’ rights to
regional autonomy as well as right to self administration that they were promised in the very Ethiopian federal constitution that was sponsored by EPRDF. In his study of how EPRDF controlled
the regional administrations from 1992- 2001, Kefale further mentions a regional official from the
Somali region that told him,
“In the first place, when the team of advisors who were supposed to provide assistance
come to our region, their group leader would be stationed at the office of the regional president.
Soon after his arrival, he would assume the utmost power in the regional government. No important
decision can be made without his approval. Even those advisors who came to provide technical
advice in different policy sectors do not work with their professional colleagues. They would rather
give instructions to the bureaus” (p. 238).
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Such failures of attempting to create a political framework (through ethnic federalism) to
accommodate diverse ethnic groups in political representation shows that the federal setup was not
genuinely planned from the start (Aalen 2006). As a former political elite (interviewee number 4)
who worked for the Amhara Regional State (which is the second largest in the country) also mentioned to me in an extended interview, the regional advisory office that was set up by the EPRDF
Coalition, (which is tightly controlled by the TPLF that had always maintained its control of the
military and intelligence units of the state), had always been led by political appointees that are
mostly come from the Tigray regional state, which is an administrative home to the TPLF.
Given the greater control of political power by the Tigrayan elites, that I broadly discuss
in part two of the dissertation, such opinions shared by the respondent were not in any way shocking. According to the interviewee’s account, “all the decision made by regional state presidents
and authorities, either simply a routine one or big ones, must be first communicated to the regional
advisor which was appointed by the federal government (which is considered TPLF political leaders’ play ground”. Another interviewee (number 11), also corroborates interview number four’s
assertions by saying that “most regional state authorities were dismayed by the presence of the
shadow of someone like the regional advisor, whom they eventually considered a position that was
created just to spy the activities of the regional state political elites and make sure that the individual appointee checks their loyalties to the TPLF led EPRDF coalition’s political programs and
goals.
Moreover, such gaps in the intended purpose of the federal structure and what transpired
in practice in the country are responsible in causing the problems that affected the democratization
attempt in Ethiopia (Fisseha Assefa, 2006). Here, the question is how such a dysfunctional federal
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structure could show us the clientelistic nature of the neo-patrimonial regime, which I argued is an
obstacle to the democratic consolidation in Ethiopia while making sure the survivalist interest of
the new regimes stays intact. In that regard, Paulos Chanie (2007), after an extensive field research
across regions in Ethiopia, also argues, “new patronage systems or unofficial mechanisms for
maintaining traditional clientelism exist. Regional political leaders cannot raise issues concerning
the new patronage mechanisms as this would endanger their political position” (p. 381). Paulos
Chanie, further argues that in Ethiopia, the decentralization that many minority groups had believed would solve problems associated with their lack of political representation in government
and self-administration rights in previous regimes turned out to be unsuccessful due to the clientelistic dealings between federal and regional political authorities. Such clientelistic political relations that are exhibited via the patron-client relationship that emerged between the regional states
and the central government as well as the bureaucracy’s diminished role due to the dominance of
the newly emerging EPRDF party structure will be discussed in detail in part-two of the dissertation. However, it is vital to note that what I attempted to present here is to indicate that the plans
that the EPRDF had in mind coming to the helm of political power, with regards to the promotion
of the group rights agenda was a failure. In further explaining such patronage networks and the
nature of clientelistic relations between the central government and regions in the country, Paulos
Chanie further states,
“Nonetheless, traditional clientelism between the TPLF and its constituency is
maintained through different and unofficial patronage networks, off-budget funds and nontransparent central government infrastructure allocations to regions. Revealing patronage
systems through reliable and complete data is not possible, since such systems are secretive
and may incite ethnic conflict.” (p. 379).
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Chanie’s attempt in studying the failure of decentralization efforts in Ethiopia in fact shows
the failure of the ethnic federal solution in creating a democratic framework for political representation as well as a balanced federal structure that entertains both interests at the center and regional
states. As Wolf Linder (2012) also argues, decentralization is very helpful in assisting newly democracies in their democratic consolidation efforts but that without the stricture in place being
conducive, chances that it works is not in any way guaranteed. I also argue that as findings from
Paulos Chanie’s field research further show, because of the high levels of clientelistic relations
between regional and central political leaders (given the political parties in the biggest regional
states are also members of the EPRDF political coalition at the center, creating branch political
parties at the regional states), the prospect of democratic consolidation in Ethiopia is slim. Moreover, the author’s findings also state that the existence of financially strong “TPLF-owned large
conglomerates, patronage networks through off-budget funding, and the presence of non-transparent distribution of centrally funded service provisions such as transport, communication and energy infrastructures” all indicate what strengthened and maintained the clientelistic relations that
effectively hampered democratization efforts (P. 379-381). Moreover, as interviewee number
eight, who I mentioned Chanie’s findings and asked if he could corroborate to some of the arguments mentioned, stated to me “in my work for the government both at a federal and regional
levels, not only what Chanie mentioned are what reinforce the clientelistic tendencies and characters in the relations between the regional state elites and those at the center, but even more so the
jobs they those at the regional states possess are also guaranteed by their willingness to work with
those at the center by keeping EPRDF party discipline intact”.
Clientelistic relations between regional states and the federal government also transcends
to the bureaucracy, which is highly affected by the patronage structure that a clientelistic neo-
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patrimonial state demonstrates. In that regard, in explaining how ethnic federalism in Ethiopia
extended such a clientelistic character of the state into the bureaucracy, Samuel Bonda’s (2011)
states,
“Despite, the ethnic federalism has granted regional states to administer themselves
and promote their language and culture, the ethnicization and politicization of staffing the
bureaucracy is still problematic. In other words, the recruitment and appointment of bureaucratic staff is mainly based on ethno-language criteria rather than competitive meritocracy. As a result, state capacity and effectiveness is still a key bottleneck to implement the
policy. Moreover, the ethnicization and politicization of state bureaucrats in the country is
critical challenge” (p. 5).
As we could see from Samuel Bonda’s explanation, the clientelistic nature of the neo-patrimonial regime’s incursion into the bureaucratic apparatus of the state could indeed derail confidence of the civil servants, politicizes services rendered to the people, and hiring and promotions
within the bureaucracy which all indicate that in fact the EPRDF regime does not differentiate the
public sphere from its own political sphere as it is evident in any neo-patrimonial regime type.
Here, it is important to mention that the bureaucracy had already emerged as even more strong
component of the Ethiopian executive branch’s arm in a post-1991 political transition. The problem that the next chapter, in part two of the project, would also explain in more broad ways is that
the way it was designed and implemented never allowed it to operate independently from the political system. The regime’s design of the bureaucracy in general and its tight control of the bureaucracy in regional states in particular entails that the political elite at the center (TPLF’s political
machines in the federal government especially at the EPRDF headquarter in Addis Ababa, the
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capital) had already been aware of the importance of seizing the bureaucracy as a way to create
the patronage system that works to the interest of the survivalist ambitions of the political coalition
at the helm of the administrative power of the Ethiopians state.
Thus far, I attempted to describe how the clientelistic nature of the EPRDF led neo-patrimonial regime in Ethiopia hinders democratic consolidation efforts through its undemocratic designs of institutions that now serve as roadblocks in how the state functions under ethnic federalism
and how it manipulates relations by overshadowing the constitution of the state. Next, I attempt
to describe how clientelism is also constraining the democratization process in Ethiopia with regards to the electoral system and how elections are conducted, which also constrains the political
representation of minorities in the government as well as their rights for self-administration in
regional states leading the way to nothing but survival of the political elite that seemingly designed
such forms of institutional relations for that purpose.
As Goodnow and Moser’s (2007) explanation also shows, the type of electoral system a
state follows is critical in affecting the level of minority representation more than the type of federal form of government. In their assessment of whether ethnic federalism increases minority candidates’ vote share or encourages minority turnout, they find that majority-minority districts are
more important than what ethnic federalism could provide for same purpose. Therefore, in that
respect, we see that the EPRDF regime’s ethnic federal agenda fails to translate into ethnic minorities gaining equal representation. In that regard, I agree with the assertion that the most direct way
to make parliaments more accessible to ethnic minorities is to establish proportional electoral systems that will maximize their chance of obtaining parliamentary seats given with that comes political representation (Alonso and Rufino 2007 and Fiseha 2012). The current electoral system in
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Ethiopia, as Desalegn Beza (2013) discusses, has effectively shutdown the political representation
opportunities for many minority groups in Ethiopia. Dessalegn argues that,
“The ‘first past the post’ system embodied in Ethiopia’s electoral law denies national and
regional minorities equitable and adequate share of political power in the respective federal and
regional councils. Hence, taking into consideration Ethiopia’s long history of competing ethnic
nationalisms and lack of consensus, there is the need for securing adequate representation proportional to the numerical presence of minorities in constituencies in lieu of stubborn adherence
solely to the majoritarian plurality system” (Dessalegn, p.1)
In line with Beza Dessalegn’s argument, John Ishiyama (2009) also conducted simulation
of Ethiopia’s election results by employing different electoral systems and argues that in different
electoral systems than the current majoritarian rule, the country’s opposition political groups
would perform better and election violence that followed in 2005 would have been prevented. The
most important aspect of my discussion in how the TPLF led EPRDF coalition rule evolved is
however, to restate that despite the emergence of institutions that seemed to have addressed the
grievances of the many, such promises of political representation and hence equality in political
and economic terms become not different to the ones the majority had already experienced in the
previous regimes.
Moreover, not only the EPRDF regime fails to integrate its newly adopted federal structure
with the right kind of electoral system that support each other’s success, but it also impeded minorities as well as opposition coalition parties from likely electoral success by employing various
undemocratic tactics that made electoral competition non-existent. In showing how EPRDF’s successful obstruction of the electoral process transpired starting from the early years of the regime,
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Alemante Gebre Selassie (1992) states that “The EPRDF undermined the prospects for democracy
by employing violent and undemocratic tactics to upset election proceedings in order to maintain
power. The upshot of these policies is the illegitimate concentration of political power in the hands
of the EPRDF, especially on the hands of the members of the TPLF leadership, that had initially
orchestrated the formation of the coalition thereby keeping most of the control of political power
within the coalition (that mainly explained due to their control of the military and intelligence of
the state). The absence of any demarcation between the powers that the EPRDF coalition elites
have, as the dominant party that is ruling the state, and the regional state authorities was also and
still is non-existent - a situation that Gebre Selassie confirms using French saying: “the more things
change, the more they are the same” that I had also earlier mentioned citing one of the interviews
I had (Page. 2). From Gebre Selassie’s further arguments, we also see that the fact that the regime
considers the wealth of the state as its own in fact signifies the neo-patrimonial characters of the
EPRDF were not anything new but they were there from the start. Replication of the old rule in a
new way becomes the norm rather than the exception.
Here, let me elaborate as to why it is also crucial to look at how the EPRDF led neo-patrimonial regime’s election tactics are also clientelistic in nature. As Martin Shefter (1994) claims
political parties that consider the economic resources of the state as their own have clientelistic
tendencies in their electoral allures. In that regard, I argue that the EPRDF led neo-patrimonial
regime in Ethiopia is that kind of clientelistic political party not just by looking and analyzing the
characters of the elite at the top rather, it is apparently manifested in the institutions they designed
and implemented while altering the evolutions of those same institutions when their intended consequences seem to differ from their expectations. As Jon Abbink (2006) explains such clientelistic
character of the regime, he states that,
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“There is no doubt that post-1991 Ethiopia saw significant political institution
building and that a public ethos of democracy emerged. But the process is still closely
controlled by the ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front–Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF– EPRDF), and has a high ingredient of rhetoric not backed
by practice. In conditions of political insecurity and contested legitimacy, a network of
political and economic control was built up by this party from its circle of trusted people,
loyalists, and former comrades in the armed struggle. Thus, a selective hold on politics and
economics in Ethiopia was established” (p. 174).
The fact that the TPLF-EPRDF rule brought the “comrades” from the armed movement
into directly administering the new state that they control reminds us what I earlier discussed about
Menellik II’s decision to bring the military leaders that served the state in the fight against colonialism to now administer the newly acquired territories, more than hundred years ago and shows
how the old culture never fades away. Irrespective of that however, continuing his assertion, Abbink further argues that such characteristics of the ruling political party in Ethiopia indicate the
need to reconsider the Ethiopian political culture from the perspective of neo-patrimonialism (p.
176). In that regard, from his study of the 2005 elections in Ethiopia that are the most contested
elections in the country’s history, Abbink states that the political party in power had to harass civil
societies from rural Ethiopia, which paved the way for starting an attack against the property rights
of the peasantry that would oppose the government. Moreover, according to Abbink, “because of
state ownership of all land, the political party also periodically redistributed to uproot possible
interest groups or entrepreneurs and keep the peasantry dependent” (p. 178). Such actions by the
neo-patrimonial regime to reward its supporters and punish dissent indicate its clientelistic char-
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acters that are impediment to the democratization process in general and hinder in creating a genuine framework for political representation in particular while serving the survivalist agenda more
effectively.
In a further discussion of the clientelistic characters of the regime, Leonardo Arriola (2005)
also argues that Ethiopians who rely on food aid from the government, voted for EPRDF (the
incumbent political party). However, he also argues that, although the reasons for such voting
patterns could not be adequately explained due to lack of variations (given similar elections were
not held before), the citizens in such food aid dependent constituencies “may do so out of their
own belief that only the EPRDF can ensure the continuation of such assistance, or local officials
may have suggested that aid would be withdrawn unless they vote for the EPRDF” (p. 14). In
concurring with Areola’s argument that I mentioned, an interviewee (number fourteen), who had
worked for the Amhara regional state stated that “…even the children in schools located across
Northern Wollo of the Amhara regional state, where he spent most of his time, in fact sing songs
of praise for EPRDF’s efforts in providing food aid, school supplies…..and what is more astounding is that their parents also fear that if EPRDF is to lose power, chances that they continue receiving such economic support would be zero. The EPRDF officials, mostly from TPLF fear that North
Wollo’s geography, which is conducive and known for folk hero bandits and rebels is very frightening to the regime that they always remind the residents in the area not to support any descent in
their localities”. Along the lines of Arriola’s argument and that of interviewee number fourteen
who claimed how the ruling coalition uses issues such as food aid as a way to legitimize the regime’s importance to the ruled, Ryan Jablonski (2014) who also studied EPRDF’s handling of
food aid distribution to target voters argues that, “The practice of allocating foreign aid for political
purposes has a long and sometimes less than savory history. Meles Zenawi’s (the long time leader
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of the EPRDF, 1991 - 2012) government in Ethiopia consistently withheld the distribution of foreign aid from families that failed to vote for EPRDF”45. A Human Rights Watch report also documents systematic bias in the distribution of basic agricultural inputs, such as seed and fertilizer,
as well as food aid to opposition supporters (Human Rights Watch 2009)” (p. 2).
In the interviews I conducted in my field research, most interviewees also concur with the
argument that that the food aid programs that the regime manages, the bureaucrats that are coalition
party members, first identify regime support base that needs (or deserves, to their thinking) the
food aid. Interviewee number seven, in particular mentioned that, “the regime instructs regional
state authorities to conduct public meetings in small towns as well as localities among the peasantry so they could explain who deserves the food aid.” He adds that, “the saddest experience for
me is when I had to explain to the deserving poor in small towns and the peasants that although
they were highly impacted by recurrent droughts, the food aid would not arrive to them in time
because those localities that had been impacted by the war in late 1980s were the ones who would
receive the aid because of their support for the regime in political power despite the fact that at the
time of receiving the food aid, those localities that had been impacted by the war were not highly
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Mr. Meles Zenawi was the president of Ethiopia in the Provisional government (1991-

1994) and served as Prime Minster of Ethiopia and Chairman of EPRDF until his death in 2013.
The quote can be find on page 3 of the article by Jabolsnki. Jablonski, Ryan S. "How aid targets
votes: the impact of electoral incentives on foreign aid distribution." World Politics 66, no. 2
(2014): 293-330.
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impacted by the drought that necessitated the food aid programs in the first place.” From the conversations I had, with the individual, his position with such an issue is that firstly the ruling coalition targets areas that are perceived anti-regime and forbids them from gaining the vital economic
aid the area so deserves, which shows the regime governs in a way that benefits its supporters and
negatively impact those that could oppose it. Secondly, the individual clearly stated that the regime’s use of food aid in such a way signals its clientelistic attributes, that I have also discussed
early on.
Moreover, the regional states also lack the capacity to identify and help their citizens in
their times of their need mainly because the federal financial distributions to regional states in
Ethiopia take place in the discretionary procedures of the EPRDF although the House of the federation, which is he upper house of the parliament that uses vague budget calculations that was
designed to distribute budgetary allocations to the states was supposed to address the issue. Nonetheless, there are also further evidences in which the government uses these financial disbursements to punish and reward voters. In a further attempt to understand the mechanics of financial
distributions in the country, John Ishiyima (2012) argues, “ultimately resource-allocation and utilization decisions are made by political officials at both the national and regional levels. Thus,
there is room for manipulation of disbursements” (p. 8). Given such a reality, Iyishima explains
that the ruling party indeed distributed more money to electoral districts that had supported opposition candidates in the 2005 general election and ensured that such districts remain loyal regime
supporters. In summarizing his research results, the author states:
“At least in the years shortly following the controversial 2005 parliamentary elections in Ethiopia, the EPRDF regime has sought to ‘‘buy off’’ and ‘‘appease’’ districts
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outside of Addis Ababa that supported the primary opposition party CUD. This finding
supports the ‘‘appeasement’’ hypotheses, articulated by Daniel Treisman and others, who
have argued that central authorities use federal disbursements to buy off political opponents
to maintain the federation and the control of the ‘‘party of power’’ rather than dedicate
funds to swing districts or to reward loyal constituents” (p. 19).
As John Iyishima’s work indicates there is ample evidence that shows the neo-patrimonial
clientelistic characters of the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia in how it rewards patrons and punishes
those considered dissenters. However, what Ishiyama fails to mention is that although the regional
states might seem to have control on the budgets allocated to them, their use of it depends on the
regional advisors that participate in the administrative affairs of regional states, while also controlling and reporting of every financial spending at a regional state level, which takes away the administrative powers of the regional states to a large degree. In fact, regional states are expected to
return a third of their budget to the Federal Treasury, which then transfers to the regional State of
Tigray, the home base of the TPLF leaders and its party members.
In general, while the regime’s attempts of establishing political legitimacy influenced the
ruling party to focus on an effort of establishing a federal arrangement to accommodate the question of political equality via fair representation, and economic reforms that empower various
groups, its clientelistic behavior did nothing but exposed its eventually emerging primary agenda,
i.e. staying in power at all costs. Among others, the regime’s failure to meet its defined goals of
political representation, which I also broadly discuss in the second part of the dissertation, leads to
the coming into being of its dysfunctional federal arrangement that opened the door for a further
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evolution and spread of clientelistic politics that harmed the validity of their declaration of democracy after its introduction in 1991. My discussion of the neo-patrimonial regime’s clientelistic actions with regards to electoral issues that range from its design of the electoral system that is illadvised for a multi-ethnic nation, and which resulted in a failure of the fair representation schemes,
the creation and implementation of the bureaucracy that ultimately served the patron-client relations of the new political elites, and the use of food aid as a political instrument and the undemocratic ways that it relies in repressing its own democratic openings all indicate how the EPRDF
coalition, which is tightly controlled by a coalition member, TPLF and its clientelistically loyal
regional elites failed the prospects of democratic consolidation in the last couple of decades of the
country’s reality. The regional elites while adhering to party discipline and principle of staying in
power, their agenda of creating a one party monopoly of the state has fully materialized in the
Ethiopian state.
5.6

Conclusion
So far in the first part of the dissertation, I have presented the literature review on authori-

tarian survival in general and the debate with regards to pros and cons of ethnic federalism in
particular. I have also presented the discussion on individual rights versus group rights that the
Ethiopian political as well as intellectual elites have debated for a long time when it comes to
picking the most appropriate approach towards addressing the age old issues of political and economic inequality. As a theoretical foundation for the arguments laid out in this project, I indicated
that group rights and the promotion of those rights indeed guided the political elites’ choices for
the types of institutional designs that guide the relationship between those at the central government and the regional states. The federal government’s policies and regulations are also drafted

116

with goals of empowering the diverse groups of the state based on the group rights agenda. Moreover, the theoretical chapter also indicated that the elites that are behind the making of such institutional frameworks have effectively maneuvered the functions of such institutional frameworks
in a way that benefit their survivalist agenda. In that regard, we have seen that the relations in
practice between various governmental entities in the federal setting are highly blurred and show
that the elites based in Addis Ababa remain extremely powerful.
The last two chapters in part one of the dissertation also explained that the political culture
embedded in the Ethiopian state and modes of political operation in more than hundred years remain fundamentally unaltered and are foundational part of the explanations for authoritarian survival in the country. I argued that that the formation of the Ethiopian modern state and those of the
reformers at the beginning relied on their relations based on kinship and loyalty in brining the
elites within their close circle together and assert their rule for the decades of political control.
Although there is no credible evidence to back up the allegations directed at these former leaders
of the country in benefiting their ethnic groups at the expense of others within the Ethiopian state,
it is very clear however, that any of the political regimes of the modern era have failed to address
the political and economic grievances of the various groups in the country. The various reforms
undertaken by those regimes lacked uniformity and mostly served the interest of the political elite
and those who already had substantial political and economic power. The first Ethiopian constitution, which is ratified in 1931 and the second one in 1954 did nothing but reaffirmed the rule of
the king and did nothing significant in terms of addressing the grievances that had already emerged.
Such utter failures in terms of lacking a legal framework to address such issues would also be
manifested through out the political spectrum and led to the emergence of competing ethnic and
national interests that led to the breakout of damaging civil wars, famines and irresponsible history
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of governance that led to the reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies and the emergence of vicious political cycle that define the Ethiopian state to this day.
The historical analysis that I presented in this part of the project that focused on the political
culture of the Ethiopian state, institutional reforms and the role of the strategic interests of the
political elite indeed show that the challenges that we see today are the same problems that are
evident through out the most important periods of the modern era. Such explanations, regardless
of their contribution in opening our eyes to the current challenges however, cannot be considered
as full-fledged answers to the challenges of authoritarian politics in today’s Ethiopia. As a result,
the detailed examinations of the institutional reforms that define the contemporary Ethiopia and
how such institutional reforms might have contributed in reinforcing the political culture of the
state the survivalist agenda of the political elite need to be presented. Part two of this project attempts to do just that.
In the next chapters presented in part-two of the dissertation therefore, I provide the wider
assessment of the Ethiopian model of ethnic federalism and how the design and implementation
of it effectively contributed to our understanding of authoritarian survival in the country. As I
argued time and again, the persistence of political culture, the institutional solutions that I examine
and the strategic interest of the the political elite all matter in equal measure. Firstly, I examine the
Ethiopian federal constitution, the constitutions of the regional states, and the reforms that occurred
in post 1991 Ethiopian state and identify what went wrong especially when it comes to the issue
of individual and groups rights issues. Secondly, I assess the relations between the federal government and those at the regional states and broadly explain the role of the EPRDF coalition as it is
dominated by the TPLF. In that regard, I present the conflicts between the government and its
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bureaucracy vis-à-vis the dominant party structure. Thirdly, part-two of the project also presents
what I refer as the most pivotal times in the Ethiopian ethnic federal state since its inception in
post-1991 political era and how the implementation of it led to the emergence of clear mechanisms
that assisted the current coalition’s leaders quest for political survival amid many challenges they
face within themselves and other factors outside of their political comfort zones.
Moreover, at the end of part-two of the dissertation, I broadly assess the economic reforms
that the political elite introduced as they aimed to address the age old economic grievances and
examine if solutions that brought about such changes accomplish anything at all. In that regard, I
assess such economic schemes and their implementations within Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism more
broadly and how that could also aid the political elites in their quest for political survival. Both the
revolutionary democracy in the first decade and the developmental state economic paradigm inspired strategies in the second decade that aimed to bolster economic equality and address the
grievances among the various groups in the country would be further examined. Most importantly,
I discuss the role of the political coalition in the country’s economy and how such economic reforms transformed the political coalition and its leaders as economic bosses further consolidated
their grip on political power and bolstered their survival strategies. Moreover, the chapter also
outlines how the newly emerging challenges to the political elites’ survival strategies led to their
empowering of the military as a force in the economy with survival remaining the most important
objective of the ruling leadership. The fact that the ethnic federal arrangement also failed to reform
strong federal institutions like the military, I argue need to be part of the broader explanations in
our understanding of authoritarian survival in Ethiopia as it pertains to the newly emerging political challenges that are currently testing the regime.
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6

CHAPTER SIX: EMERGENCE OF ETHIOPIA’S ETHNIC FEDERALISM: STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORKS AS MECHANISM FOR AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL

6.1

Introduction
Before delving deep into what this part of the dissertation presents, it is important

to note that in part one of the dissertation thus far, I indicated that the persistence of political culture
in the Ethiopian state remains one of the most foundational explanations. Through the discussion
of the political culture embedded in modern period political regimes, our understanding in respect
to the elites’ propensity to seek survivalist political approach at the expense of answering the popular pleas to address political as well as economic inequality remains the challenge of the state. In
arguing so, I relied on the analysis of the historical narratives in the evolution of the Ethiopian
modern state in making causal arguments for the failure of emergence of democratic reforms in
the older regimes, as it is replaced by elites’ priority of staying in power at all costs.
Moreover, in chapter five, I have also indicated that today’s incumbents’ purposeful ignorance of the need to consolidate the initial democratic intentions that they showed in post-1991
Ethiopia, by opting rather for survivalist political strategies, could also be attributed to the continuity of the political culture in place. In the latter part of the discussion on the adoption of model
of ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian state in particular, I also presented scholarly works that criticized the notion of federal-regional state relations and showcased conversations that I had with
former and current members of the political elite in the TPLF led EPRDF coalition, who at times
to my surprise and many others’ possible dismay, explained to me the practical aspects of such
relations.
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Most of the secondary literature that examines Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism and the unique
circumstances under which it was implemented criticize the greater aspects of the federal-regional
state relations in the country, present plausible arguments in reasoning for such failures and reveal
policy directions for possible reforms. Compared with the contribution of this dissertation, however, one major difference stands out. This research project not only builds on the contributions
that the current literature on the topic already presented on the topic, but most importantly, it
demonstrates how the model of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is utilized as a mechanism for authoritarian survival. In doing so, in the following two chapters, I provide extended emphasis on
the wider topics pertaining to the federal-regional state relations and how the political elite on top
of the political transition in post 1991 Ethiopia initiated, designed, and implemented policies that
cleared the road for the success of their survivalist agenda so that the ruling elite takes over the
political sphere in the country in general and use the federal structure to such a goal in particular.
This chapter, entitled ‘Emergence of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism: Structural Frameworks
as Mechanism for Authoritarian Survival’, therefore first, discusses the country’s federal constitution as well as the constitutions of the regional states. Then, presents discussions with regards to
citizens’ rights with a focus on whether the political equality promotions on the basis of group
rights were able to materialize. If they failed, how individuals and minorities rights were impacted
due to such structural changes will be assessed. Moreover, the chapter also thoroughly discusses
among others, how the EPRDF designed the regional states along ethnic lines and how the group
rights agenda impacted the issue of minority rights and the overall assessment of how the ethnic
federal arrangement evolved in post-1991 Ethiopia. In doing so, I indicate the initial setbacks such
a setting suffered as part of the effort in showing the critical junctures in the life of the federal
arrangement, especially the challenges in the initial period. In terms of how methodological basis
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in the writing of this chapter, as we recall from how part-one of the dissertation is presented, the
use of comparative historical analysis, explanations of very important defining moments and some
use of primary interview data were helpful as used in the making of the causal arguments. In this
part of the dissertation, I also use similar methodological avenues while mostly marrying the primary interview data that I collected in my intensive field research with the secondary source information.
6.2

Background to the Emergence of Ethnic Federal Ethiopia: Post-1991 Transitional
Government
In the part one of the dissertation, I mentioned that the first constitution of the Ethiopian

state in 1931 as well as a bit improved constitution of 1954 concentrated much of the political
power on what was considered a sovereign emperor. As a consequence of that, it was clear that
such constitutional makings failed to provide the necessary platform for the evolution of the constitutional democratic rights of the diverse groups in the country. For instance, for the emperor and
the political elite that orchestrated the show in his political reign, recognizing the rights of such
diverse groups were considered moves that could endanger Pan-Ethiopian political ideology, while
giving way for the emergence of forces that could imperil the unity of the state. In fact, what has
become apparent unfortunately, was that the absence of ways towards the recognition of such popular demands for freedom, and most importantly political and economic inequality, in these constitutional attempts indeed led to the emergence of various rebel forces that would take the country
towards unchartered territories of civil war that would claim hundreds of thousands of lives, displaced millions and kept the people at large in poverty and as targets of recurrent famine.
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Even after the 1974 revolution, the Dergue and its military leaders after so much delay had
introduced a new constitution in 1987. The problem with that constitutional effort however, was
that despite it now puts the ‘working’ citizens at the center of political power, it failed to mention
the grievances of so many armed rebel groups that claimed to carry their respective groups’ grievances in legitimizing their struggle. The 1987 constitution’s preamble for instance, explains:
“We, the working people of Ethiopia, based on a centuries-old glorious history, are
engaged in a great revolutionary struggle ourselves from our current state of backwardness,
and to transform Ethiopia into a socialist society with high level of development where
justice, equality and social prosperity prevail.”46
Given the regime’s open identification of itself as a socialist government and its sole focus
on the ‘workers’ as the most important segment of the citizenry was not of any surprise given
similarities across most socialist regimes, the fact that through out its rule of seventeen years, the
regime failed to mention the overarching reasons for the disheartening civil war that was weakening the state and its citizens during that period was indeed a significant disappointment. Although
the Dergue’s 1987 constitution very much differed from both the 1931 and 1954 constitutions, it
mostly focused in preaching the unity of the state and indicated several mentions of the glorious
past of Ethiopia. However, to the dislike of the regime, at that particular period in time, such efforts
were not acknowledged by the rebellions as well as the citizens that did not consider themselves
part of the Ethiopian state’ oppressive military regime. Of course, among considerable number of
factors that I mentioned in part one of this project, I believe that the fact that the Dergue and its
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The preamble was taken from the 1987 Ethiopian constitution, became law in effect from February 22,
1987.
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military leaders were rigidly focusing to stay in power invoking the unity of the state and the sole
goal of preserving that unity at all costs ultimately contributed to their downfall.
After the emergence of TPLF led EPRDF coalition as a new political force in the country,
after which the formation of the coalition was formalized in what is popularly known as the ‘London Conference’ of 1991 and the addition of the Oromo liberation Front (OLF) and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) as part of the old rebel consortium that have now taken over the
political proceedings of the Ethiopian state from the defeated Dergue leaders, Ethiopia entered
into a new political transition in May 1991. These consortium of now old rebel groups reached
consensus towards Eritreans’ right to determine their own future even including secession from
Ethiopia if that is what they prefer. With the American government and its envoy, assistant secretary Herman Cohen as negotiators and then eventual advisors to these group of former rebels, the
group decided that Ethiopia’s future would be democratic and shared their commitment for the
formation of a transitional government that the EPRDF coalition would be in charge of. The Eritreans started the processes of formally seceding from Ethiopia and the OLF, a political force that
represent the majority ethnic groups of the state would also become part of the transitional government. The transitional government then did not waste time before it published the transitional
charter of the state, which goes on to serve as quasi constitutional document that guides the transition until the new constitution would finally be ratified in 1995. Here after, with important discussion of the transitional charter of 1991, and the laying out of the foundations for federal Ethiopia, our understanding of the questions at hand in this dissertation would become richer.
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6.3

The Post 1991 Transitional Charter
The Transition Charter in 1991 laid out the most necessary ingredients for the publication

of the most federal constitutional framework for the country later in 1995. In many ways, the
Charter was a departure from the age old constitutions and rule books of the state in how it projected the democratic intentions. The preamble of the new Transitional Charter however, starts not
by discussing the dawn of a new hope for the people but by bashing the Dergue. The first sentence
starts by stating:
“Whereas, the overthrow of the military dictatorship that has ruled Ethiopia for
seventeen years presents a historical moment, providing the Peoples of Ethiopia with the
opportunity to rebuild the country and restructure the state democratically…”47
It then references what it presumes the Ethiopian people lacked under the leadership of the
previous regimes and makes a new assertion for the need to establish a federal state whereby the
self administrative rights of all peoples in the country are respected and guaranteed. In doing so, it
states that:
“whereas peace and stability, as essential conditions of development, require the
end of all hostilities, the healing of wounds caused by conflicts and the establishment and
maintenance of good neighborliness and cooperation…”
Keeping in mind that the previous regimes had all been indoctrinating the populace about
the need to strengthen Ethiopian unity and their nationalist agendas, as clearly stated above, in its
47

The Transitional Charter published by ‘peaceful and democratic transitional conference of Ethiopia’.
Negarit Gazeta, 50th year-NO 1, Addis Ababa, 22nd July 1991, page 1.
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attempt to provide the framework of addressing the need for self administration and addressing the
lingering political and economic inequality, the Charter now considers the diverse groups in the
country as ‘neighbors’ that are now coming together for the first time to constitute the Ethiopian
state afresh and the charter effectively lays the ground work for the materialization of ethnic federalism as an institutional solution.
Moreover, although the fact that the Charter invoked the idea of self determination with
regards to its attempt to lay the ground work for the emergence of self administrative rights for the
various groups, the fact that such a concept was historically used by most formerly colonized states
seeking such rights to determine their future resulted in a new confusion among the scholars who
observed the transition very closely. Thus, the literature had to come in agreement in that the concept of ‘self determination’ in fact has an ‘internal dimension’ to it as well. In that regard, Aaron
P. Micheau (1996) states that:
“While self-determination has generally been recognized as affording a right to independence from traditional colonization, recent writers have argued that the principle has
an "internal aspect" that provides for democratic rights and social and cultural expression.
This form of internal self-determination, if applied and observed, may preempt and prevent
secession and/or civil war, and protect human rights. In some societies, application of internal self-determination may also require juridical recognition of ethnic or national
groups. Such recognition is at odds with traditional human rights discourse. It also challenges a more conservative view that nationalism is "invented" by political leaders, and is
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not a reaction to ethnic or cultural repression. The existence of hierarchical, culturally unintegrated societies requires a new approach to human rights discourse and the self-determination principle”48.
Obviously, the struggle for independence that many armed movements in Sub-Saharan Africa waged against colonial forces was mainly a similar goal of achieving self determination rights
to the people that they represented and struggled for. Regardless, the most important point thus
becomes whether the charter, with its explanation of the democratic rights it bestows towards all
peoples of Ethiopia, provided the important credence for both individual and group rights alike.
Given individuals cannot in conceptual or logistical terms protect their self determination rights
without credible commitment coming from those with political authority, the question becomes
whether such rights attributed to groups could negatively affect the individual rights. That of
course is in addition to questioning whether institutions that are important in protecting these individuals and minorities in a new federal setting are even available, and if available, are they permitted to function free from the ruling coalition’s interference also becomes an important question.
Despite the fears, in terms of the fact that the document mentions such a right would lead
to other groups to also vie for secession by following the footsteps of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front’s withdrawal from the Ethiopian state, the political elites in later day interviews have
clarified that the notion of self determination had to be included as a guarantee for each ethnic
group’s political elites’ understanding that Ethiopian identity is not imposed on them. Rather,
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being an ‘Ethiopian’ becomes a national identity that they preferred to accept as a way to perfect
the union that they were forming during that particular period49. Part one of the Charter in fact has
accomplished that. Part two of the document in its articles also mentions the rights of individuals
first and then goes to the group rights. In its Article One, such rights are explained as follows:
“Based on the universal declaration of human rights of the the united nations,
adopted by the assembly… Particularly, every individual shall have, a) the freedom of conscience, expression, association and peaceable assembly; and b) the right to engage in unrestricted political activity and to organize political parties, provided the exercise of such
right does not infringe the rights of others.”50
And Article Two of the Charter mentions group rights as:
“The rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed.
To this end, each nations, nationality and people is guaranteed the right to: a) preserve its
identity and have it respected, promote culture and history and use and develop its language; b) administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation;
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c) exercise its rights to self-determination of independence, when the concerned, nation/nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated.”51
As could be seen from the above quotes of the charter, the political rights of both individuals and groups were protected and the democratic nature of the document was in fact on display.
However, as one of the interviewees (interviewee number twenty-one), who at the time was the
member of the OLF leadership and active member of the group of scholars and leaders part of the
drafting of the charter mentioned to me, one of the most important aspects of the charter that was
debated behind the curtain, as they “were working towards laying out the foundations for the constitution that will later emerge replacing the transitional charter” was the issue of individuals’
property rights52. The interviewee states that the fact that the nature and identity of individual
leaders presiding over the writing of the charter came from the rebel groups that went through the
armed struggle. Such a fact, according to the individual, made it conducive to ignore the individuals’ property rights altogether. According to the interviewee, most leaders especially from the
TPLF were unyielding in that most within their leadership argued that the constitution will later
explain everyone’s rights explicitly and the fact that they were trying to address the issue then was
for nothing but appeasing what they refer as ‘the Amhara chauvinists’ that were considered to have
control of so much disproportionate wealth across the nation.
In fact, the property rights in the constitution would be later addressed but short of respecting the individual’s right to the ownership of properties in the newly introduced federal setting, at
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least to the level of expectations of so many would be avoided. However, in light of the objectives
of the dissertation, two important accomplishments of the transitional charter remain critical. In
my view, firstly the fact that the charter laid out the foundations for a federal constitution was
hugely important. Secondly, the declaration of the transitional era’s political elites’ intent towards
democratic development, which had been understood to be legitimate was the other. In the following sections of this chapter therefore, I assess what has become of the new transitional government,
the setbacks it suffered and what has become of the 1995 Ethiopian constitution as well as the
discrepancies within the regional state constitutions that I argue will eventually become a challenge
for the national unity of the state under ethnic federalism.
6.4

The Initial Setbacks Towards Democratic Governance and Emergence of Survivalist
Political Elite: Partnership Fractured
The post 1991 political transition, although seemed democratic and promising at first was

not devoid of critical setbacks that take the country back to political uncertainties. As interviewee
number twenty-one argued, from the beginning it became clear that the leaders within the TPLF
that orchestrated the formation of the EPRDF coalition of four parties and kept the most important
powers within the military. Furthermore, the rapidly growing and harassing intelligence forces that
are loyal to the TPLF immediately started to play important roles supporting the ruling coalition’s
political agenda, which even expanded to controlling the political state of affairs in transitional
Ethiopia mostly in the name of restoring stability. The interviewee states that, “for the OLF leadership that participated in the transitional process and had occupied certain ministerial cabinets in
the transitional government, patience would become so important as TPLF’s power started to grow
and everyone within the transition became aware of the fact that questioning such dominance and
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asking the TPLF leaders for respect of our party’s independence in administrative duties became
unquestionable and dangerous.”
After the departure of the EPLF with Eritrea’s independence, the only parties that participated in the transition and had considerable number of soldiers, armaments were the TPLF, EPDM
(Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement) which had already joined the EPRDF coalition and
thus merged its military with the TPLF and OLF. The problem within the partnership of such
former rebel forces first occurred when the TPLF led EPRDF coalition convinced the OLF leaders
to disarm their soldiers given the country is now undertaking a new and democratic transition and
thus having a strong and united national army was important more than ever. After the OLF obliged
to do so and disarmed its military, the TPLF had assured that not only the political transition had
been completed in their favor, but also they made sure that if any failures within the transition are
to occur, the OLF’s strong and sizable army is not anywhere to pose any challenge whatsoever.
Eventually, within a short period of time, OLF leadership decided to leave its partnership with the
TPLF led EPRDF coalition. Such a decision by the OLF was made because staying in the transitional government became unbearable since watching TPLF’s dominating role was too much to
the extent of interfering in the daily and routine decisions of the OLF leadership. Unfortunately,
the OLF leadership and their political movement despite its sizable support in light of the population size of the people of Oromo that they represent would be declared a new enemy for the EPRDF
coalition government led Ethiopian state, immediately after their exit from the transitional government.
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Dima Noggo Sarbo (2009), one of the former leaders of the OLF, who also had served as
cabinet minister in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia until the OLF shortly left after the
transition had embarked its journey, recently wrote in his dissertation:
“The transitional government however collapsed in less than a year, the TPLF declaring war on its erstwhile partner, the OLF and the latter leaving the TGE. The TPLF
however, continued to rule in the name of the transitional government for another three
years. The regime also requested the United Nations to facilitate the independence of Eritrea, the first such case, and in 1993 Eritrea formally declared independence and joined the
United Nations, making Ethiopia a landlocked state. The TPLF regime was the first to
recognize the new state. In 1994 a Constituent Assembly, made up of TPLF and its surrogates, was elected, which approved a constitution that, in theory set up a federal government of nine regional states, five of them dominated by the principal national groups, and
the rest multinational regions (FDRE, 1995). A general election was conducted in 1995,
contested by the TPLF without any challenger and power was transferred from the TGE to
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). In practice, however power remained centralized under the dominant party and the coercive apparatus of the state, the
army and security services, loyal only to the core leadership of the ruling party.”53
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As the above quote is very important to the argument here, more context is needed. The
author’s point, I believe is in part to show how the TPLF was behind the successful and seamless
process that ultimately achieved the Eritrean state independence from Ethiopia, which realized the
dream of the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front) leaders to come into fruition. The second
point that the author attempted to invoke is to show that the transitional political era process was
quite dominated by the TPLF, contributing to OLF’s withdrawal from its governing duties as a
partner to the ruling coalition of EPRDF.
The departure of the OLF leaving its administrative role in Ethiopia’s transitional government and the subsequent decision by the TPLF led EPRDF coalition to wage war against the newly
departed foes thus culminates as the first most important setback for democratic development in
post 1991 Ethiopia. Such events with regards to the fracturing of the transition government, with
OLF long gone, also made everyone’s already rampant suspicion of EPRDF’s ‘declared’ intentions
for democratic Ethiopia as nothing but empty talk. Moreover, as the complaints of the OLF are
already discussed, the TPLF, would emerge as the strongest political block within the EPRDF
coalition.
6.5

The End of Democratic Opening: Crackdown on Civil Society
One positive development that came out of the seemingly open democratic space in the

country’s transitional period was also the emergence of stronger civil society, especially free-press
that was not seen at any period in pre-1991 Ethiopia. The TPLF dominated transitional government
however, published its first press proclamation in 1992, under which it started to directly attack
and detain journalists, and shut down the doors of newly emerging free-press publishing houses.
This, as we would see further in the discussion below, made such a democratic opening short lived
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and thus, disappointing. Interviewee number twenty-six, who was one of the first five independent
journalists to be ever charged under the 1992 press proclamation stated that, “the amount of freedom journalists had enjoyed in the initial period of the transitional government was beyond words.
That level of unrestricted freedom in journalism however, started to dwindle downwards immediately after the press proclamation of 1992 became officially published in Negarit Gazeta. At the
time, I was reporting the continues harassment of the Amhara citizens of the country in Oromia
and Ethiopian-Somali regional states and the government considered my reporting as inciting violence against the brotherly peoples within the federal state. In my reporting, I explained that the
then transitional charter that laid out the country’s federal structure before it became official in
1995 constitution was problematic in how it was impacting individuals’ rights and greater freedom
of Ethiopian minorities, especially those who live and work in regional states that are dominated
by certain ethnic groups that such individuals do not identify with were the ones that suffered the
most and that was what I thoroughly indicated in my reporting.”54
The interviewee further asserts that, “among some of my colleagues in the free-press, one
who extensively wrote about the killing of an Addis Ababa University student, who was murdered
by intelligence service members of the regime in summer of 1992, was forcefully asked to write
false reports about the murdered student. The intelligence officers demanded that he described the
student as sympathizer of the Dergue’s military regime and a former member of the Worker’s
Party of Ethiopia, which was the only political party in the Dergue’s political era. When he refused
to do so, they kept him in a police station, abused and tortured him until he fainted. He would later

54

The discussion with interviewee number twenty-six was conducted in Snellville, Georgia, USA in March
5th, 2017.

135

be released him after he suffered so much pain and eventually left his profession in journalism
given the agony he experienced was too much to bear.”
Moreover, the government’s use of the said proclamation to silence its critics, and its efforts in subjecting them to high levels of abuse and torture is well documented. Amnesty International’s recent publication mentions the use of such proclamation by the regime stating that,
“The EPRDF government has used legislation to stifle dissent since the early days
after it came into power. More than 200 independent publications, including over 60 newspapers, were registered by the then Ministry of Information under the 1992 Press Law,
which criminalized defamation, and established a number of other crimes, for instance the
“instigation of one nationality against another”. These crimes attracted stiff penalties and
up to three years’ imprisonment. By 1998, the application of the press law had significantly
reduced the number of independent media publications in Ethiopia to less than 20.”55
The assault on civil society in general and the free-press in particular at the start of the post
1991 transition is well documented. But what eventually happened after many years was that a
further new proclamation would come out which the EPRDF further utilizes to charge the journalists and their work that criticize the government with terrorism. The Press Proclamation of 1992
in general, however, was the worst news for those who hoped that the democratic opening at the
start of the transitional chapter and the alternative sources of information that had been growing
during that period to even expand and help the democratic consolidation efforts. As Tracy Ross
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(2010) indicated, “While nations across the world have come to respect and honor freedom of
expression and access to information as inalienable human rights, the government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has spent years retreating from the international norm on media
rights. The Ethiopian Constitution lays out the legal rights of citizens to hold opinions, thoughts,
and free expressions. In the past, the government used a 1992 Press Proclamation as a means of
restricting those rights of private media and, consequently, the citizens of Ethiopia.”56 Where the
free-press is today indeed in a very much worse position than the period I present in this segment.
Today, free press in Ethiopia is no more and the only ones that are circulating mainly in the capital
are entertainment newspapers and magazines and of course, the newspapers that are owned by
TPLF supporters for promoting the government, its political elite and the TPLF-EPRDF policy
agendas alone.
At the end of this chapter, I also examine today’s developments in more detail, as what I
presented thus far are just the initial setbacks. What is even very significant in the post 1991 Ethiopia (during the transitional period and beyond the constitution’s ratification in 1995) was that the
frees press was even under siege in areas out of the capital, Addis Ababa. Because, the circulation
of the free press’ newspapers in regional states was hampered by continuous control of the newspaper distributions by the intelligence services at regional states that receive their direct orders
from the central command of the EPRDF, from its headquarters in Addis Ababa.
A former bureaucrat who served in both the Amhara and Tigray Regional States, (interviewee number twenty-two), states that when it comes to the press freedom throughout the regional
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states he served in for over a decade, given most regional states are out of the sight of foreign
diplomats, international aid agencies and most importantly the international media, the harassment
of those who attempt to write about governance issues, complaints of citizens, and even any columns that focus on those regional states are not tolerated and usually face very stiff punishment
from the authorities57.
What is very much noteworthy about interviewee number twenty-two’s account however,
was the story he shared me about how the Tigray regional state controls the flow of news papers
into the state. According to him, “the TPLF who controls the EPRDF’s coalition and also administers the Tigray Regional State knows full well that the if the news-papers from the free press are
to be freely circulated in the region, the Tigrayan population will be presented with information
that explains about how much the the rest of the country is complaining about the TPLF’s dominance of the country and the criticism of their governance. As a result, through out my service in
the region, I have never seen any copy of news paper from the free-press in Addis Ababa reaching
the streets of Mekele or Axum (cities in the regional state of Tigray). If you are lucky to read some,
it must be a friend or a relative who came from Addis Ababa or other cities that must have brought
them to you.”
What I described thus far shows that the Transitional Charter which seemed promising
despite its flaws practically failed given the growing dominance of the TPLF from its role in ousting the OLF from the transitional government as well as its assault on the newly emerging and
then encouraging civil society. Especially, the assault directed against the free-press led to the end
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of the democratic opening but the emergence of formal process leading to an establishment of a
dominant party state. Next, I discus the federal constitution ratified in 1995 and the emergence of
the TPLF dominated EPRDF as an authoritarian party that puts its survivalist agenda above and
beyond the age old popular demands for freedom and political and economic equality and how
that evolved in Ethiopia’s newly introduced federal setting.
6.6

The 1995 Ethiopian Federal constitution and the Emergence of TPLF Led EPRDF
Dominated Party State
Understanding the rationale behind OLF’s exit from the transitional government, which

resulted in TPLF-EPRDF’s emergence as a sole dominant party, and the crackdown against the
civil society ensured that critics are now silenced, it’s clear that the transitional period was not
even completed before the authoritarian nature of the leading coalition’s political elites emerged.
Shortly before the 1995 constitution was written and formalized by the constitutional assembly
whose proceedings and agendas were mainly dominated by the EPRDF coalition, and given the
fact that the newly formed opposition political parties lacked the plain playing field to compete
against the growing power of the TPLF led EPRDF political elite, the EPRDF coalition’s intention
to create a single party dominated state became clearer than ever before.
Here, it is important to remember that, the EPRDF is a coalition of political parties, but the
fact that they operate as one party and all four member parties follow strict party discipline mean
that their desire to create a party state would be a smooth sailing. Terrence Lyons (1996), a scholar
who closely observed the growing power of the EPRDF coalition although dominated by one of
the coalition members, the TPLF, clearly stated it:
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“The EPRDF led throughout this transitional period and capitalized on its commanding position to consolidate its power. The party dominated the political landscape by
virtue of its military power, effective organization and leadership, and control of the agenda
and rules of competition. It structured the transition around new ethnically defined regions,
a constitution that emphasized self-determination, and a series of largely uncontested elections.”58
What Lyons described in fact was that in May 1995, a national election was held to elect
the members of the House of Representatives of the the new parliament that marked the end of the
political transition of the Post 1991 Ethiopia. And the process culminated with the newly elected
parliament ratifying the constitution in August of that year. Here, what is apparent is that with the
civil society under siege, the emerging opposition lacking equal playing field to compete against
EPRDF and as a result boycotting the election altogether, EPRDF’s position became even stronger
in the absence of any credible political opposition. I argue that the 1995 election cemented such
dominance of the political elite that were formerly rebel leaders and as a consequence, the newly
elected parliament members’ main roles emerged as nothing but approving of everything the leaders of the coalition (most of them are also ‘elected’ parliament members) put on the table. In August 1995, therefore, the parliament approved the first of its kind ethnic federal constitution that
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effectively transformed the Ethiopian state and targeted the promotion of group rights more
broadly than what the transitional charter had already attempted59.
6.7

The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution
One of the the first interviews I conducted at the start of my field work was with an indi-

vidual who has served the TPLF-EPRDF government since 1991 holding various cabinet positions.
The interview entirely focused on learning his assessment of how the ethnic federal arrangement
unraveled in the country since it became official in 1995. Interviewee number two, however, argued that the federal constitution in Ethiopia, “should not be characterized as an ethnic federal
model.”60 According to him, the constitution was designed to address both the issues of individual
rights and group rights without discriminating one over the other. Moreover, he stated that although the constitution bestowed various groups in the country with the ability to administer themselves, its ultimate goal was also to safeguard the national unity of the state. However, many who
study the country’s federal state disagree by explaining that from the nature of formation of the
regional states to the electoral politics within those newly formed states, the federal constitution in
Ethiopia promoted ethnic rights and the country’s politics become ethnic centered. Jon Abbink
(1997), another scholar who closely followed the coming into existence and implementation of the
federal arrangement, states that, “According to the policy of the EPRDF-led government (in power
since 1991 and confirmed in a general election of sorts in May 1995) ethnic identity has been
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declared the ideological basis of political organization and administration, and has also been enshrined in the Federal Constitution of December 1994 defining the outlines of the new Ethiopia.”61
Obviously, one very significant development in the Ethiopian constitution, as I stated earlier, was that of the political elite’s intention of putting the group rights agenda that was engrained
in their political platforms starting from the armed struggle. The constitution of course mentions
‘full respect of individual freedoms’62 as the most important part of the constitutional making.
However, it is also critical to note that most of the content of the constitution focuses on the group
rights agenda dominating that of the individual. Interviewee number twenty-one, who had actively
participated in the writing of the transitional charter and who later closely followed the processes
of the drafting of the 1995 constitution also argues that in times of any conflicts arising between
the individual’s rights and that of the regional state that administrates ethnically classified region
or local government and thus protecting the group rights with in the defined territory, the later
would always have an upper hand in any bureaucratic decision making processes or court proceedings and debates.
The Federal Constitution’s preamble that starts with: “We, the Nations, Nationalities, and
Peoples of Ethiopia: Strongly committed, in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political community founded on the rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting
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peace, guaranteeing a democratic order and advancing our economic and social development….”63, indeed puts greater emphasis on the promotion of groups rights agenda, that needs to
be also seen from the perspective of how such an agenda effectively empowered the four members
of the the EPRDF coalition (TPLF, ANDM, OPDO and SEPDM) that are in charge of the administration of the four largest regional states in addition to most of the federal government’s powers
in Addis Ababa and the so called EPRDF affiliate political parties in the states that the government
refers as ‘developing’ regional states, which the chapter discusses more broadly further down.64
This chapter sporadically discusses the application of the constitution through out and how
the debates I mentioned above play out in the federal setting will be further assessed. However, it
is also important to see that all of the regional states in the country have also ratified their regional
state constitutions and assessing such constitutions’ presentation of the foundations for the peoples’ rights within their respective regions is important. As the individual who has served the post
1991 Ethiopian state in different capacities (interview number-two) in his part stated that, ‘it’s
known that the political elite in charge of the state actually believe that the federal constitution and
all other rule books of the state are designed in a way that would not put the national unity and the
people to people relationship in jeopardy’.

63

64

See: Federal Negarit Gazeta-No. 1, 21st August 1995-page 2.

What the government refers as developing regional states are states such as Afar Regional State, Ethiopian-Somali Regional State, Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State, Gambella Regional State and Harari Regional State. Such regional states are administered by ethnic political parties that are considered ‘EPRDF
Affiliate parties’ and as we see deep in this chapter, the elites on top of such ethnically organized political
parties are highly coopted by the EPRDF political elites, which effectively undermines the constitutional
rights for self-administration.
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According to interviewee number-four, who worked as a federal prosecutor in Amhara
regional state in the nineties, however, although the federal constitution is not written in a way that
translates as anti-national unity in any way, (which many critics say when referring to the constitution), the regional states’ constitutions when carefully studied focus on the rights of ethnic groups
in their respective regions and make mentions of historical rights that gave birth to the rights they
enjoy today.65 However, such historical accounts were explained in terms of purposefully reminding the citizenry within regional states of what the political elites consider an awful past in ethnic
relations in the country.
6.8

The constitutions of Regional States in Ethiopia
The regional states’ constitutions that were also finalized at a similar period of the 1995

Ethiopian constitution are starkly similar in the wordings of the articles, and even the number of
articles in such constitutions are mostly similar. Although I stated that the federal constitution
gives more emphasis towards group rights, the regional states make good job of indicating that
their respective constitutions protect the interest of those individuals who live in the regional states
that do not align with their ethnic origins. The problem that is evident in regional state’s constitution appears to be that such political entities in the federal setting lack the necessary enforcement
mechanisms to protect such rights given they are effectively controlled through a centralist authoritarian party structure.
However, in terms of what I mentioned earlier about how such constitutions are designed,
it is critical to explain that such constitutional attempts were crafted in a way to firstly remind
The interview with interviewee number four was conducted on march 24th, 2017 in Silver Spring, Maryland.
65
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everyone of that ‘awful past’ and to depict how the EPRDF controlled ruling regime should be
considered the savior. The purpose here is that in the part one of the dissertation, I have extensively
discussed that the ethnic question has already been central in Ethiopian politics starting from the
last decade of emperor Haile Selassie I’s reign and the pivotal events such as the student movements and the emergence of armed rebellions that carried ethnic grievances at a forefront of their
struggle. Moreover, within that discussion I also stated that the rationale for the country’s elites
making ethnicity the epicenter of everything politics was the perception that the Amhara’s culture
and language was so dominant that it served as a foundation for the grievances of other ethnic
groups claims of historic oppression. Indeed, that had contributed to the legitimization of the then
armed rebellion’ expanding support base. What I argue here is that the fact that such a history
contributed to the evolution of ethnicity and the promotion of group rights as an agenda taking
center stage in contemporary Ethiopian politics was clearly evident in the making of the constitutions of the regional states. For instance, let’s look at a couple of examples (out of the many) in
how the preamble of such constitutions were presented:
Example one: The Preamble of the Constitution of the Oromia National Regional State,
reads as:
“We, the people of the Oromo Nation: Cognizant of the fact that we have paid
enormous sacrifices, with other oppressed peoples of the country, in our unflinching struggle to uproot the oppressive system which, for years, was imposed upon us and perpetuated
conditions that relegated our history, neglected our culture, suppressed the growth of our
language, violated our human and democratic rights, took away our land, looted our resources and hampered our economic development thereby threatening us as second class
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citizens within our own land and exposing us to hunger, nakedness, illiteracy and destitution;…….”66
Example two: The Preamble of the Constitution of the National Regional State of Tigray,
reads as:
“The people of Tigray are one of the peoples and nationalities of Ethiopia who
suffered a lot under the yoke of the feudal system which prevailed throughout Ethiopia. In
the period between 1975 and 1991 protracted armed struggle of the people of Tigray together with their oppressed Ethiopian brothers had been the most impressive feature of the
Tigrayan people. In the course of this struggle for peace and democracy, the region made
about 60 thousand live sacrifice and large material destruction. After such along and bloody
war, our people have proved the abolishment of the undemocratic government and formed
a Transitional Government. Thus, strongly committed in full and free exercise of their right
to self-determination, to building a political community founded on the rule of law and
capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, the people of Tigray
are on track record of advancing their economic and social development.”67
As we have seen from the above preambles of the constitutions of regional states, it is clear
that such sub-national members of the federation provide an important credence to the formation
of the federal state of Ethiopia, which ended decades of oppression. Such an assertion in fact raises
questions as to who was the oppressor indeed and how that oppression had taken place. Historians
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Oromia regional state constitution, October 1994, proclamation 46/1994.
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The Tigray regional state constitution, 19th of June, 1995, Mekelle, Tigray Regional State.
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that closely study Ethiopia also concur with the existence of dominant cultures of the north and
the oppression of the many others (Markakis 2003). However, it is also important to mention that
those who ruled the country in the past, although considered were primarily of Amhara, the population in what is known the Amhara National Regional State of today, were also subject to the
same oppression that fellow ethnic groups in the country suffered under. Regardless of such a fact,
however, the political elites presiding over the political transition in post 1991 Ethiopia and beyond
have made sure the newly regional states’ constitutions mention the awful past that they went
through so they underline the fact that such a history is long gone thanks to the EPRDF. Interestingly, those same political elites have also made sure that the Amhara national regional state’s
constitution also mention the oppression and injustice other ethnic groups suffered in the previous
regimes. The Preamble of the Constitution of the Amhara National Regional State thus in part
reads as:
“We, the peoples of the Amhara National Regional State: having been desirous to
do away with the negative impact hindering our overall development which the age old
oppressive system had for long imposed upon us by cruelly suppressing our human and
democratic rights and thereby exposing us all to the scourge of poverty and backwardness
as a result unjustified economic and social policies in place; being dully convinced of the
fact that we had for long been victims of an unbearable harm caused to us directly or indirectly to an atrocious national oppression which had to be committed in the past on and
against the majority of our nations, nationalities and peoples, and henceforth needs to be
corrected and rectified hereafter;……”68
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The revised constitution of the Amhara National Regional State, proclamation 59/2001.
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What is evident from the above preamble of the Amhara National Regional State’s constitution is that while it mentions the oppression of the peoples of Ethiopia, which in fact includes
Amharas as well, in the first segment, in the second it explains that such oppression was indeed
against the ‘majority’ of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. According to the preamble’s implications, while
the Amhara were among the victims of the oppressive systems in the past, such suffering was not
to the level of what others had experienced at large and thus acknowledge that ‘their forefathers’
indeed are to blame.
Interviewee number-three, who had served as prosecutor in both the Amhara Regional
State’s Supreme Court of Justice, located in the City of Bahir Dar as well as in federal courts in
the City of Addis Ababa, extensively mentioned in the interview, although the wordings of the
regional constitutions, in their English versions, do not quite resemble that of the stronger wording
in their Amharic versions, it is understandable that the political elites in the current regime make
sure that the Amhara know their historical dominance and thus need to own the oppressive history
of the past regimes as their own faults. When I also pressed the individual about why constitutions
that are the most important legal frameworks, would have even the slightest differences in other
language versions, the individual mentioned that, “it is very common and not surprising to see
differences in interpretation and at times, content of the many legal and other documents of the
government. The government, purposefully writes and publishes the same press statement or policy with confusing translations in their Amharic and English versions. They know that the majority
of Ethiopians mainly look at the Amharic version and they consider the publication of the English
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version just to satisfy the needs of foreign governments, aid organizations, diplomats, researchers
and the international media’s consumption.”69
An individual (interviewee number-fifteen) with a wider social media following, who considers himself an Amhara activist also described, the current ethnic federal arrangement is antinational unity and the day to day governance of the government at the federal and regional state
levels take place mostly cognizant of the political elites’ efforts in making sure the various ethnic
groups are always reminded of, whatever level of development they receive is because of the elites’
(formerly rebel leaders) success in toppling the oppressive military socialist regime. Therefore, by
doing so, they mainly hit two targets. Firstly, the make sure whatever level of development and
freedom such groups are enjoying are historical breakthroughs and the various ethnic groups therefore must feel grateful for the new found blessings. And secondly, any questions or grievances in
the political and economic grievances of the people are answered in a way that makes sure such
groups become aware of the current regime’s best efforts to provide answers and remain patient
until they receive such answers. Moreover, the political elites also mention that if the current government will be replaced in any violent and unconstitutional means, whatever levels of historic
improvements that they are counting on will be replaced by the old regime remnants’ (sympathizers of the old domination of the Amhara) destructive and anti-democratic agenda, which will come
against the majority of the ethnic groups that make up today’s federation.70
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The interview with interviewee number-three was conducted in April, 3rd of 2017 in Washington D.C.

The interview with interviewee number-fifteen was conducted on a telephone conversation on February
19th, 2017. The interviewee’s location will not be disclosed given my agreement with the individual.
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6.9

How the 1995 Federal Constitution Failed to Protect Rights of minorities and Individuals?
Immediately after the transitional charter, which served as the foundation for today’s con-

stitution put into practice, the other important test to the newly minted federal scheme, as I indicated earlier, the fate of the citizens who continued to live in newly constructed regional states that
are formed along ethnic and linguistic identity lines and what happens to their rights remained an
open question. Especially, individuals who are ethnically Amhara, Oromo, Tigre and Gurage in
addition to many other groups who are known to live all across Ethiopia and the fate of their rights
in the newly arranged federal setting becomes a dire concern.71 Despite the federal constitution as
well as the regional state’s constitutions assert the rights of individuals to live in places of their
choice, the practicality of it came under a huge scrutiny. In the earlier periods after the introduction
of the federal setting, ethnically motivated massacres were immediately evident in areas known as
Bedeno and Arba-Gugu, which are located in the Oromia Regional State. Eventually, such ethnic
tensions and hate crimes motivated by such ethnic tensions expanded across many regions in
Southern Nations Nationalities Peoples Regions (Gura-Ferda areas), Gambella Regional State,
Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State72 and Ethiopian Somali Regional States. While in most of
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For instance, an individual with huge political power and importance to the Oromo Peoples Democratic
organization (OPDO), in Addis Ababa, who was also interviewee number thirty-one, for instance, mentioned that, “According to the demographic files within OPDO, the Amharas constitute more than eleven
million of the population in the largest regional state in Ethiopia, Oromia Regional State.”
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From the United States’ State Department report, it is stated that, “Authorities in the

western region of Benishangul-Gumuz forcibly evicted as many as 8,000 ethnic Amhara residents from their homes; some of those evicted alleged police beat and harassed them because of
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such cases, the victims were of ethnic Amharas, in the case of the Ethiopian-Somali Regional
State, that largely impacted the Oromos and to some extent the Amharas have suffered as well. In
Gambella, the ethnic group known as Annuak would continually suffer from routine massacres
directed at them by forces within their regional state while the federal government’s army failing
to protect them73.
In the public spheres and across the Ethiopian opposition media based mainly in the diaspora, the problem in the existence of such tensions and ethnically motivated violence is discussed
mostly by raising questions about who perpetrated these criminal acts and why. The fact that the
government had ignored the probability that such a federal setting could also be a liability moving
forward and how it could be managed thereafter are however, ignored as every major opposition,
social and political activists are just busy to advocate for the sake of one ethnicity over the other,
that is mainly the result of the current system which has almost effectively managed to reduce the
level of Ethiopian nationalism and replaced it with tribalism at its best.
Here, it remains very critical to understand the role the federal government and especially
the security forces in making sure such violent incidents are controlled and do not pose any threat.
However, their efforts, are extremely discouraging as they purposefully ignored the need to address

their ethnicity.” (Page 32). For the full report, see: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220323.pdf.
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For instance, see this report from Human Rights Watch on the massacre in Gambella:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/03/23/ethiopia-crimes-against-humanity-gambella-region. For more on
related abuse of minorities and others in Gambella, see: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0112webwcover_0.pdf.
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such problems. An individual who extensively has written about the Amhara who suffered extensive human rights abuses, forced evictions, and who had also extensively interviewed families who
lost their family members in some of the massacres, (interviewee thirty-three), stated to me, the
federal government’s security apparatus which is highly dominated by the TPLF, has ignored such
situations all across the regional states time and again. According to him, some of the bureaucrats,
heads of security office in some regions have also secretly told him that when they tried to stop
various conflicts against minorities in the region, “people from the higher up” had even stopped
them from preventing the violence.74
A government official since 1991, interview number-two, who had provided me an extended interview opportunity also concurred with the problems with regards to forced evictions,
killings and arbitrary arrests directed against individuals and minorities in some regional states.
The individual argues that, “although this federal constitution is the most important victory that
Ethiopians achieved in a long and painful struggle, one of its major failings however, is that it has
created narrow nationalists all across the nation. What we hoped to accomplish was to empower
the groups while simultaneously teaching them the essentials of how to respect and protect individual and minority rights. Unfortunately, the lack of proper and sustained training is the reason
for the increase in the number of those narrow nationalists who are less tolerant of others in the
regional states they now administer.” When I pressed the interviewee if he could agree with the
notion that the government security forces might have encouraged some atrocities in certain regional states against the Amhara and the Oromo, he insisted that such questions are “an unfair
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the interview with interviewee number thirty-three was conducted in a telephone interview and email
exchanges on March, 17th, 2017. The location of the individual will not be disclosed per agreement.
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characterization of the armed forces and the government’s efforts to improve good governance
across the country.”
Most opposition political figures in Ethiopia and abroad in general, interviewee number
thirty-five among those who I interviewed in particular, believe that the EPRDF coalition that is
mostly dominated by the TPLF leadership act oblivious to the atrocities that happen against minorities in different regions since they are well aware that the growing division among many of
the ethnic groups in the country would mean the continuation of the TPLF domination and
EPRDF’s hold on political power. Of course, that assertion must be conceivable given what we
see in the political elites’ efforts to prolong their rule by relying on their survivalist political approaches and the use of the federal setting for such a goal is very much clear. However, the assertion by opposition officials also is amenable given what our observation of how the smaller regional states in the country are constructed in the current federal setting. For instance, looking at
the regional states of Harari and Benishagul-Gumuz, we see that the number of minorities combined outweighs the number of the ethnic groups who are given the authority to administer such
regional states.
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Table 6.1 Demographic Description of the Harari Regional State75
Ethnicity

Population in percentage

Oromo

56.41

Amhara

22.77

Harari

8.65

Gurage

4.34

Others

7.83

Total

100

Table 6.2 Demographic Description of the Bennishangul-Gumuz Regional State
Ethnicity
Oromo

13.55

Amhara

21.69

Berta

25.41

Gumuz

20.88

Agaw-Awi

4.22

Shinasha

7.73

Others

6.52

Total

75

Population in percentage

100

Central Statistics Agency (CSA), Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population

and Housing Census, December, 2008.
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From what Table I and Table II describe about the two regional states’ demographic makeup, we can infer that the federal structure, with its intent on promoting groups’ rights in every
aspect of political life in general and groups rights’ for self-administration in particular, designed
and implemented institutional solutions that in the long run served as the platform for the emergence of ethnic conflicts that overshadowed their highly celebrated rights promotions agenda.
Moreover, as it is evident from the tables, the Harari Regional State, as its name indicates is created
as a region that its administration of it ‘belongs’ to the ‘Harari ethnic group’ while the population
size of the group is merely less than nine percent of the population within the said regional state.
The problem, as mentioned earlier, is not the fact that such groups are now in charge of the administrative duties of regional states that have now arguably achieved that right to self-administration;
however, the fact that such an opportunity arrived at the expense of the other ethnic groups who
actually outnumber the Harari ethnic group lead to many questions.
The same argument also goes to explain what exactly happened in the BennishangulGumuz Regional State. In this region, we see that the Oromos and the Amharas, combined outnumber the rest of the ethnic groups but are considered majority-minorities in the state given the
administration apparatus of the region is being handled by the minorities. The question, again, is
why the institutional design is so poor? According to interviewee number-thirty nine, who worked
in the Amhara regional state’s bureaucracy and visited the Benishangul Gumuz region multiple
times for official purposes, for the EPRDF coalition and its dominant elite within the TPLF, empowering minorities makes it easier for the co-optation mechanisms that the elites devised to work
more seamlessly by limiting the voice of the majority from becoming a challenging force.76 One
76

The interview with interviewee number thirty-nine took place in a pre arranged telephone interview on
Monday, April, 3rd. The interviewee is based in ‘undisclosed’ (per agreement) location in Europe.
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additional feature within the regional constitution of the Benishangul Gumuz is that the constitution explicitly state that the minorities within the region such as the Gumuz, the Benishangul, the
Berta and Komo should claim the ‘ownership of the regional state’ despite other groups such as
the Oromo and Amhara being the majorities in its boarders77.
As we saw earlier, however, regional states that are sort of given to and run by minorities
ultimately would not be devoid of ethnic conflicts. Here, it is important to note that in the last two
decades in Ethiopia, although ethnic groups within the federation never fought against each other,
forced evictions, ‘mysterious’ massacres have always been common. While the regime is mostly
directly blamed, sometimes the regime is also observed to have had a slow reaction in restoring
calm when conflicts within two or more ethnic groups occur from time to time. Moreover, the fact
that when different forms of conflicts arise, the government either ignores them or takes a very
slow action that usually comes after the damage is already done, raises more questions on the
regime’s intent. The understanding from my field work and readings is that the regime’s absence
from taking swift measures or in most times, its slow responses towards ethnic conflicts emanates
from the political elites’ desire of empowering the minorities that run such regions or particular
districts within regional states.
Even those authors who consider the Ethiopian federal constituents (regional states) to have
most powers in comparison with other federation across the world, concur with the limitation of
such arrangement, although they fail to directly address the issue of ethnic conflicts or minority’s
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Look at Artcile Two of the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State’s constitution, the November
1995 version.
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oppression in such regions as a result of such weaknesses of the federal setting. Among those for
instance, Assefa Fiseha (2006) states that:
“the federal system assumes that every ethnic group is found inhabiting a territorially defined geographical area. Certainly, its is difficult to adopt federalism unless there
exists a territorially defined diversity, but a significant number of Ethiopians do not live in
the places where the majority of the members of their ethnic group are to be found. They
have moved, either voluntarily, in search of better opportunities, or by force, due to the
Dergue’s policy of resettlement and villagization” (Page 135).
The problems that the author indicated above in fact could be attributed to the overall failure of the ethnic federal arrangement in the country. However, addressing how such chronic problems within the federal setting had contributed to the problems I assessed above must be part of
our understanding of how it essentially benefits the regime to stay in power succeeding in their
survivalist strategies.
Given the fact that the regime introduced ethnic federal arrangement as a way to regionalize
the historically centralized Ethiopian state and promote ethnic rights through fair representation at
the central government and to provide opportunities of self-administration, its successes or failures
therefore should be evaluated based on how much such arrangement met its predetermined goals.
Thus far, we have seen them failing to deliver. Interviewee number-five, whom I asked if he could
explain the successes of the federal arrangement, stated that, “no doubt that the ethnic federal
arrangement has helped certain ethnic groups to come out of the shadows of purposeful ignorance
by the imperial and socialist regimes in the past. However, I consider the federal arrangement to
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also have some failure because if the federal arrangement was to be a success, it would have prevented the formation of further ethnic rebellions in the country. As you know, the OLF, since it
left the transitional government, returned to the bushes. The Ogadenis (an area in South-Eastern
Ethiopia, within the Ethiopian Somali regional state) under the leadership of ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) are fighting the government. The Amharas and other minorities are also
fighting the government from their bases in Eritrea. Despite such rebellions have not seen any
successes thus far, as a former insider, I can tell you that they have always unsettled the political
elite within the EPRDF and especially the TPLF leadership that controls the security and intelligence forces all alone. Therefore, I believe that if the federal experiment considered successful,
some groups would not have raised arms to fight the government in any way. But since they still
have unanswered questions, and given that the majority of ethnic groups are witnessing the dominance of an ethnic minority, feelings of the old era oppression via new institutional means is very
much the case in today’s Ethiopia.”78
Of course, the clear dominance of the TPLF in Ethiopian politics and the resulting
reemergence of popular grievances by the majority others is a common knowledge among the
citizens in Ethiopia. But it also helps to see interviewee number-five’s extended answer from the
comparative politics literature’s assessment of the onset of civil wars or rebellion for that matter
since we now have a clear understanding that the ethnic federal setting has not answered the questions of the raging rebels reverting them back to the bushes. The most debated causes of civil war
are mainly attributed to the existence of greed among those who control the political and economic

The interview with interviewee number-five took place on Tuesday, February 21st, 2017 in Washington
DC. A follow up telephone interview had was also conducted on Monday, March 6th, 2017.
78
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power and those who have the grievances from others’ unfair domination of the economic as well
as the political sphere (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Keen 2012; Stewart, 2000). The issue of
how much a country is diverse in its numbers of ethnic groups however, is not considered a contributing factor for the outbreak of civil war at large. The most important factor that could lead a
multi-ethnic nation into civil wars, however, emerges when a minority is in control of political
power and the majority feels neglected and unfairly represented (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). What
we also see in the Ethiopian state starting from the imperial and the socialist military era is that
although the rebellions were organized with certain forms of ethnic agenda, they have never declared war against another ethnic group. However, they all fought the regime in control of political
power at the center. In their struggle against centralist regimes, in the past, rebel groups formed
along diverse ethnic lines were also coordinating with each other to defeat the regimes in power
in particular periods given doing so, according to them would lead to the emergence of a new
Ethiopia. But in the newly emerged insurgents fighting against the regime, that has changed so
much given the new rebel’s declared enemies have now become the TPLF and and the domination
of the Tigrayans, which eventually could pose a difficult challenge to the country’s future as a
whole.
In that respect, we see that the ethnic federal arrangement introduced in post 1991 Ethiopia
with EPRDF’s coming to the political scene, has clearly failed among others as it did not prevent
insurgencies and rebellions from reemerging. If the ethnic federal setting fails to answer the questions of representation that now remains unanswered, of course questioning such federal institutional solution’s success and understating how it failed to deliver its predetermined goals is so
important. Here, the federal constitution as well as the regional states’ constitutions not only failed
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to protect minorities’ rights and help the state remain unified amid the challenges it faces, but also
most now consider the constitutions as the ruling coalition’s ploy to prolong their political survival.
Even when we look beyond the atrocities directed against individuals and minorities in
some regional states without the need to dwell on who incites and who perpetrates such acts, we
see that the political rights that such minorities and individuals enjoy as citizens when residing in
regional states that do not align with their ethnic identities are extremely limited. Despite the fact
that the regional constitutions and the federal constitution have clauses that call for safeguarding
the rights of these individuals and minorities to live in their preferred localities all across the nation
as stated before, they however, fail short of explaining the mechanisms that will aid such minorities
and individuals’ in having a say in the governance of their localities. According to Endaweke
Tsegaw Balkew (2010), who studied the rights of minorities in the regional state of Harari, in
particular argues, the Federal Constitution,
“does not recognize these segment of the population (‘the minorities in regional
states’79), and practically they are placed in a status between citizen and non-citizens of the
State for only they can elect persons who are not representative of their ethnic groups because language requirement of the electoral law – which imposes the criterion to speak
working languages of the state or one of the local vernaculars of the indigenous groups of
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The sentence, ‘the minorities in regional states’ is not part of the author’s quote. I added it to in reference to, his words, ‘these segment of the population’.
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the state. Eventually, since the Constitution has no room for such middle status, they are
better deemed to be non-citizens (page 8).80
From what we see above in Endaweke Balkew’s (2010) work, the problems in the federal
structure are too many and what is even more interesting is that individuals with high profile positions within the TPLF led EPRDF coalition do not deny the existence of such peculiar problems
while declining from commenting on the measures that should be taken to reform such institutional
solutions as my encounter with few officials among the regime’s ruling elites in my field work
attests to.
In addition, it is also important to look at how the citizens’ trust of the coalition in power
has been significantly diminishing over time. Terrence Lyons (2006) states that given the electoral
maneuvers of the EPRDF were too repressive in many of the national elections held since the
regime came to power in 1991, peoples’ trust in those democratic procedures has now reached
historic low point. Here, from what I have learned in my field work, I can also attest to the fact
that most of the interviewees that are former or present EPRDF political elites either in retirement,
exile, or still working for the regime in power, all concur with the idea that the people, in general,
do not trust the government. And what is more interesting is that the political elites within the
EPRDF leadership are openly aware of the people’s lack of trust on the coalition they have presided over since 1991. Interviewee number-eight, a former member of the TPLF leadership, for
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For more on Endaweke’s work, see his thesis on: http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/11765/1/24%20.Endaweke%20Tsegaw.pdf.
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instance, argues that in the annual and at times semi-annual evaluations of the works of the incumbent political coalition, many debates start with questions of assessing the level of trust the regime
enjoys at that particular time.81
According to the interviewee number-eight, the EPRDF leadership discusses areas where
protests of any kind occurred, suggestions or criticisms from the domestic and international press,
and outcries from the ever weakened opposition groups. Once the elite receives and analyzes such
issues, they start to debate what should the coalition do so it addresses such complaints that come
from the spectrum of voices. In such meetings, the coalition emphasizes on the need to get more
attractive reviews from the media and facing less criticism from the international human rights
organizations must be a renewed goal. According to the interviewee, such evaluations are especially important around the time local or national elections are held. Because, for TPLF dominated
EPRDF’s political elite, it is clear that the people are always on the side of the opposition and the
people are in fact sympathetic with the helpless political parties that dream of ousting the EPRDF
political coalition from political power while it’s already clear that in the absence of a plain playing
field, heightened abuses and arbitrary arrests against their members and leadership, chances that
opposition parties could be able to challenge amounts to zero.
In general, from the discussions presented in the chapter thus far, firstly, we see that the
democratic opening that was evident at the beginning of the transitional political order, amounted
to nothing but just a deception designed to elevate the citizens’ enthusiasm from the just concluded
regime change and gain international as well as domestic legitimacy. Secondly, we have also witnessed that the institutional solution of ethnic federalism primarily designed to answer the age old
81

The interview with interviewee number-eight took place on April 27th, 2017 in Boston, Massachusetts.
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questions of ethnic grievances of inequality did not result in a desired outcome. Instead, such an
institutional solution’s implementation led to the emergence of a dominant party state that was
possible via the ruling coalition’s successful creation of a party structure that dominated the state
of politics across all levels of the federal setting. In the next chapters, I will further present how
that dominant party structure effectively overshadowed the federal setting in a range of topics.
6.10 Conclusion
From the discussions of how the post-1991 Ethiopian politics unfolded, it is apparent that
the fact that the ruling coalition’s intent on promoting the group rights agenda backfired against
minorities in the regional states, led to the emergence of ethnic tensions, and the promises of democratic opening that were evident in the first year of the transitional charter era vanished. However,
it is also critical to note that as a newly emerged authoritarian regime, the ruling coalition’s mechanisms that it utilizes to assert its rule had to go beyond its creation of an ethnic federal setting that
now seems to have balanced ethnic interests as a result of the self administrating rights given to
the regional states, at least to their claims. This does not mean however, that such regional states
enjoy the political autonomies that are outlined in the federal constitution, as much of the discussion in the chapter indicated. Instead, the regime’s efforts in making sure such ethnic interests are
represented through the creation of regional states along ethnic and linguistic lines, have led to
claims of victory for the regime for it succeeded in bestowing such rights unlike its predecessors
and such claims of success have convinced the regime’s elites to believe that they have gained the
legitimacy to rule. Unfortunately, the regime’s political elites seemed content with their introduction such an institutional solution to address the historical grievances while ignoring the political
will and governance needed in affirming their efforts to address such questions of inequality.
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However, recalling part two of the dissertation’s goal is to understand how the ethnic federal setting as an institutional solution has contributed to the political elites’ survivalist approach
to politics by serving the political elites with a framework to apply the tactical mechanisms of
survival. Hence, the focus remains in understanding the tactics of the ruling coalition and how
such mechanisms played out in practical terms. I argue that the discussions on the use of evaluations at central government and regional state levels, as managed by the EPRDF member parties
that administer the larger regional states are critical to our broader understanding. Those EPRDF
coalition member parties that also happen to supervise the EPRDF affiliate political parties across
the ‘developing’ regional states and all the evidences point to how the regime’s political elite benefit from the very federal structure they created to ensure their survival ambitions. Henceforth, in
the next chapter, we see how the electoral system in the country has also failed the very federal
setting of the Ethiopian state in the last two decades given the dominant party structure. Moreover,
the next chapter also exposes us in understanding how the relations between the regional states
and the federal government evolved, and how the bureaucracy also emerges as a patron to a centralist party structure of EPRDF’s ruling coalition.

7

CHAPTER SEVEN: ETHNIC FEDERALISM, CENTRALIZED PARTY STRUCTURE AND CO-OPTATION MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL

7.1

Introduction
To recall, in chapter six, I discussed that in the post-1991 Ethiopia, the newly arrived po-

litical coalition first outlined a transitional charter, which promised greater rights and freedoms,
promised democratic reforms, and introduced the basics of the federal structure along ethnic and
linguistic lines. However, I also argued that such a federal setting as it eventually evolved, was
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proved to be deficient in so many ways. Such a federal setting’s shortcomings in terms of safeguarding minority rights are therefore detailed. We also see that some instances in the relations
between the central government and the newly minted regional states became questionable in so
many of the examples I presented. By continuing in the path of such a conversation, chapter seven
also focuses in explaining the ruling coalitions’ manipulations of the electoral mechanisms in place
while also providing a broader explanation with regards to the Ethiopian state bureaucracy and the
power it maintains vis-à-vis the dominant party structure spread across all levels of government in
the country. Moreover, the chapter also addresses how the relations between the regional states
and the political elite in charge of the administrative duties in those regions vis-à-vis the TPLF
dominated EPRDF coalition in the broader context.
7.2

Electoral Mechanisms in Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federal Setting
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed that the initial setbacks that failed the democratic open-

ings in the post 1991 Ethiopia and opened the doors for the unraveling of survivalist strategic
interest of the TPLF led EPRDF political elite, and that started with OLF’s exit from its partnership
with EPRDF in the transitional government. Then, I had also explained that the onslaught that was
directed against the newly emerging free-press in that particular period, was quite an example of
how the democratic opening occurred only for strategic purposes of legitimizing the new regime’s
rule from the start, in which the regime’s further assault on that sector grew after the EPRDF elite
achieved full grip of political power at the end of the political transition. There, I also showed that
OLF leadership’s understanding of the political dynamics in which it became clear that they could
not play a constructive role in serving their constituencies’ as well as the nation in a newly arranged
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federal setting due to the dominance of TPLF’s leadership in the transitional period and its unflinching control of the security apparatus (all playing in its favor) became the basis for their exit
from from the partnership. Moreover, it is critical to note that I have also mentioned that the opposition groups that were hastily formed by political elites from the old regimes, some intellectuals
and civilians, were not able to withstand the repressive tactics of TPLF led EPRDF coalition and
even boycotted series of election from 1992 to 1995 nationally as well as regional elections, which
would even become a pattern as could be seen later after the advent of the new millennia.
Boycotts of elections in Ethiopia’s national elections by the opposition political parties is
mostly common. And the complaints among the opposition, the media (of course, the international
media, in particular given the domestic media is extremely weekend) and some observers, however, starts with the nature of the National Election Board (hereafter NEB) of the country. Thus
far, it is known that in post 1991 Ethiopia, the newly designed institutions and the regime’s intent
in committing to democracy was discussed. The achievements of the new political elite in factual
terms, in fact, cannot be undermined as what happened in the country was quite a departure from
what describes the imperial era or the repressive socialist military regime’s highly centralized national politics in the decades past. However, it is crucial to recall what remains important to the
dissertation is not knowing how the NEB functions, but how the regime effectively manipulates it
to succeed in its survivalist agenda will be further explored in detail below.
The reality is that the TPLF leadership that dominates the EPRDF coalition has effectively
closed on the idea of democratic reforms that they had openly aspired to build from the beginning
of the transitional period, given the democratic opening we witnessed was also short lived. For the
regime, it was important to curtail those openings so they could embark on the survivalist political
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agenda which they saw as the only option for not only the survival of the coalition but also crucial
if the programs they envisioned are made to work. The electoral mechanisms and the institutions
that manage such elections in that regard would become highly exploited instruments of the regime
from the start. In that respect, the NEB since its founding became no more than an institution that
serves the interest of the coalition in power. As one of the interviewees (interviewee number-one)
mentions, the officials running the NEB have always been political appointees and their main job
is to make sure the EPRDF coalition secures an institutional cover in the management of fraudulent
elections. According to the interviewee, “given the NEB is highly controlled by the EPRDF, the
governmental authority or ‘institution’ that gives licenses to newly emerging opposition political
parties, the ‘institution’ that revokes the licenses of such opposition parties, and who also allocates
the public funding of the political parties competing at any given election period is indirectly the
EPRDF, which is a political party coalition that manages the electoral framework resulting in the
absence of an independent institution for the one that exists is nothing but a fake stand in saving
faces.”82 What the individual stated here is crucially important. As someone who worked for such
an institution, what he argues implies that the electoral board that had to project an important level
of political independence but has failed tremendously in that regard. Because, from what its actions
induce, the institution is there to do nothing but to serves as an institutional cover to the ruling
coalition’s survivalist agenda.
According to further explanations by interviewee number-one, expecting the NEB to be
impartial and fair is of course very difficult and the fact that the opposition has lost trust of such
an institution is not in any way surprising. As Jon Harbeson (1998), who studied the first few
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elections in the post socialist era (post 1991) states, the issue of impartiality was not even a question given how the electoral commission, (which was later renamed as a Board) came into existence in the first place. Harbeson states,
“The National Election Commission came into being in December 1991. It was
composed of ten members of the Council of Representatives, representing the major political groups within the council. The commission oversaw all aspects of the 1992 elections.
The EPRDF issued Proclamations 9 and 11, establishing the legal and institutional framework for the elections. The commission then issued a comprehensive set of rules for implementing these proclamations (page 119).”
What we see is that the NEB, as opposed to managing the electoral competition in a fair
manner and ensuring that the diverse groups in the country will have the opportunity for fair representation, it emerged as another institutional mechanism where the political elite within the
TPLF led EPRDF leadership manipulate and co-opt those serving in various institutions within
federal Ethiopia in supporting the survivalist agenda, by depriving them of their independence,
and by formalizing such co-optation mechanisms effectively. As Harbeson clearly state above, the
formation of the NEB was even facilitated after ten individuals were picked from the pool of members in the transitional government’s parliament, which of course completely dominated by the
EPRDF and its affiliate parties. Indeed, from what is evident from the what I learned from my
discussions with interviewee number-two, a long serving government official, noting that his argument was also concurred by many others, competing against the EPRDF in Ethiopia is like
witnessing a very competitive sport with one of the teams also sponsoring and selecting the team
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of referees who over see the competition, immediately leading to questions on the integrity of the
games to be played.
In post-1991 Ethiopia, when we look at the electoral competitions starting from the transitional period, EPRDF’s role in election management was very much clear from the outset. Walle
Engdayehu (1993), who also studied the first elections in post 1991 Ethiopia states, if we are to
measure the elections and management of elections in the country in the transitional period based
on the basic tenets of what a free election should be, the elections in that period would be considered complete failures even if that period to some extent was considered to have had a relatively
promising democratic opening. From what Engdayehu stated, it is also clear why despite the initial
democratic openings and promises of free and fair elections, the boycott of elections by the opposition groups became common from the start. In the author’s explanation of the elections conducted
in post 1991 Ethiopia, we find that,
“First, it became clear that the boycott of the elections by the major opposition
parties left the ruling EPRDF party in control of the regional administrative bodies. This
means that when national elections are held for the federal legislative seats in 1993, the
regional units of government will be dominated by supporters of the EPRDF, giving that
party an edge for its candidates in most of the election districts throughout the country.
Second, although any politically organized groups were free, in principle, to compete
openly in the elections, the party in power, that is the EPRDF, had a built-in advantage to
influence the participation of those groups that it liked or disliked. This was confirmed
particularly in the cases of the COEDF (Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces) and
Medhin, both of which were not allowed to operate as legal opposition parties. The two
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exiled opposition groups have continued to report that the EPRDF refused to authorize
their participation in the political process. Some observers believe that the two have the
potential of unseating the EPRDF in free and open democratic elections. They argue that
the efforts to democratize the political system would have had a positive meaning for Ethiopia if the opposition groups had been allowed to compete uninhibited by, and free from,
the threat of political intimidation and harassment' in all political activities” (page 42).
What we see from the Engdayehu’s assessment is that the playing field in electoral competition remained skewed in EPRDF’s favor from the beginning and the old traditions of fake
elections as a way to gain even meagre amounts of legitimacy has continued to this day where
there is no insight of a credible opposition political party that can stand against the EPRDF dominance in any way.
Bringing the extended discussion I had with interviewee number-five back, the interviewee, (important to note the individual had also served the EPRDF government holding various
cabinet positions in the central government and at a regional state level), answered to my question
focused on the fairness of the electoral competition in the country saying, “I run for parliament
three times and only I can assure you that I won outright in the first one since I had no a direct
opponent at all as the independently running candidate was forced to decide not to compete against
me given the mounting pressure he felt from the security forces. In the second and third time I run
for Ethiopian House of Representatives (the Parliament), both times, the internal polling indicated
that I would lose my reelection bids in landslide to Oromo National Congress’s (ONC) well liked
and successful candidates. However, the regime made sure that alternative ballots were pre-pre-
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pared and the election results that were announced showed that I garnered more than seventy percent of the votes in both elections leaving me as an outright winner.” To my surprise, the interviewee also mentioned that the election board (NEB) and some officials within the board were
very much aware of what actually transpired in my district as well as many others where fraudulent
election result were also revealed”. When I pressed the individual in providing examples on how
the NEB addresses complaints of the opposition, the individual stated that, “in 2010, one of the
officials running the NEB was asked by a foreign journalist if he can prove the election in the
district where I ‘won’ was not fraudulent. And the official responded saying that, ‘that district in
particular had an extremely free and fair elections and in fact the NEB considers the district as an
example of the success of all the elections held during that period.”
From the nature of the type of the electoral system, which I discuss in part-one of the dissertation to some extent, the NEB serving as a stand in elections comptroller, and the ever-increasing presence of the security forces in playing roles of intimidating, arresting and pressuring the
opposition parties and their members from challenging the regime in power, we can infer that the
TPLF led EPRDF, I reiterate has emerged as a successful survivalist political coalition out of its
tactics of exploiting the very institutional frameworks it designed and cooptation mechanism that
successfully coopted the regional and local elites.
7.3

The EPRDF and the Emergence of a Dominant Party State
It was during the May 2010 elections in Ethiopia were taking place, and I was watching

the Ethiopian public television (commonly known as ETV until it changes its name to EBC, Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation), English news broadcast, when the journalist reading the news
referred the EPRDF’s success in winning ‘consecutive elections’ has now led to the coming to

171

existence of a ‘dominant party state’ in the country. The ‘forty-five’ seconds news item also featured the then Speaker of the House of Representatives (the Ethiopian parliament), Ambassador
Teshome Toga. The news, as I fully transcribed it reads as,
“The federal parliamentary speaker, Teshome Toga said, “the dominant party state
is taking its roots in Ethiopia as EPRDF has won the national elections consecutively.
EPRDF has consequently won the national elections, as the Ambassador said, adding this
shows Ethiopia is transforming into the dominant party system. He singled out Japan, Finland and India as living examples where the dominant party system has developed. Though
political parties were not able to assume power by winning elections, there is a wider opportunity for them to have their say in issues of national interest and concerns, Teshome
said. He noted the dominant party system will not limit multi-party system.”83
The existence of dominant political parties that win consecutive election in democratic
states is in fact common and it would not take away from the democratic characters of such countries in most ways. The problem with the Ethiopian experience however, is that as opposed to the
May 2010 elections, it was the May 2005 national elections that were competitive and during that
particular national election, the opposition for the first time was able to galvanize huge popular
support and even winning the election until the EPRDF decided otherwise and the then Prime
Minister, Mr. Meles Zenawi, declared a curfew and a state of emergency in the next day after the
election84. Such incidents and their significance will be explained in the other half of this chapter
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as I broadly discuss the most pivotal times in the evolution of Ethiopia’s federalism and the
EPRDF’s success in its survivalist strategies. Nevertheless, after most of those opposition politicians decisively won the 2005 election but instead were sent to prison signified the end of the
meagre democratic opening during that era (second time after the the other relative opening during
the transitional period in early nineties), the regime’s political elite learned their lessons and the
May 2010 national elections would emerge as the most boycotted of all since the EPRDF was able
to win 99.6 % of the election, confirming the speaker of the house’s assumption of the emergence
of a dominant party state.
In fact, it was in the aftermath of that particular election in 2010 that the then Speaker of
the House, Ambassador Teshome Toga was able to proudly state the emergence of ‘a dominant
party state’ in the country. Even recently, a top EPRDF leader and the most important player within
the TPLF and the longest serving minister of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Mr. Abay Tsehaye,
even suggested that if EPRDF is to lose political power, and with most of the opposition complaining about the ethnic background of those who are in power, (given most of the political power is
in the hands of the TPLF and thus ethnic Tigrayans), the fate of the country could even resemble
that of what happened in Rwanda. According to his interview given in Amharic language, he is
heard saying, “the number of the major ethnic groups in Rwanda is just two. But imagine that
happens in our country where over eighty ethnic groups live together, and the results would be
catastrophic.”85 The TPLF leadership’s mentioning of the Rwanda genocide is quite common and
even at a certain point in the 2005 election campaigns, the ruling elite had often recalled ‘the
notorious interhamwe’ group in Rwanda and used it to describe the Ethiopian opposition and what
85
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they would do if chances of seizing political power arrives86. In claiming so, not only it became
so clear that the EPRDF coalition aspires to assert its dominance, but also indicated that they will
not have open ears for the opposition that constantly demands fairness on issues of representation,
wealth distribution and democratic rights.
In general, as Kjetil Tronvoll (2010) also stated in a clear summary of what the EPRDF
was able to accomplish in stifling the voice of the opposition and setting the tone for the public
that without their leadership, Ethiopia would proceed into ruins and thus the ultimate option left
is nothing but to back the regime, prior to the election in May 2010, the author states that,
“By ratifying new restrictive legislation and adopting new policies aimed at curbing
dissent, the government consciously developed a complex and multi-layered strategy to
prevent the political opposition from consolidating and making further political and electoral advances. In the aftermath of the 2005 electoral shock, the EPRDF leadership, and
notably the chief ideologist Prime Minister Meles Zenawi himself, authored a number of
booklets used to reinvigorate and re-ideologize the party apparatus and to inspire and guide
cadres in fulfilling the power ambitions of the party. For instance, in a booklet called Democracy and Democratic Unity used in the massive, countrywide teacher training ideology
seminars conducted in early 2006 to ‘explain’ the 2005 election result and the following
crackdown, and make corrections for the future, it is explicitly stated that the Ethiopian
people has a ‘clear choice between dependency and anti-democracy forces (utilizing tools
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of chauvinism and narrow nationalism) and revolutionary democracy (peace and developmentalism) …. No Ethiopian can stand on middle ground or be neutral.’ During the massive re-ideologization campaign undertaken after the 2005 elections (commonly referred
to as ‘capacity-building’ seminars and supported through donor basket funding), the
EPRDF and the Prime Minister deliberately employed an alarmist language, aiming to polarize the political landscape and to convince the people that, without EPRDF in power,
Ethiopia would turn into chaos” (page 3-4).
What Tronvoll argues in fact is also what confirms what the political elite in particular
interviews that they provided and I cited, had clearly explained boasting of their cementing of the
ruling party’s dominance by either in sharing their warnings against the opposition or their extended use of the scare tactics against the peoples’ quest for fairness in elections. Now that I have
explained how the EPRDF coalition emerged dominant and made sure such dominance could not
be challenged, it is also vital to look at how the EPRDF is able to dominate the political spectrum
and achieve the trust of its members (party cadres all over the country) in both at the central government and the regional states at large. From the discussions presented as to EPRDF’s manipulation of the electoral system, it is crucial to note that the national elections in 2005 and 2010 and
what subsequently happened point to the further consolidation of the dominant party state.
7.4

The Makeup of the Ruling Coalition: Patron-Client Relations in Ethiopia’s Ethnic
Federal Setting
As discussed in the literature review’s segment in part-one of the dissertation on what leads

certain authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes to rule longer, what mostly surfaces is that how
the regime under a leadership of a certain political party succeeds in survivalist approaches is by
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primarily amassing support among the party members that are available in various leadership positions within the party structure as well as on duties of administering local governments. In the
case of the PRI, in Mexico, we saw that the party made sure the rents are somewhat distributed
along the party lines and the lower position cadres had their share of benefits, which is explained
in the outcome of not much challenge coming against the elites with higher party positions. (Magaloni, 2006). In cases of some Middle Eastern monarchies, we see that the role of family and relatives who control the most important positions of the state led to outcomes of stability in ruling
regimes (Herb, 1999). In general terms, however, as I argued in part one of the dissertation, finding
an argument that explains most cases, especially the ones in Sub-Saharan Africa is difficult to
come by. In most single or multi-case studies of African states as well as comparative cross-case
studies, however, one important explanation looms most than others and that is the issue of institutions and institutional settings.
Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski’s (2007) seminal argument for instance, states that
the ruling elites’ enclosure of potential challengers in their coalition make up and legislative assemblies across the political spectrum could lead to an outcome of regime survival. Taking this
and applying to various cases of parliamentary systems where the need for coalitions is the only
and ultimate option in creating a fifty plus one voting block in semi-authoritarian states where we
get periodic quasi competitive elections could in fact show that the authors’ argument suffices in
its attempt to explain such cases. Nonetheless, applying to Ethiopia, it still falls short given the
dominant party apparatus of the EPRDF coalition is no where near to appeasing or incorporating
oppositions in its executive or legislative setting as this ruling coalition despite known as a coalition, basically functions as a single political party that is very much unwelcome of unwanted
guests, i.e. the opposition. While that indeed is the case, the authors, consistent with most who
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argue the existence of clientelistic relations (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) also argue that, “coopting by distributing spoils and co-opting by making policy concessions entail different institutional mechanisms” that help such regimes survive longer).87 Such an argument, indeed show that
institutions and how such institutions are designed play equally a huge role to our understanding
of survivalist strategies of political elites on top of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. I
have so far showed how the ethnic federal setting starting from the constitution to the the design
of regional states and the results we saw from decreasing nationalism and the emergence of ethnic
conflicts contributed to the EPRDF coalition’s emergence as a sole care taker of the Ethiopian
state. Questions on how the institutional setting within federal Ethiopia shaped the clientelistic
nature of regional state-federal relations therefore must be further examined. In doing so, I hereby
attempt to dwell more on the co-optation mechanisms in play within that center-regional state
relationship.
The Ethiopian Somali Regional State is a region in Ethiopia that had its share of suffering
due to Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia during the imperial as well as the military socialist regime’s
era for their irredentist agendas of creating the greater Somalia nation causing unprecedented proportions of violence and suffering in this region. Moreover, the Ethiopian Somalis have also suffered under low levels of representation in previous regimes and the introduction of ethnic federal
arrangement in post 1991 Ethiopia, which bestowed the opportunity of self-administration on Somali citizens had aroused quite an enormous level of enthusiasm and hope among that part of the
country. Understanding how that particular regional state is administered, identifying the powers
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and autonomy of the regional state’s elites within that region however, displays a different outcome.
One of the extended interviews I conducted in my field research was with an Ethiopian
Somali who had served within the regional state as well as lived most of his life as businessman
in the city of Jijiga, the capital of the regional state. According to interviewee number forty-one,
in his long experience of working in the region and for the regional state, he has never witnessed
the Ethiopian Somali regional state enjoying the autonomy that the federal constitution had given
to the newly created regional states. Not that the other regional states enjoyed such rights as well,
but we find that the Ethiopian Somalis’ regional state appears to have different outcomes even in
comparison to other regions. First of all, the interviewee argues, “the region and its people, as we
all know were one of the most forgotten regions by previous regimes and the fact that the federal
arrangement took place and created wider sets of openings for the emergence of regional elites
that would take advantage of the opportunity, (which led to a competition among those who wanted
to show their capabilities as poised and experienced leaders) by appearing in front of those who
come from the central government to help the Ethiopian Somalis make that transition of administering their own region, was quite intense. The problem however, was that the political elite from
the center wanted to make sure that they elect not individuals according to their educational qualifications or expertise, but ‘who is trusted more’ became the rationale in that decision making
process of organizing and establishing a properly functioning Ethiopian-Somali regional state.”88

The interview with interviewee number forty-one, was conducted on Sunday, July 2nd in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands.
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Due to tensions across the Ethiopian-Somali boarder and the presence of armed rebellion
whereby the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) constantly fighting the regime’s military
at all times since the past decades, the presence of the Ethiopian defense forces in the region in
huge numbers is easier to witness. The Ethiopian military, as one of the highly dominated institutions of the state by the TPLF political leadership and their former rebel commanders now turned
generals and higher military officials, however, has led to its role in the region to also grow by not
only overseeing the regional elites in this particular region, but also it even has the necessary legitimate authority to dismiss and appoint the regional state’s leaders as it wishes.
To provide a further extended example, according to Abdullahi Hussen, an individual who
had worked for the regional state as a personal advisor to the regional state’s president and close
confident, and who gave an interview to an Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) based in Washington D.C., after he left the country to exile, the individual explains that the regional state’s president receives his orders directly from the military general based in the regional state. According
to the individual, “General Abraham, not only receives reports and gives orders in any administrative issue that ranges from budgetary issues to security matters, but also I believe that he is the one
who is indirectly administering the state.”89 When pressed by the journalist about how that actually
happens in reality and what are the benefits of administering such a big regional state, Mr. Abdullahi responds by saying that the regime has convinced that the only way that the Ethiopian Somalis
were able to now claim their won regional state and enjoy the ‘self-administrative rights’ is because of the sacrifices the TPLF leadership and its former rebel soldiers paid in the armed struggle
that ousted the military regime. Therefore, as a way to build the administrative capacity of the
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regional state, close supervision of the state by central elites, mainly those elites within TPLF is
important.
What I argue is mind blowing in that interview is however, the footage of a secretive meeting that the regional state president had conducted with Ethiopian Somali clan leaders, provided
to the media outlets by Mr. Abdullahi, where the regional state’s president is heard and watched
explaining how for the ethnic Somalis to keep their interests and grow their capacity and have
greater say in the country’s politics could only be possible by working closely with the Tigrayan
elites. In that interview, the regional state’s president, Mr. Abdi Mohamoud Omar claims as he
speaks in Somali language and the excerpts taken from the subtitles of the television network,
Ethiopian Satellite Television, ESAT,
“Today, the Tigrayans like the Somalis more than any ethnic group in the country.
The problem is however, we the Ogadenis,90 are the ones that are causing the regime problems while the truth is that what the Tigrayans aspire is to arm us, strengthen us and lead
the nation together with us. The Tigrayns do not want to see only one thing, that is the
Amharas being able to control the Ethiopian state ever again. We Somalis consider the
Oromos, the Gurages and the Tigres and others as if they are all Amharas. Because, we are
backward and we cannot even distinguish among all these groups. That has been the problem that kept us from developing and growing. Unless we are now able to learn and differentiate among such groups, they all can work together and rule over us like before. Make
no mistake, when an Ethiopian Somali goes to Addis Ababa, he immediately works with
the Tigrayans who are extremely dominant at the central government. And know that all
90
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other major ethnic groups are so divided that chances they can all cooperate and work
together is slim. Therefore, we have to take advantage of that.”91
What we see in the Ethiopian ethnic federal arrangement in general of course, is that the
political elite within the TPLF that are the dominant force ruling the EPRDF coalition and the
mind behind such an institutional design of ethnic federal setting, have made sure that what the
such a setting serves for is nothing but producing political elites that are conducive for their manipulation strategies and co-optation mechanisms that are in play for realizing their survivalist
strategies. In that respect, finding honest and sincere ‘confessions’ by the co-opted elites themselves, as President Omar of Ethiopian Somali’s region could be the best example, is more telling
of such institutional schemes of survival than anything else.
Tobias Hagmann (2005), who conducted extensive field research in the Ethiopian Somali
Regional State and identified the mechanism in which the the regional state’s elites are co-opted
also argues that that region in particular could be explained in terms of the traces of “neo-patrimonialism, institutional instability, and patronage relations”.92 Consistent with the arguments from
my findings in my field research and other information I presented on how the regional state is
‘indirectly’ run by the TPLF, Hagmann also broadly states the phenomenon in Ethiopian Somali
regional state as:
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“Generally, the insecurity of state institutions and agents engenders systematic instability. Ever since 1991, instability has been omnipresent within the executive branch of
the Somali region. Under the EPRDF regime, regional presidents have become ‘perishable
commodities. No former president lasted for more than three years, and for half of this
period they were subject to federal investigation. The first three presidents were charged
with corruption, abuse of authority, and other crimes, and their successors usually met a
similar fate. The ruling party’s central committee dismisses large parts of the regional cabinet each year, usually at the start of the new budget year (July). In addition, its common
for government officials to circulate between the regional bureaus, seldom maintaining
their position longer than one year. This has led to a situation in which the people never
ask themselves ‘How does the regional government perform?’, but rather ‘How long are
they going to stay in power?”.93
The underlying reality in this particular region is that it likely because of what the author
explained above that between 1992 and 2010, there were 12 presidents of the Ethiopian Somali
Regional State, who barely escaped with their lives or removed from their position of power or
detained. As we see from Hagmann’s close observations of the state and given earlier explanation
in how the so called ‘developing states’ like the Ethiopian Somali region are governed through cooptation, EPRDF’s affiliate parties that are running regional governments would have to be content
with ever increasing control by the central government’s elites if they are to remain in power. The
nature of the patronage system thus relies on the elites at regional governments accepting that they
would be staying put enjoying relatively low levels of rents from corruption. And that will not put
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them under the federal elite’s scrutiny as along as they are not suspected of conspiring to ‘increase
their region’s level of political autonomy’ and start to ask questions. In return, such levels of purposeful ignorance of the TPLF elites’ maneuvers of the regional states, presents them the legitimacy in the eyes of the TPLF leadership and ensure longevity to their rule of such regions. Next,
I also provide a highlight of a couple of other regional states and how the center-periphery relations
under the ethnic federal setting in Ethiopia further unraveled in favor of the survivalist ambition
of the EPRDF coalition and its dominant elites from the TPLF.
In a further effort to show how the federal setting that was promoted and implemented as
response to the age long calls for reforms that would correct the political and economic inequality
across ethnic groups in the Ethiopian state, although I have argued that it has become an utter
failure, I would first discuss another highly marginalized state both in past and present times, the
Regional state of Gambella, and then corroborate other broader cases where I assessed with sets
of discussions with my respondents in the intensive field work as well as use of the secondary
literature on the topic at hand.
The Gambella regional state, like the Ethiopian Somali region also went through various
political and economic misfortunes. The region, which is located in South-Western part of the
country, due to its geographical proximity to the South Sudan, which had its share of civil wars
had also served as a base to the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Front (SPLA). The region remains
highly populated by the southern Sudanese refuges that avoided the grueling civil war that still
characterizes their new nation. Moreover, the ethnic groups in Gambella had also suffered from
under representation in previous Ethiopian regimes and its demographic make up had always been
shifting, sometimes in dramatic ways, due to the settlement programs of the military regime that
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brought many highlanders (mostly Amharas and to some extent Oromos) to the region (Feyissa
2006). The post 1991 Ethiopian ethnic federal arrangement thus had brought new optimism as it
was perceived as a solution that would alleviate the region and those ethnic groups in the area from
the problems of prolonged history of inequality that they suffered under.
The problem with in the Gambella regional state however is two dimensional, which is
quite different in comparison with other regional states. The regions that I discussed earlier such
as the Harari regional state and the Bennishagul-Gumuz regional state have usually one dimensional in a sense that those who control the administrative apparatus of the regional state usually
are found to have oppressed minority rights and as a result, they receive their share of blessings
from the central government that either acts oblivious to what happens against such minorities and
individuals or takes slow responses when under pressure. The same is true in the Ethiopian Somali
regional state where various forms of oppressions could be seen on clan and tribal lines but mostly
the regime’s military generals are in control of the political climate in the region therefore most of
the blame in the atrocities committed against what are considered minorities could be attributed to
the regime’s dictating of terms in the region. In Gambella however, the problems are two dimensional because the people to people relations and the conflicts that are prevalent in the region are
mostly witnessed in the conflict amongst the native ethnic groups themselves as well as the natives
versus the settlers who came due to the so called villagization programs from the previous regimes
(Feyissa 2006; Kurimoto 1997).
The federal setting starting from its implementation in 1991 had therefore attempted to
address such issues in different ways. The two ways that I argue stand out are however, firstly the
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regime effectively empowered the natives, especially the Nuer, which the political elites had considered an ally given their suspicion that the majority ethnic group with in the region, the Annuak
had been collaborators of the old regimes therefore were not trusted to be empowered with political
powers. Secondly, the EPRDF elite, with the region’s fertile land and untapped resources in mind,
had militarized the regional state and empowered its military leaders in also interfering in regional
administrative affairs thus weakening the autonomy of the newly created regional state of Gambella. EPRDF’s use of the TPLF dominated military in the so called ‘developing states’ indeed
was also clearly evident from what the role of the military generals that I discussed with regards
to their part in administrative decision makings processes in the Ethiopian-Somali regional state.
I argue that the unleashing of the military emanates from the regime’s fears of such regions climatic features that are considered to be potential safe heavens of anti-regime armed resistances.
Recalling what I discussed with respect to ethnic conflicts and the gross human rights violations,
especially perpetrated against the Annuak, what I argued above makes even more sense. As interview number twenty-eight, who is an ethnic Oromo but lived all his life in the Gambella region
corroborated, “the TPLF led regime understands that an effective control of the Gambella regional
state implies a creation of a security zone that prevents a potential rebellion from breading in the
region’s conducive terrains and rain forest that is challenging to control. Secondly, the region is
economically so important means that any problems that potentially arise from the natives, especially the Annuak majority had to be kept in check.”94 According to the individual, the Annuak’s
suffering in the region, which had always garnered international attention due to headlines of massacres and even genocide in the area, had always remained the ruling elites’ headache. Thus, making sure the regional elites’ become highly controlled patrons of the central elites based in Addis
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Ababa was the only option. Any challenges that come from the regional elites in Gambella therefore has led to arrests of the leaders that includes one of the region’s former presidents who still
remain in jail with bogus charges although his main crime, most believe is that he attributed the
killings of the Annuak to the regime’s military in the region95.
Looking at the Literature written assessing the regional autonomy of Gambella regional
state and how the federal setting failed from its initial promises, Dereje Feyissa (2006) states that
instead of correcting the historical failures, what the regime introduced is nothing but a “renewed
interactions of dominance” between the central and regionally empowered elites. The author further states that:
“The primary reason why the federal experiment is faltering is that the post-1991
political order has produced new and insecure political minorities, and the political actors
have failed to strike a political bargain and articulate a regional interest. Instead, they have
sought to capture fragments of the regional state and its institutions. In the event, they have
increasingly recognized and exploited the rationality of violence in the politics of group
entitlement” (page 215).
In actuality, the above argument captures the notion of a failing federal experiment in well
articulated fashion. However, as I stated time earlier, I reiterate that what is evident in Gambella
is a pattern of using a certain region’s political peculiarities to the federal level political elites’
benefits of nothing but political survival as we clearly saw in cases of other regional states from
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In Oakland institute’s page, we see a letter from the son of the jailed president appealing to American
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Bennishangul Gumuz to Ethiopian Somali and from Harari regional state to others. As Feyissa
also further elaborates by bringing into fold the issue of individual rights and group rights, he states
that, “the problematics of group rights are also acted out amongst the locals, making the issue of
entitlement and ownership ever more contestable” (page 217). This in fact is a challenge in addition to the fact that under-represented highlanders, that mostly arrived from areas in Amhara and
Oromia communities, and now considered minorities within that regional state, are left with reality
of encountering a two-ended sword of oppression by both the regional elites in the region in addition to the central government ruling coalition which indirectly control the political proceedings
in the said state that never addresses such grievances that come from minorities in those regional
states like Gambella.
I believe that the general explanations presented in this segment of the chapter with regards
to the existence of political clientelism and the mechanisms of manipulation, as exhibited from the
cases we have seen thus far should suffice the goal of the project, which among others looks at
identifying patron-client relations and thus the mechanisms of elite co-optation at the regional state
levels that aid the survivalist ambitions of those controlling political power. Overall, as the dissertation’s main contribution is explaining how such a federal ethnic setting enabled the political
elites at the center (mainly the TPLF leadership and their allies within the coalition), understanding
how such federal experiment also unraveled in the bigger and influential regional states that are
being administered by the member parties of the EPRDF coalition is essential. In my field research
whereby I extensively attempted to collect the most information with regards to how the ruling
coalition actually operates, the central explanation I found most is that the federal elites at the
center that are mostly composed of the four member parties (TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDM)
control the proceedings from Addis Ababa and the regional elites in these four regional states of
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Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Southern regions implement the directives that come from their particular party’s bosses at the center.
The Tigray Regional State, in the post 1991 political transformation in Ethiopia, although
located in the northern periphery of the country, served as the political epicenter of the TPLF led
EPRDF era. The TPLF and its leadership that had orchestrated such a federal setting, organized
and created the member parties that would join and create a formidable EPRDF coalition, had
installed its strongman, Mr. Meles Zenawi first as the federation’s president in the transitional
government and then as Prime Minster until his death in the summer of 2012. The TPLF’s core
leadership, one based in the Tigray regional state’s capital, Mekelle, and the other in the capital of
the government in Addis Ababa had controlled the politics of the coalition and thus the proceedings
in each of the four regional states in a seamless fashion with some challenges getting corrected in
the TPLF way. Bringing back my discussions with interviewee number-five, a longest serving and
once a powerful individual on top of various cabinet portfolios that span almost two decades, the
EPRDF, although is known as a political coalition, truly functions as a single party and its cadres
on both federal and regional levels operate with strict party discipline96. According to the interviewee, the EPRDF coalition basically runs as ‘one party’ and shapes its election manifestos each
national cycle. Therefore, the regional states’ that are controlled by the EPRDF member parties
have to implement such election programs in each five-year cycle and a given regional state’s
performance in its implementation of EPRDF’s programs will be evaluated each year as well.
Based on the reports signaling the successes’ and failures’ of each region to the coalition’s leadership, the policy makers at the EPRDF headquarter in Addis Ababa either reward regional elites for
The interview with interviewee number-five took place on Tuesday, February 21st, 2017 in Washington
DC. A follow up telephone interview had was also conducted on Monday, March 6th, 2017.
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their better performances or interfere in regional affairs so that certain failures are corrected. In
agreement of what I described thus far in the anatomy of center-regional state relations, Lovise
Aalen (2002), who captured such asymmetric relations in the federal setting explains that:
“Ethiopia is today ruled by a coalition party composed of several regionally based
ethnic parties. At first sight, this appears to be a party structure which enhances a federal
division of power, because the central government appear to be run by an organization with
regional, rather than central bases of power. But practically, the EPRDF is controlling all
the regional state governments in the Ethiopian federation, either directly through the member parties or indirectly through affiliate parties. These largely centralized party structures
appear to contradict with the devolved power strictures of federal system” (page 81-82).
As the author articulated it above, the Ethiopian federal setting is of course, clearly characterized as an authoritarian party centralism that overshadows the bureaucratic setting of the
country’s institutions at large. Thus, it essentially invalidates the regime’s claim of a well functioning ethnic federal arrangement. Indeed, given the discussions and evidences presented, we
could also claim that the regime is attempting to fool everyone. However, I take the ethnic federal
setting as it is presented by the regime because it is such ethnically arranged structural setting that
ensured the effective manipulation of the system, providing the political elites the platform for
their mechanisms of political survival. Hence, I argue that in absence of the federal setting, the
regime would have faced a huge difficulty to create such survivalist mechanisms in comparison to
what they have achieved through their manipulation of the federal setting. Within that respect, as
one of my extended interviews with interviewee number-seventeen, who corroborates the argu-
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ments stated above by saying that not only the country is directly run by EPRDF, which is dominated by TPLF’s agenda, but also, there exists what is known as the “government line and the party
line”. The interviewee states that, “the regional states perform effectively better when directions
arrive within the lines of the government’s bureaucratic setting that are mostly about implementing
political and economic programs via policy execution mechanisms. However, at any minute a directive or memorandum that comes from a party headquarter can nullify anything that is being
done at both federal and state levels.”97
As another interviewee, (interviewee number-nine) who had served as a EPRDF’s youth
league leader in Addis Ababa but later joined an opposition political party and now live in exile
stated, “not only the EPRDF headquarter that is filled with individuals considered policy wonks
of the TPLF, provides routine directives to all four of the regions that are under the control of
EPRDF member parties as well as party affiliates in developing regional sates. But also, the party
offices located in the regional states also must receive routine reports from state capitals, which
they would report back to the EPRDF headquarter in Addis Ababa.”98
The individual even shared with me an interesting example in which, at a time he served
as a youth league leader of the Addis Ababa’s EPRDF office, he was even able to receive daily
reports from the care taker mayor of Addis Ababa immediately after the 2005 national elections.
The story, according to him, was that the 2005 national elections led to a stunning defeat of the
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The interviewee resides in Ethiopia but granted me the interview opportunity while in work visit in
Washington DC in the month of April. The date will not be specified given agreement with the interview
participant.
The interview with interviewee number-nine took place in Atlanta, United States on Saturday, April 15th
2017.
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EPRDF coalition at the hands of an opposition coalition of parties. After the then fragile looking
political coalition known as the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) won all of Addis Ababa’s parliamentary as well as regional council’s seats, and EPRDF leaders eventual decision to
arrest of the leaders of the opposition materialized, the city of Addis Ababa had to be run by hastily
organized ‘independent’ care taker committee that will control administrative matters of the city.
However, what the individual witnessed was that the care taker administration of the city immediately was ordered to report its daily activities to the already defeated mayor of Addis Ababa, Mr.
Arkebe Equbay, who remains one of the strongmen within the TPLF leadership. Moreover, the
interviewee also mentioned that besides Mr. Arkebe, as a EPRDF youth leader of Addis Ababa,
he was able to receive and read such reports from the Addis Ababa’s care taker administration.
According to him, such cases are very consistent with how EPRDF directly and indirectly runs the
federally constituted regional states as well as the two city administrations that fall under the federal government’s jurisdiction, i.e. City Administration of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa.
From what I presented above, although Addis Ababa is directly controlled territory of the
federal government and a seat of the government, which legitimizes the federal government’s administration of the city, two takeaways remain crystal clear. Firstly, it is not the government that
controls administrative issues rather the party apparatus that is highly dominated by the EPRDF.
And such political dominance is what is visible when looking at the ruling coalition’s administration of a city of more than five million, even immediately after it its candidates were defeated by
those same citizens. Secondly, such an instance looking at the city of Addis Ababa’s administration
also provides us a further example on how other regional states in the Ethiopian state are also
administratively co-opted and indirectly ruled. What we see here is that the EPRDF, although
composed of the four political parties that directly administer the four bigger regions, its powers
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outweigh the constitutional frameworks of the federal setting and signifies that the Ethiopian state
is indeed under the yoke of a centralist party structure that has just one goal of survival and assert
its rule for now and forever.
In general terms, it is also vital to note that such a centralist party structure which overshadows the constitutional rule books of the state and installs the EPRDF coalition above everything else however, is constructed through a carefully studied and implemented co-optation mechanisms that even travel beyond the confines of party offices and representatives in regional states.
In that regard, we also see that the bureaucracy at both the federal and regional state levels is the
victim of such a scheme.
7.5

The EPRDF and Cooptation mechanism over Ethiopian State Bureaucracy
As Mengistu and Vogel (2006), who study the bureaucracy’s independence under Ethio-

pia’s Ethnic federalism explain, the trouble is deeper than that as it also exposes the federal constitution’s deficiencies and ambiguities from the start. The authors argue that:
“For Ethiopia and its ethnic-based government, the character, function and capacity
of bureaucracy pose unique questions in terms of achieving bureaucratic neutrality. The
requisite pre-conditions for bureaucratic neutrality and the authenticity of civil service ‘reform’ in such an environment are problematic. For any ethnic federalism, a crucial obstacle
to achieving bureaucratic neutrality is that by definition, ethnic implies separatism while
federalism assures that each ethnicity maintains a significant degree of autonomy with less
collective accountability for its actions” (page 6).
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Leaving aside problematic nature of the constitution in terms of how it addresses the bureaucracy for now, according to Mengistu and Vogel’s account that indeed captures the main issue
however, it is crucial that we closely look at how the patronage system eventually became the main
feature of the Ethiopian bureaucracy across the federal setting. I argue that in post-1991 Ethiopia,
as it is before, the country’s bureaucracy is never made to enjoy the level of independence that it
should have and we see that in EPRDF’s Ethiopia it is very much by design. From the information
collected throughout my field work, the process that challenged as well as tarnished the ‘independent nature’ of the bureaucracy is found to be the selection and recruitment mechanisms that propel
someone to work for the federal or regional state bureaucracy at the initial stage. Such mechanisms
that I hereby discuss with regards to the bureaucracy could also explain the very mechanisms employed by the party structure in its recruitment efforts to fill political positions. In the later stages,
the professional bureaucracy that joined the work force across various departments, regardless of
how good it wants to perform with respect to the rule books of the state, will struggle to evade the
party structure that made sure that those professionals feel that they are there until the party wants
them, which also entails that failing to abide by the rules of the ruling coalition mean jeopardizing
their jobs and the livelihoods of their families. Simply put, what we see in EPRDF’s Ethiopia is
that the government and its bureaucracy administrative efforts across many issues face the constant
threat of their works and decisions overridden by the party structure.
One important feature in the evolution of the the bureaucracy in the EPRDF led regime is
that the party in power introduced series of civil service reforms and capacity building programs
across ranges of departments and issue areas starting from the transitional period in post-1991
Ethiopia (Watson and Yohannes, 2005; Mengistu and Vogel 2006). The very objective of these
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civil service reform strategies was to make sure that the professionals across all levels of the bureaucracy are well acquainted with the ruling coalition’s political and economic programs. Thus,
to the baptize any new recruits to join the bureaucracy with the party’s expectations was one of
the most important priorities in the civil service reform packages. A former state Auditor in the
Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples Region, interviewee number forty-two, who attended series of trainings aimed at the above mentioned goals of the regime explains that the those
who oversee the training programs are not only members of the EPRDF coalition’s member parties
but also urge every trainee at the start of the training sessions to also register for party membership.
In facilitating such a mechanism, the instructors first identify who came from which regional state
and divide all the recruits along ethnic lines. Once that is achieved, and every one becomes a
member of one of the parties within the coalition, the first phase of the training program starts
focusing on how the previous political regimes used the bureaucracy and limited its growth by
completely utilizing its whole purpose for their strict implementation of prior regimes’ political
agenda. The irony, according to interviewee number forty-two however, is that “after the instructors exhausted the trainees with what they refer as ‘the awful past’ history of the civil service, they
commence to familiarize all of us with what EPRDF would do differently, which is basically nothing unique to appreciate.”99
As I argued earlier, as well, EPRDF’s plans from the start were focused on the need to
reestablish a bureaucratic system that is subservient to the coalition’s agenda. In doing so, the
training system makes sure that the professionals running wide spectrum of departments are well
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aware of the ruling coalition’s agenda and takes away methods in which they can use to effectively
implement such party programs on the lower levels of bureaucracy across all levels of government
structure. According to my discussions with interviewee number forty-two, the establishment of
such a bureaucratic setting is also structured in a way that aligns with the party’s line of hierarchical
structure. The trainees will be told that the main purpose of the training programs as seen from
propaganda pieces in the training manuals all point to EPRDF’s commitment in empowering ethnic groups and promoting group rights, while it is evident that what matters most is the survivalist
party structure and program. As such, the professionals within the bureaucracy at both the federal
and regional settings, just as much of the political operation of the EPRDF, will also be recruited,
trained along ethnic lines. In showing how the ruling coalition politicize and ethnicise the bureaucratic apparatus, Arreola and Terrence (2016) also argue that:
“Not only has the EPRDF provided opportunities for the country’s various ethnic
communities in national power structures, it has also granted them a degree of autonomy.
Although the constituent and affiliated parties that govern the regional states still rely on
the center for resources and security, they also control their own substantial bureaucracies
and budgets. It is not the EPRDF as a national coalition that controls the regional institutions and resources, but rather its constituent and affiliated ethnically defined parties. The
regional states are more than mere conveyor belts that transmit the wishes of the center;
they have well-developed political infrastructures and are the day-to-day face of the state
for most rural Ethiopians” (page 77).
While the authors’ acknowledgement of EPRDF’s goal of enriching diverse ethnic groups
opportunities in participating in the management of the bureaucracies in their respective regions
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and districts is certainly the reality per EPRDF’s goals and thus true and not a problem in its own,
few challenges however, become further evident. Firstly, the process in which the bureaucracy is
organized from the recruitment process to the point it is operational shows that the ruling coalition
has successfully achieved the creation of new clients that are out there for the purpose of implementation of the party agenda that leads to strengthening the coalition’s position in its survival
ambitions. Moreover, the notion that the bureaucracy is also designed carrying the promotion of
group rights as its main purpose also poses the same challenges that I presented in discussing the
federal settings across the so called developing regions and others. In such regions, ethnic minorities and individuals were made to be exposed for various methods of oppressive policies and
actions by the regional and lower level elites, whose actions are not checked by the ruling party
coalition at the center. Leonardo Arriola et al’s (2016) work on identifying the chains in the regime’s management of the bureaucracy however, effectively captures what I was able to learn in
my field work experience100.
Table 7.1 Patterns of Co-optation in EPRDF’s Political Reign post-1991
The federal Government and the EPRDF Party Structure à Directly controls the federal
bureaucracy and party members within the structure à The federal bureaucracy and the party
bosses à directly control the regional state bureaucracy and its party member administrators
à the regional state bureaucracy and party members then à directly control the bureaucracy
at Zonal and District level administrations.
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For instance, in my field work, among the very interesting encounters I had with a former Deputy
Minster and a policy researcher at the EPRDF headquarters in Addis Ababa, interviewee number
thirty-six, explained that, “in the policy implementation process after series of the civil service
reform programs and capacity building trainings, (which still continue periodically, given the
party’s adoptions of evolving changes) the ruling party’s ambitions of reforming the bureaucracy
at all levels by empowering ethnic group representatives at different levels of the federal bureaucratic setting backfired immediately against among others, the notion of democratizing the bureaucracy.” The individual adds that, “the first thing that happened was that the newly appointed department directors and individuals within the wider setting of the bureaucracy signed on the terminations of professionals for the reasons such as declining party membership, for being considered anti-development and anti-reform when they voiced concerns on certain policy matters, and
mostly also for being ‘suspected’ as former regime remnants.”101 What is important to note however, is also that what I presented above is mostly relevant to explaining how the professional
bureaucracy that joins the government workforce on expertise basis is co-opted via EPRDF’s centralist party structure. But when it comes to my studies of the more political offices across all levels
of the federal setting that has to be filled with elected candidates, via periodic national elections,
the EPRDF coalition member parties and its affiliate parties in so called developing regions have
unparalleled levels of ever-present capacity to keep their dominance over such offices because of
the leverage they enjoy from the design of the bureaucracy’s structure that is highly manipulated
and co-opted. As a result, what should exist as a line separating the party structure from what
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should be the government’s bureaucracy, in the case of Ethiopia is non-existent or blurred (Lee
2001).102
I reiterate that it is important to note that what we witness in the problems within the state
bureaucracy and the mechanisms employed by the ruling coalition are found to be exemplified
across all ministries, departments, authorities, and directorates. Even to mention an instance of
how the legal bureaucracy and the court system operates in Ethiopia, from the information I collected in the field work, we see that the legal bureaucracy is also not immune from the civil service
reform and capacity building trainings. For someone to work as a judge, government prosecutor
in the legal bureaucracy, party membership becomes the foremost criterion. Thus, showing how
the legal bureaucracy operates depends on the EPRDF party structure.
Interviewee number forty-seven, an individual who had taken most of the training to assume a role of judgeship in the Amhara regional state shared with me his experience, through our
email exchanges explains history in a detailed manner. The individual states,
“I graduated with L.L.B (Law) degree. However, it became very difficult to get a job due
to the fact that I was not a member of the ruling party. After enormous effort and help from
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across Woreda (District) levels, Jin-Sang Lee (2001) mentions the challenges he faced saying,
“The main problem noted here is the blurring of lines between elected and appointed personnel.
At the Woreda level, those who run sector offices are both elected and appointed officials” (page
8).
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someone in the government, I received the chance to join the Amhara Region Justice Reform Program as candidate judge in 2010. During the judicial training, the officers and
tutors of the training began to recruit candidates for the ruling party membership. I believed
that such a move was unconstitutional since a judge should not be a member of any political
party and must be impartial. I immediately rejected the move, citing the relevant provisions
of the law and began to be outspoken about the issue. Most of the candidates although
feared so much, eventually began to support my idea. Eventually, we decided to collectively urge the tutors and officers of the training center about the illegal nature of recruiting
candidate judges for political party membership. On the other hand, the Judicial training
was conducted under the follow up of the Justice Bureau. However, I disagreed with them
since Justice Bureau is an executive organ to overlook the would be Judges’ training and
my argument was the appropriate organ to follow up the training was the Supreme court.
We asked the immediate officials of the training center to give a response to our legitimate
claim. But, they failed to do so. Finally, I organized a committee to make a peaceful demonstration. Once we have had our committee organized, we went to the streets of the Bahir
Dar City to protest and express our concern. Hours in advance, I informed one of the then
widely circulated newspaper, Awramba Times, about the demonstration and its purpose.
After we walked a mile away from our training center, a truck loaded with a huge number
of security police arrived and started to beat us and fire a tear gas towards us. The crowd
would be dispersed and we run away from the area where we were protesting. On the next
day, the newspaper made the demonstration and its cause as a front page cover. What then
followed was that all my three friends and I would again be arrested on our way to flee the
country fearing arrest and persecution. They detained us in a town called Humera for two
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days and took us to Aksum detention center, located in the Tigray Regional State. During
my stay in Aksum, I was interrogated, harassed, and beaten by multiple security personnel
numerous times. After four days of stay in the Aksum detention center, they moved all the
prisoners including me to the capital city, Addis Ababa. When we arrived in Addis Ababa,
security officers blindfolded me and would be taken to a place which I do not have any
idea where it is until today. Keep in mind that all of this happened because we demonstrated
mainly against ideas requiring judges to accept party membership requests and for our call
of judicial independence.”103
The above information as broad it is and as it is directly taken from an email exchange with the
individual, speaks volumes about the nature of the ruling coalition’s strict party structure that is so
rampantly organized at all levels of the bureaucracy. The legal-rational system of the bureaucracy,
as dominated by the party structure and as it is manifested through the EPRDF leaderships’ strategic interests, also shows us that disagreeing to be clients to the party leaders and their survivalist
undemocratic programs could even be punishable by arbitrary imprisonment, tortures and other
forms of human rights violations.
In part-one of the dissertation, as I discussed the persistence of the political culture in the
Ethiopian state and how its impact on democratic development and or the elites’ propensity to
adopt survivalist strategies, we have seen that the patrimonial nature of the first few political re-
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gimes in the modern political history of the country gave way to the emergence of a neo-patrimonial regime type. Such a neo-patrimonial clientelsitic regime now effectively utilizes the regimes’
political elites’ and their dominant party structure’s co-opting mechanisms with regards to submitting the newly emerging bureaucracy as one of the ways of succeeding in their political survival
strategies. As the definition of neo-patrimonial clientelism indicates, identifying the bureaucratic
setting separately from the political setting, given the blurred nature of the relationship in this type
of regime type, is difficult.
What I also showed above in terms of the post-1991 emergence of Ethiopian bureaucracy
and the co-optation mechanisms employed in submitting the said institutions at all levels to the
party agenda, the explanation follows the path of both the continuity of the political culture as well
as the elites’ implementations of survivalist approaches to politics in broader terms. Hence, the
discussion of such survivalist approaches shows the ruling elites’ mastery of the technicalities
required of submitting the institutional framework all at once. Moreover, such approaches clearly
indicated that despite TPLF-EPRDF’s elites’ admittance of the need for democratic development,
they are fully aware that attempting to open up the political space would not only leave them
politically vulnerable but also could end the coalition’s stability at the core. Looking at Jean Nicolas Bach’s (2011) article that fully captured the ways EPRDF’s manipulates the state for its
survivalist programs and how democracy is practiced in the ruling elites’ camp, he states that:
“The EPRDF has clearly chosen and maintained a democratization from above. The
state, not distinguished from the ruling party (EPRDF) nor from the government, creates
organizations, leaders, and vanguard elites who all spread and impose the party’s ideology.
EPRDF’s top-down policy is presented to both domestic and international audiences as
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democratic and revolutionary. In order to publicize its democratic credentials and achievements, the EPRDF has to educate people through the intermediary of its own elites who
are at the same time party members. In this configuration the public administration has
little independence, nor have the civil servants. The latter are regularly required to attend
lengthy meetings in the federated regions, in which the party ‘‘educates’’ them about issues
such as ‘‘globalization’’ or ‘‘development’’, which have a touch of indoctrination” (page
648).
Bach’s argument, in addition to supporting the many points I made with regards to the
emergence of party centralism that crippled the federal arrangement, which negatively impacted
the autonomy of the regional states, his argument also concurs with the overall explanation of
EPRDF’s model of authoritarian survival strategies. In summary, as I explained in part-one of this
project early on, our understanding of the political discourse in the Ethiopian state, old or new,
will only be better served by our analysis of the three approaches such as: cultural, institutional as
well as the strategic interests of the political elite that remain focused on cementing their rule by
the very cooptation mechanisms they employed through the institutional settings they devise. Furthermore, given what we see within the secondary literature I highlighted and most importantly
from the interviews I conducted throughout my field work, it is very clear that the lines that distinguish the bureaucracy from the party structure in Ethiopia’s federal setting are very much vague.
Thus, drawing a conclusion from the patronage system that is exhibited within the bureaucracy
vis-à-vis the coalition’s centralist structure, I argue that such a patron-client relationship detailed
above represents one of the mechanisms utilized by the EPRDF coalition in advancing their survivalist agenda is not extraordinary.
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7.6

Conclusion
From what I presented in the discussions thus far, the question of ‘who leads’ and who

controls every aspect of politics in contemporary Ethiopian state, I believe is clearly addressed
thus far. Given the discussions thus far, the questions on whether or not the party leads the state or
the state leads the party could not remain ambiguous. In that regard, we have seen that from the
ways the federal and regional constitutions were devised, and our observations of deep problems
of interpretation exist, I argue is by design. Of course, constitutions are there to be amended,
changed and or reinforced in different ways. But the fact that the EPRDF leadership do not even
agree with discussions of constitutional amendments unless certainly when the coalition needed
them for its benefits, also shows that they are in fact made to be the ‘eternal’ rule books of the
state, which is so telling of the political leaderships’ interests of nothing but political survival. The
fact that what the discussions show is that constitutional-institutional solutions are proven to have
failed the very goals that were attributed to them to achieve is indeed a testament to my argument
with regards to political survival. Because, the success of the ethnic federal setting in post-1991
Ethiopia is that it mostly ensured the political elite survival interests as they presided over the
country’s politics for well over twenty-six years, and materialized those survivalist strategies.
Moreover, my discussions of the failure of the group rights promotion agenda as it curtailed minority rights across the board, the mechanisms employed by the ruling coalition’s leadership in
their electoral maneuverings of the elite, and the patron-client relations witnessed in the relations
among the center-regional states relations as well as the bureaucracy, as co-opted by the EPRDF
coalition’s party structure all point to such survivalist approaches of the political elite.
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In addition to our understanding of how the ethnic federal setting is in fact overshadowed
by the centralist structure that effectively stripped regional states’ elites from the autonomy of
administering themselves across spectrum of issues and levels. From what I presented so far, it
therefore remains essential that we also look closely on how the TPLF led EPRDF’s leadership is
able to survive the crucial challenges it faced throughout the evolution of post-1991 Ethiopian
ethnic federalism. In the next chapter, such critical junctures I discuss by drawing from the last
two decades and half of the Ethiopian state under the leadership of the EPRDF coalition further
provide us crucial insights on how the survivalist political approaches of the role players within
the EPRDF leadership survived certain pivotal challenges that occurred even within the party
structure and by coping well against other pressures outside of their political comfort zones.

8

CHAPTER EIGHT: CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE SURVIVALIST AND DOMINANT EPRDF COALITION IN POST-1991 FEDERAL
ETHIOPIA

8.1

Introduction:
Besides explaining the role of the political parties within the EPRDF coalition and beyond,

this chapter of the dissertation pays special attention towards the most important critical junctures
in the evolution of a strategic interest of the political elite and the survivalist agenda and how the
ruling coalition survived the very existential challenges it faced by relying the mechanisms that
are now apparent in the federal system. In general, in part-two of the dissertation, by relying on
the efforts in identifying such pivotal time periods within the broader context in the unraveling of
federal Ethiopia, I will attempt to explain that the federal model in the country indeed serves the
survivalist agenda and not the promotion of democratic ideals based on group rights.
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The TPLF dominated EPRDF coalition’s efforts in devising a constitutional framework
that effectively helped in introducing and implementing ethnic federalism as an institutional design
that promotes group rights was quite a ‘success’. Such a success however, is limited to the achievement of the political elite presiding over the coalition in prolonging their political reign despite the
fact that the two dominant and majority ethnic groups in the country, the Oromo and the Amhara,
are devoid of any political power due to the dominance of the TPLF political machine whose
mechanisms of manipulation extend from controlling the political discourse in the federal government’s capital in Addis Ababa to effectively co-opting political elites presiding over the regional
states across the board. Today, I believe that TPLF led EPRDF’s strength, from the party structure
that successfully engulfed the bureaucracy to its control of the security and intelligence community
whose leadership across all levels are extremely dominated by ethnic Tigrayans and TPLF members, chances of keeping its grip on political power seems formidable.
Various levels of post-election violence and turmoil in different cities (especially in the
capital, Addis Ababa) throughout the last decade that some within the ever weakened political
opposition as well as neutral observers hoped will challenge the incumbents’ dominance of political power did not accomplish anything. Instead, periodic political unrests led to hundreds of civilian deaths and detentions of tens of thousands. The first of its kind ‘nation wide’ (mostly happened in Amhara and Oromia Regional states) protests in the summer of 2016, that many observers
of Ethiopian politics had even considered unprecedented in terms of the size and magnitude of the
movement, has been effectively controlled. Given this project’s scope is limited to until the earlier
periods of 2016, I will not therefore include the 2016 ‘nation-wide’ protests as part of my discussion in identifying the critical points that would have been considered existential threats against
the ruling coalition. However, in this part of the chapter, I present the Ethiopian-Eritrean war that
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broke out in 1998 and claimed hundreds of thousands of lives from both sides and the very interesting episode of a break-up within TPLF core leadership, the 2005 national election and the developments that followed and lastly the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi as the three most
critical points in the life of the TPLF-led EPRDF rule of the Ethiopian state since the coming into
being of the coalition onto the political scene after the overthrow of the Dergue’s military regime
in 1991.
Such critical junctures are not only events that tested the coalition and the regime it rules
but also represent the resilience of the coalition’s leadership in surviving these existential challenges. I argue that such pivotal points in Ethiopia’s contemporary political discourse are not only
marked as very crucial events that challenged the EPRDF’s rule, but also they influenced the regime’s sweeping changes in the way the leadership operates. The discussion of such events, however, will be also mostly parallel to the changes in the evolution of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement and how the ruling coalition ambitions and efforts of survival coped with such semisystemic changes in the past two decades. Moreover, as can be recalled from my discussion of
what I referred to as the initial setbacks that the EPRDF leadership had to cope with, the coalition
indeed has successfully mastered the art of political survival through its well crafted mechanisms
of submitting a very complex, heterogeneous and highly populated country.
8.2

Critical Juncture One: The War with Eritrea and A Fractured Coalition Leading a
Fractured Nation: Repercussions’ for Survivalist EPRDF
Background:
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Eritrea was once part of the Ethiopian state enjoying a slightly higher level of political
autonomy in comparison with other regions all across the country. The roots for the complex and
tenuous history between Eritrea and Ethiopia however, dates back to the era of Emperor Menelik
II. As already stated in part one of the dissertation, one of Emperor Menelik’s foremost legacies
that Pan-Ethiopian nationalists recall is of course the emperor’s leadership that galvanized the
country’s mostly primitive societies, mostly farmers, in picking up arms (mostly shields, swords
as well as small percentages of modern armaments) to fight a highly modern European army from
Italy. In fact, Ethiopia’s victory over Italy, the then new comer to the colonial scene and its effect
on the conundrum of partition of Africa remains the most important historical episode in the continent’s struggle against colonialism in addition to its significance to the study of international
relations in the 20th century. The problem however was that Menelik’s victorious army, after defeating the Italians, did not advance beyond what is known as Mereb River, today’s border between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Eritreans see such a decision by Menelik II as a historic mistake that has
evolved into making the Eritreans feel that they were in fact not desired by the Ethiopian empire
as Menelik II’s betrayal in their view, exposed them to decades of colonial rule under Italy.
After the Italian colonial rule for more almost half of the twentieth century, the Eritreans
returned to join the Ethiopian state under the leadership of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1951 after
the United Nations resolution federated Eritrea with the motherland, while granting Eritrea the
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autonomy, which includes among others, its own constitution, parliament, flag as a federated region of the empire of Ethiopia. However, Eritrea’s federation with Ethiopia was short lived as
Emperor Haile Sellassie’s regime slowly dissolved Eritrea’s federal arrangement in 1961104.
As we recall from earlier discussions, it was around the same period that the unification of
Eritrea with the rest of the Ethiopian empire became completed that most anti-regime rebellions
representing ethnic grievances for lack of political and economic inequality emerged across the
country. Again, it was also during that same period that Eritrean rebels against the Ethiopian empire also came into existence. The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), was the strongest
amongst both other Eritrean rebel groups as well as rebellion armies of other groups in the Ethiopian state. Among all such rebels at a time engaged in fighting against the Ethiopian state, the
TPLF and the EPLF were the ones with the closest relationships and levels of cooperation. In my
view, such a strong relationship between the two liberation fronts occurred for two important reasons. Firstly, the fact that both despised what they referred as ‘the Amhara domination’ of the
Ethiopian state and the fact that both groups called for a struggle for independence of their respective groups (Tigray and Eritrea) from that political domination was one of their major commonalities. Second, and most importantly however, was that both the TPLF and the EPLF represented
Tigrnya speaking groups thus making their military cooperation relatively easier. Most also credit
that the EPLF was the political force that trained, mostly armed and organized the TPLF to become
the dominant force they became in the era of struggle against the Socialist regime and eventually
104

See the UN resolution in Ethio-Eritrea Unification here: "The Ethiopian-Eritrean Fed-

eration." Middle East Journal 5, no. 1 (1951): 89-91.
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the force that they became by creating and manipulating the EPRDF coalition in today’s state of
Ethiopia, that is formally known as, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
After the defeat of the Dergue military socialist regime in 1991 by the TPLF, EPLF and
other armed forces that I discussed in the earlier chapters of the dissertation and the eventual declaration of EPLF to secede from the Ethiopian state, the differences between the TPLF that now
dominates the Ethiopian ruling coalition and the EPLF that is the only legal party running government in Eritrea grew significantly and the relations between the two groups became sour. Without
dwelling more on the historical development of such formerly allied rebel movements and now
political parties ruling over two different countries however, it is very important to elucidate how
the soured relations between the two led to the fracturing of the EPRDF coalition in general and
how I argue that that should be considered a critical test in TPLF led EPRDF coalition’s quest for
political survival since their coming to power in 1991.
8.2.1 Developments Leading to the Emergence of a New Challenge: How EPRDF Survived?
Leaving aside the major and immediate causes to the outbreak of inter-state war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was started when the later invaded a small town known as Badme
in 1998, much of the discussion thus gives more emphasis on the conclusion of the war that ended
with a clear victory of the Ethiopian forces that had not only returned the invaded territories but
also had advanced much closer to Eritrean capital, Asmara until an internationally brokered ceasefire stopped the destructive hostilities. The war however, was a complete disaster for both nations
and their poor economy. At the end of the war, the post war atmosphere also looked like a lose-
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lose scenario partly because of the hundreds of thousands of lives lost on both sides and the overwhelmingly strained economy the war left behind loomed large. As Richard Reid (2003), who
wrote extensively on the anatomy of the war explained about the fighting that occurred between
Tigrayans and Eritreans (thus, considering the inter-state war as a war between TPLF and EPLF)
tense relations and the characters of the two leaders of the fighting countries, the author explains:
“These were two bald men fighting over a comb; two poverty-stricken African nations (the 'hostile tribes' concept was lurking just below the surface) fighting for pride at
the expense of the material dignity of their populations; two ignorant governments engaging in brutal and bloody 'First World War tactics' for pieces of insignificant land. When
Africans fight, the world tuts disapprovingly, which is one thing, and condescendingly,
which is another. But in looking at the nature of Eritrean-Tigrayan relations over time and
space, one thing is clear in the first instance: the war itself, while it took most (including
the author) by surprise when it first came to public attention, was not a tragic but isolated
interruption of the normal course” (page 374).
Regardless of that important explanation on the war’s effects nonetheless, during and after
the war with Eritrea, severe divisions among the core leadership of the TPLF emerged. Such divisions within the TPLF leadership focused on issues of both the management of the war as well as
on the questions of the most important decisions that are to be made in post war crisis management
(Gudina 2003; Reid 2003; Clapham 2009).
The management of the war, and other post war decisions that were mostly made by then
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his supporting cast of leaders mostly within the TPLF would
encounter challenges by other strong leaders within the TPLF. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and
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his supporting faction within the TPLF, hence, faced the daunting task of convincing a faction led
by former Defense Minster Mr. Seye Abraha and his supporting faction on the anatomy of the
decisions that were made in the war against Eritrea and the political proceedings that followed.
The Seye Abraha faction, among others even accuses the Zenawi’s leadership of the war as aiding
Eritrea, which invoked the family ties that the Prime Minister has with that country given his
mother was an Eritrean. What is interesting here is however, given the magnitude of the deep
dominance of the TPLF of the EPRDF ruling coalition, the problem within such a dominant member of the ruling coalition would become the problem of the EPRDF at large and the country as a
whole.
As a consequence, what followed was that an unprecedented level of political crisis engulfed the EPRDF ruling coalition discussions of uncertainties became common. Discussing such
problems of governance that occurred within the Ethiopian government, in his article entitled,
‘Post-War Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis’, Christopher Clapham (2009) states that,
“The crises that beset the ruling political coalition (the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF) of Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, after the apparently triumphant conclusion to its border war against Eritrea in May 2000, were only partially of
its own making. This is not the place to delve into deeply contested histories, but it is at
least necessary to place the developments that led to the impasse so apparent by the end of
the first decade of the twenty-first century in their broader context. This impasse was not
merely the outcome of failed democratization, or human rights abuse, or even indeed poverty, but was, rather, the latest expression of much deeper problems that derive from the
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inherent contradictions of state creation and maintenance in a perennially violent corner of
Africa (page 181)”.
What we see form Clapham’s explanation indeed is that despite the ramifications of the
war dominating the reasons for the emergence of crisis within the TPLF (and thus, the nation),
concerns of maintaining the political order in a highly divided Ethiopia and careful balancing of
the changing political atmosphere with the regime’s ubiquitous priority of survival was very essential. Here, it is important to identify what really saved the ruling coalition that was challenged
by the magnitude of the division within the TPLF leadership. As former member of the Oromo
Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) leadership, which is one of the political parties that
makes up the EPRDF coalition, interviewee number twenty-nine stated that, “the crisis within the
TPLF during the post war period, mostly in the years between 2002 and 2004, became a huge
concern for the rest of the political parties that make up the ruling coalition. Especially, leaders of
the political parties within the coalition, mainly ANDM and OPDO also became divided on where
to side when the TPLF leadership became a fractured group. Such parties started to mediate between the two factions of the TPLF knowing that any failure would lead to emergence and development of existential threats to the EPRDF as a coalition. What was also crucial is that within the
ANDM and OPDO camp, we knew that given the military and intelligence apparatus has been
highly dominated by the TPLF, such divisions could imply a further fracturing of the army and the
security forces at large, which then opens up for other serious challenges to emerge. But the fact
that such arduous mediations failed mean that for ANDM, OPDO as well as the relatively weak
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SEPDM, their party leadership had to step in and stand on the side of the TPLF faction led by the
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.”105
In my field work that spanned more than half a year from January to July 2017, what
astounded me the most in the answers I receive for the majority of my questions was that most
respondents’ admiration for political gamesmanship of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is
very much amusing. Most applaud Mr. Zenawi for his negotiating skills and his intellectual prowess that assist him in drafting most of the EPRDF’s political strategies at times in just a night of
work. Especially, some state that how he maneuvers the political elite’s mindset within the ruling
coalition and how he convinces the leadership to perform the duties that he singlehandedly assigns
to them are a testament to his skills. The opinions expressed by interviewee number twenty-nine
are also not different from those others who I interviewed. In general, interviewee number twentynine states that the political backing that Mr. Zenawi received from the other political leadership
members of the EPRDF, was in part due to the mistaken or foolish assumptions of ANDM and
OPDO officials who thought that a more balanced EPRDF could emerge given their thinking that
the break-up within TPLF leadership showed that the domination of a single party of any coalition
is not sustainable thus reforming the balance of power within the coalition was desirable. However,
the individual added that, “Zenawi was extremely skillful and articulate in convincing both the
members of his faction within the TPLF and the Oromo and Amhara political elites by promising
them greater roles in his cabinet shake-ups and persuading them to work with him with promises
of the emergence of a more balanced EPRDF and even stating his deceiving commitment to even
being open about discussion of leadership succession. Of course, as it is clearly evident in today’s
The extended interview with interviewee number twenty-nine took place in March 28th, 2017 in the city
of Atlanta, Georgia and a subsequent telephone interview had also taken place on April 12th 2017.
105
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Ethiopia, the TPLF, even after the fracturing of the political leadership, has redeemed itself and
Zenawi’s political skills in artfully deceiving his EPRDF colleagues effectively paved the way for
his own party’s (TPLF’s) political redemption.”
The political debacle within the TPLF leadership, that emerged as a result of the post war
crisis would soon be solved after Prime Minister Zenawi’s faction overcame the challenge with
the aid of the political elites from EPRDF member political parties such as ANDM and OPDO.
Moreover, the regime would also accuse some strongmen within the opposing faction of the former
TPLF leadership of corruption charges and some less threatening ones would also become discharged from their administrative duties and start leading civilian lives. How the EPRDF leadership with its strongman, Zenawi took effective control of such a development was also extremely
interesting. Especially, how the then Prime Minster first charged and then threw out Mr. Seye
Abraha, the former Defense Minister, who was also the main leader behind the break-up within
TPLF, to a six-years of imprisonment was particularly well documented. Assefa Fiseha (2016),
who discussed ‘legislative-judicial relations’ in the country, shows how the regime even made
unexpected changes to the law to make sure that the accused, Mr. Seye Abraha, remains in prison
without the opportunity of any bail that constitution would have guaranteed him to receive. Therefore, in the absence of any constitutional rule that would deny the individual bail, Fiseha explains
the actions of Mr. Zenawi and his coalition by stating that:
“Following a split within the ruling party in 2001, Siye Abraha, a former defense
minster, was accused of grand corruption and brought before a court. When the lower
courts ruled that the accused should be released on bail, which is a constitutional right by
virtue of article 19(6), security officers prevented the accused on bail, parliament hastily
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convened to enact an law that deprived all persons accused of corruption of the right to
bail. Following this development, the press nicknamed the law ‘Siye Abraha’s law’. This
was not the end of the story. Several years later and after the new law had served its function, parliament amended the law reinstating the right to bail to persons accused of corruption where the charge entailed a potential sentence not exceeding ten years’ imprisonment”
(page 276).
As we see from the regime’s maneuver of the legislative assembly, first in terms of how its
security forces superseded the court’s ruling to release Mr. Abraha by providing him constitutional
bail and then how the leaders of the coalition made sure that constitutional amendments will
emerge making sure that the individual who posed a threat to the TPLF and hence to the coalition’s
political dominance, remain in jail, we learn that the EPRDF of course, would do anything to enact
bogus laws that help keep the coalition in power.
Going back to my discussion of how the Oromo and Amhara political elite within the
EPRDF came to the rescue of the Zenawi’s TPLF camp, we also see that their decision was an
easier one to make. And that was, in not so small part, due to the political turmoil that occurred in
2003, in the capital, Addis Ababa. In that particular period, Addis Ababa University students were
uprising mostly protesting the issue of lack of academic freedom and demanded for changes to
restore that. However, such protests led to a significant level of unrest in the capital that led to
lootings of jewelry shops and businesses that were owned by ethnic Tigrayans. Such kinds of
violence that was considered unusual for over a decade of rule of the EPRDF coalition signified
that unless there is a strong unity within the ruling political elite in asserting their control of the
political environment, such types of unrest could lead to nation-wide violence that could even
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escalate up to eruption of ethnic tensions and conflicts. Such events I discussed and the fears that
aroused within non-TPLF political elites within the PERDF are important in further solidifying
the rational behind the coalition’s efforts in coming together to the rescue of the regime from the
critical test it faced as a result of the Ethiopian-Eritrean interstate war.
Furthermore, what we also see in the trajectory of such a challenge that tested the EPRDF
coalition and how its leadership came out of such a situation goes with much of my discussion on
how the ethnic federal arrangement in the country has evolved parallel to the ruling coalition’s
effective control of the political environment and its co-optation mechanisms in place. In fact, we
have seen that the TPLF, despite its dominance of Ethiopian politics in the last twenty-six years at
the national level, its political base of the Tigrayan regional state and its supporters’ minority status
in Ethiopia’s demographic make-up mean that their political survival ambitions and programs require them to rely on the co-optation mechanisms that they effectively devised in a way of assurance of such ambitions of keeping their grip on political power.
Recapping the first major pivotal event that challenged the EPRDF and that I discussed
earlier, the event shows that the regime successfully coped with the unrest within the TPLF that
led to the departure or retirement of some and the imprisonment of others. But the EPRDF coalition, still dominated by the TPLF, (given that the promise of the balancing of power among the
EPRDF leadership did not come into fruition), reemerged in its very much stronger position. Such
levels of lack of balanced power sharing even within the coalition however, do not even happen to
cause the political leadership any questions and the EPRDF ship continue to sail without eminent
challenges of any political waves. After surviving the first major political test that the regime faced
in its first decade of political rule, in post inter-state war against Eritrea, and after regaining the
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clam it so needed, the coalition would rather act a bit democratic, which aroused quite a bizarre
feeling among the populace, according to most of my interviewees with regards to questions of the
2005 national election also concur.
8.3

Critical Juncture Two: The 2005 National Elections and Challenges that Tested the
EPRDF Coalition and the ‘We are Here to Stay’ Politics
As we have seen it until this point, the political regime in Ethiopia led by the EPRDF

coalition, in power since 1991, has faced many existential challenges. The coalition however, successfully coped with all of such tests to their own satisfaction. Even after what I already discussed
earlier, much time did not pass before EPRDF reclaimed its command of the political climate, that
re-commenced the usual proceedings in its favor. The exit of OLF from the initial partnership,
which I also discussed early on could also be considered one of such pivotal moments or first tests
in the coalition’s evolution to become the strongest political party in the country’s modern history
given its effectiveness in creating a dominant party-state and a political play ground only conducive to the EPRDF family. Here, it is also critical to note that the OLF’s exit from its partnership
with the EPRDF at the transitional period, although significant, like many other small challenges
is not included in this part of my discussion of the critical junctures given its overall impact in
shaping the ruling coalition’s survivalist politics was quite minimal.
As seen in what I described as the first major pivotal moment in the coalition’s survivalist
political reign, the EPRDF mastered the political solutions by manipulating the courts, and the
legislative assembly in asserting its power for the next few years after the political tension in the
period 2001 and 2002 in the post Ethiopian-Eritrean inter-state battles. In doing so, the coalition
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basically acquired the most needed time in reforming the way of doing things at its coalition member parties as well as in putting all of the members of such parties in taking courses and seminars
that are nothing but efforts in reequipping the political elite across all federal and regional state
administrative levels with the new course of direction and mechanisms of propaganda that the
coalition would be relying as it attempts to make adjustments after the political upheavals that it
faced from within.
Moreover, the periodic evaluations that the front conducts across the year also come in
handy in helping the coalition identify dissent of any kind and magnitude among its members. And
such evaluations have been the party’s ‘strength’ as it tightly focuses on its survivalist ambitions
by instituting corrective measures even against its own cadres, who appear to challenge the ruling
coalition’s bosses. Jean Nicolas Bach (2011) who carefully observed the importance of evaluations
(or gimgema in Amharic) for EPRDF states that:
“Democratic centralism reveals above all the rigid and hierarchical structure of the
EPRDF coalition and is, among others, illustrated by the gem gema. These ‘‘polico-administrative evaluations (. . .) allow the appointment and discharge of civil servants and government officials to be manipulated and subverted’’. ‘‘Criticism’’ and ‘‘self-criticism’’
procedure is thus presented as ‘‘an instrument used to reprimand defects and mistakes in
members’’. This practice inherited from the TPLF internal organization during the struggle
is now at the center of the administrative system in which the ruling party finds a powerful
way of controlling the affiliated party members” (page 647).
Apart from the values such TPLF’s cultures of evaluations bring into the needed stability
of the coalition’s efforts in also understanding the differing ideas that appear within their members,
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had also helped them to come out of the challenges they face even stronger than that they had been
in previous periods. EPRDF’s strength among others, of course is its successful mechanisms of
pacing its elites to face against their challenges in unison amid the recurrent problems they face
from time to time.
About five years after the conclusion of the war with Eritrea, however, reforms in the
EPRDF dominated Ethiopia’s political scene started to be witnessed. That is of course irrespective
of the fact that the lingering TPLF dominance remains in the shadow of each and every political
development. Such small but important levels of reforms led to the opening of the political climate
for the first time since the first year of EPRDF’s hold of political power in the country. Although
unexperienced and mostly unorganized, the political opposition seized such a political opportunity
with open hands and the fact that the 2005 national elections were also approaching became an
added bonus. Opposition figures who returned from exile, renowned intellectuals and some entrepreneurs within the business community arrived at the political scene by either joining the already
existing but weaker opposition parties and or by coming together in forming one, did not waste
time before they delved deep into the electoral scene to prepare, compete, and challenge the
EPRDF coalition’s dominance. Hence, as the 2005 national elections approached, the electoral
atmosphere became nothing short of impressive (Samatar 2005; Arriola 2005; Lyons 2006; Lovise
and Tronvoll 2009). Moreover, the EPRDF regime not only showed its sudden ‘democratic’ intentions by easing its repressive tactics against the opposition, but also, the regime declared that
the elections would be free and fair and the necessary state sponsored electoral funds would be
provided to opposition parties.
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The pre-election debates in the prior months and weeks before the 2005 general elections
were too many to count and most EPRDF elites that either served as advisors and ideologues to
the coalition in power or in hold of ministerial cabinet positions openly debated against the most
articulate and intellectual leaders of the opposition in open and surprisingly direct debates, even at
times trading direct jabs and criticisms against each other. The debates, which were broadcast live
on state owned radio stations and the state television, created quite a thrilling democratic climate
that kept everyone in the country surprised and questioning how the regime could all of a sudden
open up the media sphere and even how it could be possible for the the regime’s leaders to sit
down with opposition figures who openly criticize and embarrass them become the talk of the
nation. In a country plagued with authoritarian political culture and no history of democracy, these
were in fact legitimate surprises. Two opposition coalitions such as United Ethiopian Democratic
Front (UEDF or simply Hibret in Amharic, meaning ‘union’) and the Coalition for Unity and
Democracy (CUD, simply Kinjit in Amharic, meaning ‘coalition’ or ‘coordination’) consolidated
their positions as opposition political coalitions, not for the sake of just coalition making as seen
from examples in the make-up of opposition parties in the past, but they immediately would be
considered real contenders.
The time arrived and the May 2005 national elections took place with unprecedented and
highly celebrated electoral turnout and proceeded in relatively peaceful manner. Notwithstanding
of relatively calm elections however, leaders of the political opposition continued registering their
complaints on the election’s irregularities that range from harassment of voters to regime’s introduction of fake and pre-arranged ballots that the opposition contended were designed to undermine
the electoral outcome. Given the citizens, opposition parties, and independent observers under-
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standing of such issues, it seemed clear to all that EPRDF’s perceived commitment towards electoral openings were not so genuine as its old ways of maneuvering the political process eventually
reemerged. The opposition, which at the conclusion of the election, had won almost fifty percent
of the elections per officially released electoral records, left with nothing but their old ways of
bickering and complaints. Suddenly, all the hope of democratic consolidation vanished and
EPRDF’s survivalist political tactics of repression would remain to be the norm.
Unlike past regimes, the fact that EPRDF was even taking a shot at a democratic attempt
could be commendable. The problem, however, is that for the Ethiopian public, it became clear
that the EPRDF would pursue its survivalist politics while playing with the minds of the society
by at times fooling them to believe democratization could be a possibility. Unfortunately, the 2005
national election, was not only marred by complaints of fraudulent elections and calls for recount,
which had happened to later come back with even worse results. But also, it created a feeling
among the citizens that the closest shot at the prospects of democratization of the country as well
as for EPRDF to redeem itself as a coalition of reforms was that of the 2005 elections, which of
course happened to be a very bad outcome. As Jon Abbink (2006), clearly stated:
“The elections were a step forward but did not signify a decisive, non-reversible
move towards democracy because of the uncertainty about the counting procedures, the
real results, and the controversial government response. Not only Ethiopian public, but also
donor countries, and development partners, who invested a lot in the 'Ethiopian example',
were greatly disillusioned. The 2005 elections and their aftermath thus revealed major constraints in Ethiopia's political system, underlining that after the regimes of Emperor Haile
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Sellassie (1930-74) and the military leader Mengistu (1974-91), centralist authoritarianism
is not gone but perhaps is being reinvented in a new form” (page 174).
Abbink’s explanations indeed are valid and certain in that despite the rising expectations
of the public from the 2005 national elections were quite higher but as the author mentioned, most
students of Ethiopian politics also clearly understood that EPRDF can reverse its course at any
given time for a simple reason that, since its inception, the coalition’s political moves indicated of
survivalist political approaches coming first and all matters of service to the nation did not and still
does not count. Moreover, although Abbink’s explanation that invokes of the similarities of
EPRDF Coalition’s authoritarian tendencies and its centralist ruling regime with that of the old
regimes is valid, even from my extended discussion of how the ethnic federal institutionalization
played out, it is evident that the regime not only effectively used its patrons from the bureaucracy,
and the party structure all over the Ethiopian state in its successful maneuvers of the electoral
outcome. But also, the coalition and its leaders, led by the dictator, Meles Zenawi, immediately
enacted different measures that range from the declaration of state of emergency that stripped of
the public’s right to peaceful demonstration to the imprisonment of political leaders from the opposition that were still contesting the results of the election. As Berhanu Abegaz (2005) stated,
“Ethiopia finds itself once again at the crossroads. The May 2005 national elections have presented
the country with a clear-cut choice between a functional multiparty democratic system or a patrimonial state-party system” (page 33). Indeed, what appears to have emerged would be the latter.
Hence, the national elections of that year showed EPRDF opened the doors of democratic electoral
competition and it immediately closed them after defeat would become the eventual outcome. Because, for EPRDF, failing to address such an existential challenge signals nothing but putting its
survivalist political approaches to bed.
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As we recall from my earlier discussion on how the EPRDF mechanisms of co-optation
work in making sure the regime keeps its upper hand in electoral processes as well as outcomes,
what had also transpired from the 2005 national elections was that the regime’s success in devising
a political framework via its ethnic federal arrangement helped its political leadership keep the
question of ethnicity in the political discourse and used it as a way to stifle the opposition’s political
voice while the patron-client relations serving those supporting and working for the regime to
further receive rewards after every political storm that threatens the regime’s grip on political
power passes by. The spending of donor funds to strengthen the party structure, the use of food
aid in buying votes and electoral support in general and the deployment of security forces in urban
and semi-urban areas of the country in creating uneasy political atmosphere, were just some that I
explained early in the chapter as well. Some of such measures by the regime, as seen by Alemayehu
Gebre Mariam (2010-20111), who interviewed opposition leaders in post 2010 elections that the
regime dominated at large, but are very much relevant to our understanding of the pre and post
national elections of 2005, the author states:
“The security network is so sophisticated that it has Stalinesque quasi- directorates
consisting of party and security organizations working together to maintain around-theclock surveillance of citizens and generate and distribute real time intelligence on individual households through an established chain of command. According to Dr. Negasso106,
the local commissariats have expansive powers of investigation, arrest, interrogation and
detention. They maintain a network of anonymous informants and agents who provide tips
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Dr. Negasso Gidada, was the first president of federal Ethiopia after replacing Meles Zenawi, who had
served as the president of the provisional government and later would become the head of the state in a
parliamentary and federal Ethiopia.
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for the identification, investigation and arrest of local individuals suspected of disloyalty
to the regime. They control and regulate the flow of information and visitors in and out of
the town. Apparently, they even have the power to deport anyone considered persona non
grata from the town. In general, there is little question that the commissariats and the interlocking quasi-directorates engage in repression and widespread human rights abuses
against the local population” (page 31).
The regime, which had boasted about formally introducing democracy in a fundamental
way during that electoral period, of course eventually perceived the national elections of 2005 as
a learning curve and refocused its agenda of appealing to the masses, saying ‘the EPRDF is your
only choice and the opposition are here to distract us from our development strategies that help
end poverty that we have been suffering under. In my field work, I had also the opportunity to
discuss the regime’s response to that particular election’s outcomes with two individual members
of the EPRDF coalition’s member parties. One is a member of ANDM and the other a member of
SEPDM. In a candid discussion I had with such individuals, (interviewees number fifty-two) about
how the regime’s leadership first acted in a democratic way and later curtailed such deceivingly
democratic proceedings finding out that that in any ways is not play out in its favor, they stated
that the EPRDF leadership, internally had always discussed that the country was not ready for
democratization and the only reasons in which the regime decided to proceed the open democratic
climate that it had suddenly introduced was mainly because what the coalition’s leadership termed
as ‘testing the waters’.107
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The discussions I conducted with the two individuals, (interviewees number fifty-two) took place in
May 19th, 2017, in Atlanta Georgia, United States.
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According to such individuals, EPRDF really believed that rural Ethiopia, which comprise
more than eighty percent of the total population of eth country would be voting and supporting the
regime and that the only difficulty they will be facing would be limited to the urban centers, that
they had considered opposition strongholds. But such initial guesses by the leadership came out
as utter miscalculations, which therefore had to be corrected. Such corrective measures, unfortunately, also included the killing of hundreds of protesters by the regime’s security forces as a result
of the post electoral violence mainly in the capital Addis Ababa108. While one of the opposition
coalition, called Hibret (UEDF) decided to join the parliament, the CUD leaders who decided
against entering parliament would be jailed and most would end up spending up to two years and
some more than that.109 Based on the views that interviewee number thirty-two, an individual who
was elected member of the House of Representatives, (although he declined to enter) who had also
served as one of the most influential leaders of CUD who spent almost two years as a political
prisoner shared with me, the EPRDF not only jailed all the majority of the leaders of the coalition
and turned CUD into political irrelevance. But also, the regime successfully managed to further
divide these imprisoned political leaders by using game tactics that are designed to create animosity amongst each other.110 Such tactics, according to the interviewee, are mainly revealed through
what the investigators of those jailed opposition leaders would inform a certain opposition leader
information that they claimed heard from another jailed colleague, which led to a situation whereby
one opposition leader could not trust the other even after they left the prisons. In fact, one certain
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The interview with interviewee number thirty-two occurred in Washington D.C. United states on April
7th, 2017.
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feature that was witnessed after those jailed leaders were released from TPLF’s notorious prisons
was that the magnitude and camaraderie that had characterized the leaders of the CUD was completely replaced by political antagonism amongst each other. Witnessing political bickering
amongst those leaders became quite common as the post-prison period unraveled. One of the
leaders would be giving an interview that he uses to criticize and attack a former colleague within
CUD or one would even publish a book that paints his contributions in gold colors while using the
same publication to blame ‘others’ who the individual considered traitors and collaborators with
the ‘woyane’ 111, resulting in CUD’s downfall.
What such political developments in the post 2005 national elections more or less show is
that the EPRDF firstly, learned that it does not have popular support except the massive support it
enjoys in the Tigray regional state and ethnic Tigrayans and secondly, they also learned that taking
corrective measures against the flourishing opposition and its mass support was the only way to
restore the calm that they need so much to advance reforms and consolidate their grip in political
power. In doing so, the structures that they have in place, in terms of the ethnic federal institutional
solutions would definitely come in handy to further rescue the challenges the regime faces from
time to time.
In general, as we see from the discussions I presented on how the 2005 national elections
played out, and how the regime coped against the challenging developments in aftermath, the
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EPRDF not only made sure it now restored ‘calm’ within the coalition’s leadership and among its
massive patrons spread across the Ethiopian federal arrangement, which is now understood parallel
to the centralist authoritarian party structure in place. But it also publicly comes out as a reformed
agent of developmental programs and the elites would add the acronym ‘developmental’ to every
possible position available within the ruling party structure. Further more, the issue of democracy,
according to their open propaganda items, would become something they will only consider once
after the country embarks on the success of the coalition’s renewed efforts that target economic
growth and eradication of unemployment that has been a major problem especially with what they
considered a raging youth.
Thus, the 2005 elections, for the EPRDF regime, signaled that for the political elite to stay
with their dominance of political power, democracy and democratic questions are not questions
that they would have to answer. The conclusion they arrived at the end was that EPRDF’s leadership must continue to rule only by reforming itself from time to time and addressing the political
and economic challenges as they go. Moreover, the regime also understood that despite its massive
work and relative success in creating the necessary environment of patronage and established success in installing strong party structure, expanding its base of supporters by amassing new members, by millions, and having those members as agents of their new programs are the only options
left. Thus, the regime decided that the only option left is to come up with strategies for successful
implementation of such goals as the mode of operation of the EPRDF.
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8.4

Critical Juncture Three: The Death of Prime Minster Meles Zenawi and the Emergence of EPRDF’s ‘Collective Leadership’
The 2005 national elections, which I discussed as one of the most pivotal events in the

country’s contemporary politics as well as in the evolution of the TPLF led EPRDF coalition’s
ruling regime had come and gone. The end result of such a critical juncture, as already discussed,
was of course the emergence of the ruling coalition as more dominant than it was before. The
strongman, who presided over two decades of the TPLF-EPRDF rule of the state, Mr. Meles
Zenawi, had also seen his power rise and consolidate even further to the level that the country’s
politics was even considered by many in the public arena as a one-man theatrical play. In every
political juncture that students of Ethiopian politics refer as a defining moment, Mr. Zenawi comes
out stronger than he was ever before as well. Medhane Taddese (2012), in his assessment of
Zenawi’s political rise irrespective of the challenges that the coalition that he leads encounters
from time to time, by focusing on how he survived and thrived in the aftermath of the post war
breakup within the TPLF, states that:
“The rise of Meles to a dominant and undisputed position in the Ethiopian state had
far reaching political implications. It weakened the rest of the political forces within and
outside the ruling party, decimated other centers of power and influence and immobilized
the TPLF, the most organized political force in the post-1991 Ethiopian landscape. There
is no doubt that the removal of the rather well-entrenched and adamant party leaders would
give him the opportunity to seize the full reins of power and make a clean start in the affairs
of the state. He tried hard to relocate his power base from Tigray and the TPLF to the
Center and the EPRDF with some success. Thus the progressive political ascendancy of
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Meles was paralleled by growing political strength at the Center. He created a centralized
government and a party leader unified with the state making the party, the government of
the day and the state one and the same. He promoted loyal bureaucrats than party loyalists
which served to reinforce a clearly identifiable power pyramid. In doing this he created a
power base independent of all the members of the ruling party” (page 1).
Tadesse has in fact a point in that Mr. Zenawi had successfully seized the trust and loyalty
of the non-TPLF members of the ruling coalition while I disagree with the author’s assertion about
the relocation of the center of power from the TPLF elites in Tigray to the EPRDF headquarters in
Addis Ababa given we do not have credible evidence in showing the growth of political power
whether in ANDM, OPDO or SEPDM’s leadership. Nonetheless, Tadesse’s piece shows that the
Prime Minister who led the country and the EPRDF coalition with iron fist for the first two decades
was indeed a tactical genius in asserting his political power and in destroying opposition that come
against his ways of doing things from within his party or from outside.
In the aftermath of the 2005 national elections, Zenawi had also already come to
the conclusion that if EPRDF continues without a massive support base, the coalition would struggle in its ambitions of staying in hold of political power. Thus, the ruling coalition, according to
him, had to come prepared with a new strategy of recruiting millions of new members and each
political party within the coalition as well as the affiliated parties spread across the so called ‘developing regional states’ would be tasked with expanding their support bases. According to interviewee number twenty-seven, an individual who had worked in the EPRDF headquarters in Addis
Ababa and a longtime member of ANDM, the new memorandum distributed was scary to say the
least. The individual states that, “Mr. Meles Zenawi and his advisors debated what the new strategy
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of expanding our member base should be. After a long debate they decided that constituting new
youth associations and creating pilot job fairs and opportunities with loan programs would be able
to attract the unemployed youth that we at the EPRDF had considered ‘the main support of the
opposition”. Such strategies targeted all urban centers and while mainly focused on regional state
capitals and Addis Ababa. The success was quick and each group of youth associations would be
given a day or two of lectures about the new and improved programs of EPRDF and then would
be ‘invited’ to become party members in line with their ethnic origins.” The interviewee continues,
“this rapid success would be immediately followed by what is famously known as the ‘anid
le’amist’112 phenomenon that even further created millions of new patrons to the system that the
ruling coalition created.”113 As we recall from the discussion of how the EPRDF’s successful system of patronage resulted in its domination of the ethnic federal setting and thus any potential
electoral challenges, the new structure known as anid le’amist even further reinforced that already
functioning mechanism of survivalist EPRDF’s manipulation of the federal arrangement and the
patronage system spread across all levels of the government. In the earlier discussions of the electoral manipulations by EPRDF, we have also clearly seen that the 2010 national elections led to a
sweeping ‘victory’ of the ruling coalition of the country’s 99.6 percent of parliamentary seats.
Given such levels of the successes of the coalition and a rising power of its leader, the regime
would once continue its grip on political power and its supporters would be assured that as long as
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EPRDF stays in power they would continue to enjoy the rights that EPRDF has given to them from
the hands of the chauvinists and the sympathizers of the old regimes.
A unique problem however arrived in the middle of year 2012 when the health of Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi was recognized to be deteriorating as a result of health complications that
still remain an EPRDF secret and a mystery to the rest of the Ethiopian public. After series of
unsubstantiated rumors in the social media sphere and the regime’s unsuccessful attempts to calm
the situation about the whereabouts and health conditions of Mr. Zenawi, an opposition media
known as ESAT broke the news about the death of the Prime Minster who ruled the country for
over twenty-one years on July 30, 2017.114 The ruling coalition, visibly confused and devoid of
effective media strategy, restrained from admitting their leader’s death until August 21st 2012,
when the state television’s early morning broadcast declared the passing away of the ‘dear’ leader
by a sudden death while also confirming that the leader was indeed battling an unnamed sickness
for over two years.115 The issue of political succession, the fate of the country and problems that
face the ruling coalition created a new political juncture that stand to redefine the course of the
country afresh.
The political leadership of the regime, deeply mourning the death of the dear leader, and
discussing nothing about the future of the state rather the legacies of the departed leader, eventually
started tackling one of the most challenging times in the history of the EPRDF’s rule. The issue of
political succession that should have been normally handled given the constitutional rule book’s
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explanation of the deputy prime minster assuming the position, the EPRDF and its leadership
stayed silent about it and the country would remain without a head of state until the Deputy Prime
Minister Mr. Haile Mariam Desalegn was sworn in as the second Prime Minster of the country
since 1995 on September 21st 2012116 in an emergency meeting called by the parliament. With the
arrival of the newly sworn in Prime Minister onto the political scene filling the big shoe left by the
late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s death, the ruling elite started its propaganda of the emergence
of collective leadership with the appointment of nine deputy prime ministers who now serve as
advisors of the new Prime Minister while also managing certain cabinet portfolios. Seven of those
deputy prime ministers are top TPLF leaders.
As a leadership member of the OPDO and formerly a youth political association leader,
who is interviewee number forty-nine, in my field interviews explained to me, “the Prime Minister,
not only is usually bypassed, in most of the administrative issues that the EPRDF encounters, but
most within the party leadership in Addis Ababa and across the regional states believe that he does
not even receive intelligence briefings and vital reports from certain ministerial offices and state
controlled enterprises.”117 The individual adds that most of such tasks are overseen by those who
deputize Mr. Haile Mariam Desalegn. Moreover, posters of the late prime minister would be visible across the country and EPRDF’s programs become nothing but implementing the visions of
the late prime minister. As one unnamed reporter of The Economist, in a small article that was
entitled, ‘Long live the king’, once stated, “His party is trying to wring as much legitimacy as
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possible from his legacy. It may be too early to speak of a post-Meles era—even in death he is the
country’s most visible politician.”118 In that respect, I also argue that Prime Minister Desalegn and
his comrades not only declared their intentions to lead the nation keeping the legacies and visions
of the late leader intact, but also the fact that they emerged out of the crisis as one, depicted their
usual success in coming out of any crisis stronger. And that, from what we already seen in the
discussions of the first two critical junctures, has become part of the political culture within the
ruling coalition. Many of the respondents to the questions I extended in my field work also echoed
that such a strength is attributed to EPRDF’s strong party discipline across all levels of the party
structure.
Ultimately, the death of Zenawi never led to the breakout of any protests and or unrest
across the country and the EPRDF’s resolve in capitalizing the ‘vision of the late leader’ as a new
source for legitimacy reinforced their efforts in the ideals they refer to as ‘collective leadership’
and thus resulting effective control of the state. The Ethiopian public in general, that was confused
and limited to following the new developments from television windows and radio waves, also
understood that in the absence of a formidable political alternative thanks to EPRDF’s effective
obliteration of the opposition, observing how the post-Zenawi era unfolds in the country and hoping of a calming political atmosphere were the only hope and option available.
Interestingly however, the TPLF, which dominated the EPRDF for over two decades had
to hastily reassure its dominance by making certain political moves that further strengthened its

118

Economist’s piece can be accessed at: https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21571936-ethiopias-new-leadership-practising-hero-worship-long-live-king.

233

control. Even before the new Prime Minister was sworn in on September 21st of 2012, the TPLF,
that has has always controlled the security apparatus that ranges from the military to the intelligence forces and the federal police, appointed thirty-seven new military generals all on same
day.119 Thirty sis of those generals were individuals of Tigrayan origin. According to interviewee
number forty-nine, the TPLF had already understood that relying on the EPRDF party structure
and elites at the regional level through the patron-client relations spread across the ethnic federal
arrangement may not be sustainable for so long. Therefore, strengthening their grip on the military
would become an alternative option. Some of this developments, especially with regards to the
military’s involvement in the economic spheres of the country, will be briefly assessed in the next
chapter. However, what is essential to our understanding is that throughout TPLF-EPRDF’s tenure
on top of the political power in the country, the ruling elite, seemingly diverse but highly controlled
by the TPLF, have effectively survived the challenges that they have faced through their control
of the military and security apparatus, coupled by abiding by the party discipline and their sheer
desire in succeeding with their survivalist approaches.
The passing of Mr. Zenawi and the vulnerable political climate that he left behind is now
long gone. The basic concerns of the general populace in terms of lack of prospects of democratization and what would come out of the ruling coalition however, lingers. The 2015 national elections, would also arrive and the EPRDF ‘improves’ its control of the legislative assembly from
what the regime had claimed to have won in 2010 (99.6 %) to now winning hundred percent of
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the seats in the parliament. As I indicated above, the fears of the TPLF in considering the ethnic
federal arrangement as unsustainable also became a reality when the question of identity of certain
groups who wanted to reclaim their Amhara identity and reunite with the Amhara regional state
from the north became a new challenge and the youth of the Oromo, an ethnic group arguable
considered the largest in the country, also demanded fairness and equality in the economic and
political spheres of the Ethiopian state.
Such questions that emerged from the two most populous regions and ethnic groups led to
a breakout of massive unrest across the two largest regional states of Amhara and Oromia. The
majority of the political elite from the two political parties that administer Oromia and Amhara
regional states (OPDO and ANDM, respectively) also, in the eyes of many observers and students
of Ethiopian politics, for the first time ever in the history of the EPRDF, sided with the people’s
demands in their respective states, which now is considered a new challenge for the TPLF led
EPRDF regime. The state of emergency that was declared by Prime Minister Desalegn’s government and the deployment of massive troops across the country seemed to have now quelled the
rampant violence that dominated the Ethiopian political scene in much of 2016. Given this research
project’s scope focuses until the end of 2016, I restrain from discussing the further ramifications
of such popular protests to the future of the Ethiopian state in general and the ruling coalition in
particular. However, further discussion in how such events unfolded and what also triggered them
cannot be explained here. Instead, in the following chapter, I focus on Ethiopia’s state sponsored
economic paradigms in an ethnic federal setting, in the next chapter.
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8.5

Conclusion
From the three critical junctures that I discussed in this chapter that show how the EPRDF

coalition managed to survive the existential challenges it faced, we see that such a success enjoyed
by the ruling elite did not happen out of sheer luck. Instead, we see that the dominant party state
structure in place in Ethiopia, the mechanisms for political survival manifested through the patronclient relations, the co-opted political elites across all levels of the federal structure, and the fact
that the security apparatus of the state is fully controlled by the TPLF and the coalition it created,
which is still in power, all have come through in defense of the regime’s vulnerabilities. Indeed,
such mechanism could still continue to support the regime’s survivalist agenda. However, as explained in this chapter and throughout the discussions presented overall, how reliable such survival
tactics would remain could be an open ended question in light of the new developments I mentioned. Thus, in understanding the further evolution of EPRDF’s rule requires to await those new
developments and analyze them. Regardless of that however, as we saw the political elites’ maneuver of the institutional solution of ethnic federalism to their survival ambitions, understanding
how the regime’s economic programs also played out in the ruling coalition’s efforts to assert its
power remain very much essential. Therefore, in the next chapter, I discuss the economic paradigms designed for implementation in the ethnic federal setting. In that regard, and my further
analysis of authoritarian survival mechanisms from the economic perspective and further assessment of how such mechanisms also played out with regards to people’s rights and the federal
setting itself will be further addressed.
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9

CHAPTER NINE: ETHIOPIA’S ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND STATE-CENTERED
ECONOMIC PARADIGMS: A FURTHER ANALYSIS ON THE ANATOMY OF
SURVIVALIST PARTY-STATE

9.1

Introduction:
In the last chapters of this dissertation, I have attempted to explain what Ethiopian politics

is all about with depth and clarity. In doing so, I indicated that both in historical narratives as well
as in assessment of the current reality, I argued that those political actors who presided over the
country’s politics at one time or another could be characterized as what I call survivalist political
elites. Such political elites put the notion of political survival above and beyond the ideals of public
service and political legacy. Here, it is also critical to note that in any democratic or authoritarian
setting, political elites’ priorities and efforts in public service or political activities could primarily
center around longevity of their political reigns or opportunities of extending the time-span of the
offices and official capacities they hold. However, I believe that while those political elites’ efforts
in democratic states focus on appeasing to their political base i.e., in the large part to their constituents and to some extent the party hierarchy, those in authoritarian countries in the large part focus
on appeasing the party bosses and the party structure. Therefore, in the question of the Ethiopian
political elite, I am of opinion that no matter how much they achieve in their leadership of development programs in all aspects, the tenacious efforts they put and the mechanisms they employ in
their quest to prolong their political reign standout more than their accomplishments in serving the
nation.
In that respect, studying Ethiopia’s authoritarian regimes, past or present, entails a careful
understanding of their political as well as economic programs. Identifying the successes as well as
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failures of such programs and finally making sure to comprehend the why and how of the emergence of such programs as well as their implementations becomes crucial. In doing so, closer attention must also be given to party documents that outline such programs, critic their shortcomings.
Thus, in broader terms, I have attempted to explain the patrimonial and neo-patrimonial past and
the persistent nature of political culture in shaping the behavior of the political elite in the country.
Moreover, I have also extensively addressed how the ethnic federal setting as an institutional solution has helped the TPLF/EPRDF regime in its survivalist ambitions.
Moreover, I have showed that Ethiopia’s political elites, old or new, are rational actors that
focus in maximizing their strategic interests via their effective control of the state, resources and
their efforts towards defeating the challenges they face against their political fortunes. In the last
few substantive chapters for instance, I have presented the ‘why’ of ethnic federalism from the
individual versus group rights perspective, and explained the ‘how’ of its implementations from
the electoral politics, the minority rights’ protection, absence of genuine relations between the
regional states and the central government, and the creation of a patron-bureaucracy to the centralist party structure.
Furthermore, in the last section of the chapter, I have also indicated that the fact that new
testing challenges are emerging, from the issue of questions of identity to popular demands for
political and economic equality, are forcing the TPLF led EPRDF elite to vie for new approaches
that will ensure continuity and survival of their political power. I argue that one major aspect in
that respect is the economic sphere and how the TPLF led EPRDF shaped its economic agenda
from time to time. Hence, in this chapter, I first present how the group economic rights promotion
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agenda was also crafted in post-1991 Ethiopia along the lines of the introduction of Ethnic federalism so as to achieve considerable levels of reduction in economic inequality in compassion with
the failures of the past regimes. Note that the discussion in the development of such economic
programs and EPRDF’s efforts in that regard, did not happen in reaction to recent political developments that I cited as new challenges. Because, they were there from the beginning of the post1991 political era. However, the fact that the ruling coalition’s hold of the economic sphere is even
more stronger than the political sphere has now influenced the tactically gifted TPLF leadership
to give more emphasis in strengthening the coalition’s grip on the economy as further reinforcement to their dominance. In doing so, I primarily focus on the TPLF led EPRDF’s land policy,
agricultural economic programs, as well as the ruling coalition’s evolving ideological foundations
by categorizing them in two time frames, i.e. the first and second decades.120 Here, I present the
successes as well as the ambiguities in the economic approaches the regime relied in attempting to
meet its predetermined goals by discussing the literary foundations for the economic ideologies
EPRDF picked up on in its time as a ruling coalition, i.e., the revolutionary democracy political
and economic paradigm and the developmental state economic growth and development strategy,
which were put into practice in line with the time frames I mentioned.
Secondly, chapter seven also presents how the ruling coalition’s centralist party structure
across all levels of government is also in control of the economic sphere where the parties are
witnessed the most important economic actors and the nation’s economic bosses. In that regard, I
discuss the ever-growing endowments that the TPLF/EPRDF member parties established and
transformed the ruling elites as leading economic forces in the country while again effectively
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transforming those same political parties as economic bosses of the country’s vital economic engines. Moreover, throughout the discussion, it will also be evident that the illiberal economic approaches have essentially kept the country in state of mixed-economy and left the TPLF led
EPRDF ruling coalition in command of the state enterprises, which are cash cows that serve the
survivalist ambitions of those in power. Essentially, the chapter presents how the state enterprises
are in control of the EPRDF coalition’s party structure while each member party of this coalition
is also overseeing the management of endowments. In that regard, I elucidate the ‘lost accountability’ in the management of such enterprises. Moreover, while explaining the anatomy Ethiopia’s
political economy from various perspectives and across time frames, further analyses of the economic paradigms and programs and how they played out in the ethnic federal setting will be further
detailed.
In that regard, I believe that at the end of the chapter we will be able to understand how a
rational ruling elite as shaped by continuous authoritarian political culture, absence of needed institutional strength designed and implemented solutions that secure their survivalist political interests. Here, it is also important to note that despite the dissertation focuses on contributing to the
literature on authoritarian survival in general, it will also pay attention to the successes of some of
the policies implemented in the Ethiopia’s economy in post-1991 political era. Because, some
successes should not also be ignored. In achieving such objectives of the chapter, I will rely on my
analysis of the critical events that transformed federal Ethiopia’s economy in the last twenty-five
years, for better or worse, according to the time frames I outlined. The interview data I collected
in my field work, through interviewing policy makers, bureaucrats, and party officials to entrepreneurs and business owners will be also presented. Moreover, secondary resources that help explain
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the Ethiopian phenomenon and support or oppose the primary data I relied on will be presented as
well.
9.2

Ideological Foundations of the TPLF-EPRDF Economy: The Literature
In this section, I discuss two ideological beliefs that the EPRDF ruling coalition had utilized

in pretty much every aspect of political and economic programs that it has employed thus far, i.e.
revolutionary democracy and developmental state model for economic growth and strategy. While
the revolutionary democracy ideology was the song of the regime in every aspect of political and
economic programs it envisioned and implemented in much of the first half of the TPLF-EPRDF
rule, developmental state economic paradigm came to the Ethiopian political scene in the advent
of the new millennia and remains the main ideological basis of the regime, which at times changes
the meanings of what developmental state means to its liking as we will see in the later stages of
this chapter. One central question of course, remains not only what do we mean by such ideological
beliefs and how do they differ. Henceforth, I explain how such paradigms emerged and played out
from the literary perspective.
9.3

Revolutionary (Abyotawi) Democracy as an Economic Paradigm in EPRDF’s First
Decade
The TPLF, which orchestrated the formation of the EPRDF coalition, and one that remains

the most dominant of the coalition’s member parties is also one credited with the adaptation and
implementation of such ideologies. I will not dwell much into the literature on revolutionary democracy in detail. However, it is also critical to present how the TPLF and then the EPRDF have
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come to use it the first major ideological foundation for their hold on political power. The revolutionary democracy ideology, essentially a leftist ideological framework of governance, was not an
ideology picked up by accident. The TPLF, all along had been a leftist movement. One of its
founders, Aregawi Berhe (2008), who now lives in exile, in his dissertation that focuses on the
TPLF as a political movement, explains that:
“Initially, the TPLF considered itself an organization within the broad spectrum of
Marxist movements of the Ethiopian left. With the rapidly growing number of peasant and
nationalist members in the Front in the late 1970s, the left-wing elements saw the need to
organize themselves to lead the Front in the direction they believed would realize the interests of the ‘poor and exploited masses’, and in which the right to self determination of
Tigrayans would be respected. At the beginning of 1978, a Marxist Leninist group was
uniting around this notion within the TPLF - as a network of revolutionary fighters who
believed in socialism as a just and fair system for all” (Page 208).
Of course, no credible source could be available more than the founder of the movement
himself. And according to Berhe’s assessment of the ideological foundation of the TPLF, we see
that TPLF indeed organized itself as a leftist rebellion that wages an armed struggle against a leftist
regime, i.e. the Dergue. In fact, the considerations that the TPLF leadership used as a basis to join
new political partnerships in a fight against the Dergue were based on whether such groups had
embraced similar leftist ideologies in addition to their commitment in overthrowing the socialist
regime in place in much of the seventies and eighties. What is also vital to discuss is that the
mentions of peasants, and and the “poor and exploited masses”, in the above quote, stresses the
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adoption of a revolutionary democracy ideology which is a byproduct of eastern left-wing ideologies was quite needed. According to interviewee number-two, who has served the regime from the
beginning, the term ‘revolutionary’ symbolizes EPRDF’s commitment to group rights and the term
‘democracy’ to their commitment in embarking on democratic reforms according to the group
rights promotion agenda. In that regard, achieving both, according to him, was possible through
institutionalizing the state in a new federal setting which guarantees equal distribution of wealth
while empowering the regional states towards implementing such centrally driven economic strategies in a way that benefits the economic groups within their respective states.121
Notwithstanding the explanation of interviewee number-two on what he means revolutionary democracy, a look at a seminal contribution by Jean-Nicolas Bach (2011), who not only to
helped with a brief description of the meaning of the concept but also analyzed it from the perspective of the terms used by TPLF and then EPRDF, revolutionary democracy actually means
further than that. According to Bach,
“The democratic project through revolutionary means partly emerged from a Leninist interpretation of Marx’s Proletariat Dictatorship thesis. The notion of revolutionary
democracy came from an opposition to capitalist liberal ideology, and Lenin’s revolutionary project. Quite demarcating himself from his Marxian heritage and inspired by the writings of the utopian socialist Tchernychevski, Lenin stressed the necessity for the ‘‘enlighten’’ elites to lead the unconscious masses to the revolution. Lenin’s revolutionary
strategy and goals were mainly presented in his famous What Is To Be Done? and at the
occasion of the First Communist International in March 1919. ‘‘Proletariat dictatorship’’
121

The interview with interviewee number-two was conducted in March 14th, 2017, in Washington D.C.
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was considered the antithesis of ‘‘parliamentary bourgeois democracy’’ and the social revolution was expected to be led by a vanguard party in a ‘‘democratic centralism’’ that
would not allow any internal factionalism. Thus, revolutionary democracy has been interpreted as a bridge between pre-capitalist and socialist societies” (page 641).
Of course, as the above quote puts eloquently, the Ethiopian societies that the liberation
fronts including the TPLF were attempting to liberate could be described “pre-capitalist” and socialist societies. For one, in the economic systems in modern Ethiopian history and to this day, we
see that the free market economy was either non-existent or limited to a higher degree by the
government policies in previous regimes. And for the rest, of course, it is clear that for most of the
seventeen years or so that such rebel groups were fighting the military socialist regime, the economic system was constructed along the same leftist anti-liberalism economic principles that most
importantly could be described in terms of the socialist regime’s deep ties with the former Soviet
Union and its partners. Hence, for TPLF, adopting and understanding such ideological foundations
in guiding its political and economic principles was important as what it aspired to help through
such revolutionary struggle was to free the exploited masses that suffered under the lingering economic and political inequality rampant in previous political regimes.
TPLF kept such a leftist political and economic ideology throughout the period of struggle
and after it assumed political power with its formation of the EPRDF coalition in post-1991 Ethiopia. However, such an ideology was not kept as is by the TPLF. Certain changes have always
been introduced by its ideologues throughout. In indicating some of the fundamental changes,
Bach adds that:
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“In its 1976 Manifesto, the movement initially called for the independence of Tigray, thus defending Tigrayan nationalism on the basis of the national oppression thesis. In
the course of the 1970s, the TPLF progressively adopted a broader Ethiopian agenda in
which Tigray would gain autonomy. Under the influence of the Tigrayan intellectuals and
their Marxist-Leninist inclination, one can consider TPLF was as an NDR movement in
the 1970s, i.e. at the time of the Manifesto. However, during the struggle, facing the necessity to adapt its strategy in a rural Tigray environment and following the USSR friendship
with the Derg regime, the TPLF adopted the Maoist model, thus entering the RPDR (or
New Democratic Revolution) at the end of the 1970. In the 1980s, the tactical alliance
between Maoism and bourgeoisie was rejected by TPLF thinkers who eventually shifted
to the Albanian model which appeared less ‘‘revisionist’’ to them” (page 642)122.
Bach also explains the ideological changes and re-adaptation of the Marxist-Leninist belief
in the TPLF camp, through the establishment of the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, which he
described as “a party within a party.”123 However, with sweeping changes in the international climate with the fall of the soviet union, the spread of liberal economic agenda in most ex-soviet
states, the fall of the Dergue that put the TPLF at the helm of political power in the country, another
changes had to happen in an attempt to appease the western world and show readiness for political
as well as economic reforms. Hence, liberal free market policies would be introduced and the
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While the NDR model (national democratic revolution) is a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the RPDR model
(National Popular Democratic Revolution) is a Stalinist-Maoist (Albanian-Chinese) ideology that the TPLF
had to seize upon realizing the socialist regime that they were fighting against, at the time was of course
just like them, i.e., Marxist-Leninist. This explanation is taken from Bach’s description of the changes in
page 642.
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Page 642.
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private sector would be encouraged with the establishment of the first of its kind agency that facilitates the process of privatization in the country (Bach 2011). However, the TPLF tenaciously
keep its revolutionary (Abyotawi in Amharic) democracy ideology in tact even amid the liberal
economic policies being introduced. Quoting the speech of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi, where he asserted such an ideology’s importance in helping the country’s future,
saying it “had to be firmly grasped if Ethiopia was to embark on sustainable economic development”, Bach further stats that, “Despite the adoption of a multi-party system and liberal economic
policies, Meles paradoxically reaffirmed the ideological line rejecting parliamentary democracy
and defending democratic centralism based on a vanguard party” (page 643). Indeed, what we see
here is that the TPLF-EPRDF leadership saw in revolutionary democracy the only option in transforming the Ethiopian state in terms of its promotion of the group rights agenda, the vision they
had for the establishment of a strong centralist party structure and eventually the realization of
their survivalist political programs.
Bringing how the ethnic federal agenda could also be explained according to such a revolutionary democracy ideology is hence, very essential. Of course, the economic reforms through
the revolutionary democracy framework had to occur throughout the newly constituted members
of the federation. Among the first questions, for instance, is how is the state revenues are collected
and shared. According to E J Keller (2002), the regime, in its attempt to satisfy donor countries
and organizations standards echoed the regional states’ autonomy in economic management,
which according to the author, the World Bank had acknowledged in its 1999 report by stating,
“Ethiopia has embarked on a bold and thoughtful process of decentralization, which has been supported by a widely shared consensus over both the development strategy and objectives, and very
large transfers of untied resources from the federal government to the regions. At this point, the
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system is unquestionably working well.”124 Here, I would like to note that the author did not mention the revolutionary democracy economic paradigm per se. However, given such economic policies that range from revenue sharing to other economic notions and strategies were designed according to such a paradigm, inferring such a concept would not be an understatement. Nonetheless,
E J Keller (2002) counters the World Bank’s report by arguing that:
“By the standards of public administration, this would seem to be the case. However, there is a political dimension that organizations like the World Bank and other international development agencies seem to ignore or simply downplay. Ethnic federalism has
not resulted in a widespread consensus in the general population of Ethiopia. There are
some in the public at large, particularly among the Amhara and other amharized ethnicities,
who contend that by definition a development strategy involving ethnic federalism is fatally flawed125…….. Despite such concerns, the EPRDF government has forged ahead with
its plans, justifying this approach based on the fact that its first priority is the removal of
social inequalities based on ethnicity” (page 22).
I believe that the author’s explanations above serve two important purposes to the discussions of the chapter. Firstly, it shows that the ruling coalition’s liberalization of the economy,

124

Keller’s quote of the World Bank can be found on: Ethiopia: Regionalization study. Report No. 18898ET (February 3, 1999). Page 1.
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Keller’s mentioning of the Amhara and Amharized societies, although in part, true, the author’s argument seem incomplete. Because, firstly, not only Amharas, but most Ethiopians today believe the flaws in
the federal setting are too many. Secondly, it fails short of explaining despite the ruling coalition’s interests
in embarking on such reforms through the empowering of ethnicities, the ethnically formed regional states
are not endowed with the level of autonomy in doing so.
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although occurred to some degree, was mostly done in appeasing the donor countries and organizations. Secondly, it also shows that the ideals of revolutionary democracy with a EPRDF’s intentions of its promotions of the group rights agenda, is in full practice as we saw in much of its
political agenda. Nevertheless, the main point in the discussion of what the concept of revolutionary democracy is about and how it evolved within TPLF and then TPLF led EPRDF coalition is to
show that such an economic paradigm had been the main ideological foundation that guided the
new post-1991 Ethiopia’s economy. That continued until the revolutionary democracy paradigm
became replaced with the developmental state economic paradigm at the turn of the century.
9.4

The Developmental State Economic Paradigm: The Second Decade in EPRDF’s
Economy
Chalmers Johnson (1982), who studied the rapid economic growth of Japan in post war era

by focusing on the performance of Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), was the
first to use the concept of developmental state. Johnson argues that the term represents the extraordinary economic success that the Japanese state apparatus helped create for a long time. The Japanese experience then becomes an example of economic success and would be copied by many
South East Asian states, which even leads to the eventual association of the theory of developmental state with that region’s economic transformation. According to Chalmers Johnson, Japanese
efforts in setting consistent economic priorities, its focus on prioritizing economic development,
its government’s heavy intervention in the economy, its extensive consideration of the developmental state economic thesis as its foundation for growth, its effectiveness in establishing a functioning bureaucracy and the kind of institutions or “pilot organizations” that it established (such
as MITI) all indicate the generally accepted characters of a developmental state.
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When we see beyond Johnson’s explanations of what the theory entails based on Japan’s
historical past, Evans (1995) argues, “only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together
can a state be called developmental” (p.12). According to Evans, embedded autonomy is what
offers the fundamental basis for effective intervention in the economy, for a state that aspires rapid
industrialization. Furthermore, he also argues that the developmental state and its prime example,
Japan fits the “Weberian hypothesis”, which points to the need for a strong state apparatus, which
is crucial to creation of effective bureaucracy (p. 48). Assuming the South East Asian success in
rapid economic growth and development was achieved by developmental state economic model,
the question becomes how other states could also adopt such a growth strategy to emulate such
success stories from Asia. In that regard, Atul Kohli (2004) argues that those most effective developmental states’ characteristics have existed long before the states even adopted this state-centric
economic model. According to him, history of the state (for instance, what form of colonial history
preceded the state’s independence), the state’s bureaucratic strength, the state’s ability to levy taxes
and spend the collected tax in public development programs, and the state’s ability to create a
“disciplined labor force” is very much paramount to its successes (p.10).
Kohli, who extensively discusses various types of developmental states, however, argues
that the level of success the developmental states achieved in their industrialization programs had
also its costs. In his discussion of South Korea economic success for instance, he argues:
“The successes, however, came at a high cost. Rapid industrialization occurred
within the framework of a highly authoritarian state characterized by overtones of fascism,
a state that I have labeled cohesive-capitalist. Political dissent was not tolerated. Many
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opposing the regime were repressed, and labor was corporatized and state-controlled. Income, wealth, and power inequalities in the society also became more skewed, especially
starting in the 1970s, as the government deliberately encouraged economic concentration
in the hands of the big chaebols (p. 122”.126
As we could see from Kohli’s argument, despite witnessing changes in economic lives of
citizens of a developmental state and unprecedented economic growth, such a model did not encourage democratization from the start, at least in the case of South Korea. Here, Kohli’s argument
also begs questions like whether we can argue the developmental state economic model is incompatible with democracy or it is just that it helps survivalist ambitions of ruling elites as we have
seen thus far with EPRDF’s mechanisms of manipulating the institutional solutions it devised for
the sake of its survival.
According to Chalmers Johnson (1986) another seminal contribution on the topic, the
claims that connect developmental states with authoritarian forms of government are not valid.
However, he also stresses that “authoritarianism can sometimes inadvertently solve the main political problem of economic development using important players in the economy such as some
market- forces’ efforts in mobilizing the overwhelming majority of the population to work and
sacrifice for developmental projects”127. For Johnson, what matters most for a developmental

126

Chaebols refer to big busineesses and conglomerates.
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See page 52 on, Johnson, Chalmers A. MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of

industrial policy: 1925-1975. Stanford University Press, 1982.
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state’s government is a level of legitimacy from the masses and its approval of the development
projects. Here, we can see that in both the revolutionary democratic economic paradigm’s implementation process and also in the adaptation and implementation of the developmental state model,
the EPRDF in fact has successfully managed to use its heavy handed intervention in the economy
and state sponsored economic programs (especially in infrastructure development), to seek and
gain some levels of political legitimacy. However, although infrastructure development as a strategy to gain legitimacy could be one example in the case of Ethiopia’s regime, the problem is that
Johnson did not explicitly indicate what further techniques could the state utilizes for the purpose
of achieving legitimacy from the public, as factors for gaining such legitimacy could be very much
broader than that. Hence, I find Johnson’s claims contradictory with each other although his argument in terms of the role of the market forces in such economic paradigms remains vital to explore.
In fact, this chapter pays considerable attention in what we even could refer to as ‘market forces’
in the case of Ethiopia and witnessing party owned businesses, endowments and state enterprises
that directly report to party headquarters will not be surprising.
As we could further see from Han Sung-Ju’s (1974) historical account of the period of high
economic-success in South Korean example, its is clear that such economic progress was in fact
marred by high forms of state repression. For instance, Sung-Ju explains more broadly about how
the Korean state was oppressive amid its rapid economic transformations. The author, among others, mentions the brutality of the police, that had similar responsibilities at times even with the
bureaucracy. And the fact that, according to him, how much useful it was for the Korean repressive
state apparatus to use such security institutions of the state against political opposition was indeed
very much important to note. Here again, in light of the previous discussions about the existence
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of a patron-bureaucracy that I discussed and the domination of the TPLF-EPRDF government of
the security apparatus, we see that important parallels are there to further explore.
In his assessment of the state-centric theories, Peter Hall (1986) explains that such theories
prioritize the autonomy of the state more than the societal interest.128 Consistent with Hall’s claim,
Peter Evans (1995) also argues that at least as it was evident in President Rhee’s regime of Developmental State of South Korea, the bureaucracy was highly repressed, promotions and dismissals
within the civil service were entirely political and the state was highly clientelistic with “rentseeking behavior rampant and systematic”.129 Of course, as we could learn from Evans’s implication in his explanation of ‘embedded autonomy,’ the state in fact gets legitimacy based on some
forms of interaction with its citizens that might not align with the generally accepted expectations
of democracy. That I believe indicates that the coercive apparatus of the state could be essential to
the regime’s ambitions of success as a developmental state.
In EPRDF’s case, that would be attributed to its survivalist political and economic approaches. Hence, the autonomy that the state enjoys in its heavy handed management of the economy might not be what its citizens pledged or agreed to voluntarily, rather an imposed party-centered economic agenda that aligns with the party’s political interests of survival. I argue that in
both Evans and Johnson’s description of the developmental state, we see that a form of semiauthoritarian behavior (or soft-authoritarianism) could be tolerated as long as the state is following
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such an active state-centric economic model, which I will further discuss the economic policies,
the implementation strategies and how it played out in practice.
Nevertheless, debates on the compatibility of a certain state’s adoption of developmental
state theory as its guiding principle and the ideals of democracy has led to a new effort that attempts
to make the connection between developmental state and democracy. Because, for a regime like
the TPLF-EPRDF’s, despite the lack of clear commitment to democracy and its authoritarian
tendencies, keeping the term ‘democracy’ as part of any ideological belief is very much important
as a further attempt to gain more legitimacy. This attempt, as in Mark Robinson and Gordon White
(1998), is what is referred to as democratic developmental state, and that happens to be the case in
what we see the Ethiopian regime use of the term in its programs and the ruling coalition’s propaganda pieces, mainly as ‘democratic developmentalism’. In formality, the Ethiopian regime had
also debated and clarified the terms in terms of what labels uses for such an economic model, from
calling their model ‘developmental state’ originally to claiming later, it is democratic developmental state. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who was the chief ideologue in the importation, adaptation
and supervision of the country’s transitions from a command economic model to a revolutionary
democratic and semi-liberalist economic ideologies and then to developmental state, seemed to
had been aware of the unbearable cost that could emerge with the adoption of South East Asian
model of developmental state. In what seems an inspiration from such a concern, Meles Zenawi
(2006) argued for democratic developmentalism, by stating that:
“Development is a political process first and economic and social process later. It
is the creation of a political set-up that is conducive to accelerated development that sets
the ball of development rolling. Only when there is a state that has the characteristics of a
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developmental state can one meaningfully discuss the elimination of rent seeking behavior.
In its absence rent seeking will be rampant no matter what the size of the state might be.
Only in the context of such a political environment can one debate about development
policy in a meaningful manner. In its absence all government policy and action however
limited and timid it might be will be riddled with rent-seeking behavior and this particularly
so in developing countries as these countries will be coming out of a social and political
environment where vertical, patron-client networks are pervasive.”130
What we see from Zenawi’s argument implies that economic policies cannot be disentangled from political concerns. Hence, in his subsequent arguments, he calls for a state that is committed towards both political and economic concerns of the society. Ironically, however, the Prime
Minister’s mentions of rent-seeking patterns and the patron-client relations, indicate that while he
fully knows that the Ethiopian bureaucracy is effectively overshadowed with his ruling coalition’s
highly centralized party structure across all levels of the federation, he advocates for a ‘strong
government actions and policy’ that are crucial to success of the country’s developmental state
characters. But whether strong government means the empowering of the coercive powers of the
state in the management of the economy could be open to interpretation. I however, argue that
given the growing involvement of the military in owning and establishing corporations in the country’s growing economy, the Prime Minister and his ruling coalition might have given economic
role to the loyal military chiefs and commanders, in a way ensuring the success of the economic
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program in one hand and the ruling coalition’s survivalist ambitions on the other hand. On a different note, it is also important to mention that the concept of democratic developmentalism, although highly used in line with the developmental state economic paradigm, the regime had also
been using the same concept along the lines of the revolutionary democratic economic plans.
Of course, all in all, Ethiopia’s adoption of such an economic model seemed to have led to
rapid economic growth despite its imperfections and acknowledging some levels of economic progress is essential. However, despite such economic success in the last decade and half, the regime’s
commitment towards democracy has quickly dwindled to oblivion. In the same time frame (that I
referred as the second decade), where EPRDF’s democratic developmentalism, is put into practice,
the ruling coalition’s hold of the political power grew tremendously to the level of dominating the
people’s parliamentary seats hundred percent. Moreover, we have also seen from the literature on
this form of economic model that the role institutions play in realizing the potential of developmental paradigms is extremely important. But this leads to the question that in the case of Ethiopia,
where are the such institutions that are critically needed if developmental states are to succeed? Of
course, they are either non-existent or new and pre-mature to handle the requirements of the demands of such a model, which requires that such a void must be filled in one way or another.
Interestingly, however, here is what comes the role of the party endowments of the EPRDF,
the growing transformation in the state economic enterprises in their role in the economy, contradicting the party’s initial commitment towards liberalization primarily through privatization.
Moreover, the growing role of the military in the economy, as indicated above, could eventually
become one of our explanations to our answers for the question, ‘where are such institutions’. Such
topics will therefore have to be addressed in more detail. However, in the next section, I present
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how the revolutionary democracy and developmental state paradigms played out via the economic
policies of the regime in the first and second decades and assess their impact on the group rights
promotion agenda of the ruling coalition as they played out in the country’s new federal setting.
9.5

EPRDF Coalition’s Economic policies, Programs and Ethnic Federalism in the First
and Second Decades
As we discuss the first decade in EPRDF’s economic policies that the coalition adopted

and implemented, let’s recall that the political elites’ predetermined goal was focused in delivering
the needed policies that would change the lives of citizens that were part of the neglected masses
by the previous regimes. Hence, raising the level of economic equality was the primary issue and
part and parcel of the group rights agenda that gave extended emphasis on ethnicity. The next
episode in realizing such an agenda was to create the ethnic federal arrangement, and make the
newly created regional states the center of the ruling coalition’s vision for economic success. As I
indicated in my discussion of the TPLF’s leftist past and revolutionary democratic economic
agenda, however, it is critical that we see what segments of the Ethiopian society the regime targeted to help with the realization of its economic programs. In that regard, we find that the peasantry and rural Ethiopia in general become the focus of the ruling coalition. Hence, the first of the
major eye opening laws would be directed on the issue of land. And the major economic policy
directions would also focus on agriculture led economy and ways of improving agricultural outputs
of the peasantry while working on making the lives of people in this sector better than before and
working to ensure the most important goal of ‘food sufficiency’ that would help combat the recurrent famine that usually impacted the rural areas.
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The first of the economic policies to be introduced along the lines of the revolutionary
democratic paradigm was the ‘Agricultural Development Led Industrialization’ economic policy
that emerged immediately after the unveiling of the transitional government in 1991. Such economic policy, which EPRDF’s party program states as:
“To ensure that development is centered on the agricultural sector in recognition of
the pivotal role of human capital in rapid and sustainable development, as most of the population is rural, and in further recognition of the fact that it is in agriculture that limited
investment yields great returns in development. To ensure rapid development through landuse policy whereby farmers have sufficient farming land and that this resource would be
put to optimal use with a view of protecting and preserving the environment”131
And the ruling coalition’s presentation of such views that ultimately pushed the introduction of their land and agricultural policy into fruition seemed convincing even for those who opposed rural centered programs, instead opting for industrialization focused economic programs
that will both support the agricultural sector as well as the growth of manufacturing. Regardless
of that however, such programs ensued and would be put in place by erasing Dergue’s land policy
that many had considered an upgrade form the imperial era’s land related polices that had proclaimed land as the possession of the state whereby the aristocracy had much say in its use and
distribution. Therefore, the military regime efforts of land distribution and easing of restriction on
the land use as a response to the famed ‘land to the tiller’ slogan of the student movement that
helped oust the imperial regime were given deserved credits.
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To the contrary, The EPRDF regime declared that land now would be re-nationalized
(Harbeson 2005). And the rational in declaring so, according to EPRDF would be to protect the
peasantry was that, the farmers are too illiterate and too ill-trained of the land market, that protection of such a wealth must be the ultimate responsibility of the government, therefore the EPRDF.
One way to protect the farmers therefore would be to focus on improving the yields that come out
of small holding agriculture which is the case in the country.132 Moreover, EPRDF also declares
that land cannot be sold or exchanged with a minor exception where the Prime Minister at the
time, Meles Zenawi, who had stated that while those in the north are owners of the land although
not allowed to sell or exchange it, those in the south would not considered owners of the land
although they can retain it indefinitely.133
An economist by profession and a long serving bureaucrat in Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture, interviewee number-thirteen, however, states that, “the EPRDF and its leaders’ intention
from the beginning when it comes to the renationalization of land was mainly for the purpose of
its political agenda of benefiting those ethnicities that they had considered the victims of the old
land policies from previous administrators that they considered had allegedly helped the Amhara
farmers although that was not the case. Hence, for EPRDF land nationalization serves to important
goals. One is that it helps the ruling coalition to reward the loyalists and its patrons across the new
regional states that are now formed along ethnic lines. Secondly, it effectively serves the purpose
of punishing those whom the regime thinks had benefited a lot during their ownership of land
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during the Dergue era.”134 In fact, as the individual indicated in the interview, the regime had first
embarked upon the redistribution of land in the North, mainly in Amhara populated rural areas
where the land would be first taken from a given household that had been considered wealthy, in
Ethiopia’s rural standards and its possessions would be distributed to another household that was
considered to have owned less of it. According to an individual whose family relied on their farming practices, interviewee number-eleven, stated to me that, “my family who had owned about
thirty acres of farming land were deprived of their land possessions and left with only twelve acres,
because they were fortunate since any member of the family were not found to be a member of the
Dergue’s worker’s party. However, those who were found to be former members of a ruling class
would be only left with four acres of land for being ‘old regime bureaucrats’ a name that was given
to those farmers who were perceived to support the old regime or served in any capacity in one of
those farmers’ associations of old.”135
As we could see from the personal accounts of a former EPRDF civil servant and an individual descended from a family of farmers, in fact the ruling coalition had used the land policy to
create new winners and losers, which seems the way the TPLF led EPRDF operates in much of its
political practices. Although the notion of empowering group rights as a basis for most of its
agenda, the practicality of the policies and implementation strategies align with much of the deception of the political elite that use the institutions they designed to create new patrons and sup-

The interview with interviewee number-thirteen occurred on June 24th, 2017, over telephone conversation and the location is withheld per agreement.
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porters and punish others. The issue of land management in urban centers after decree that nationalized land emerged was also not any different from any of the rural area. In an email exchange
with one of my interviewee respondents, interviewee number-ten, the individual stated that:
“In one of the week days in October 1998, a government cadre, who is of a Tigrayan
origin, came to my textile shop in Merkato136 and asked me if I can sell one of the compartments in my store. I told the individual that I have never advertised to sell any part of
my shop and would not consider selling for any value. In the next week, three government
officers came and put a ‘tashigual’ (closed) sign on one of my shops. I immediately went
to the municipality, and asked for any explanation. But they were clueless as just as I was.
After many trials in court, I was only scheduled to appeal after two years and in the mean
time a section of my store would be occupied with someone who would start to wholesale
the same products I was selling. I was hurt to the extreme and did not know what to do.
Eventually, the court date arrived and I was asked by the presiding judge ‘for how long I
had owned or occupied the store and I replied for over twenty-two years and indicated that
it was also owned by my father before that for a longtime. The judge replied that, ‘well, if
you had used the store for all this time, what would be the problem if others also try to use
it for some years’. And he decided that I would lose the battle before the ‘court’ of law and
I am left crying for all those years since then.”137
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Merkato is a large open market located in the heart of Addis Ababa, and it is considered the largest open
market in Africa.
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The email exchange with interviewee number-ten occurred from June 17th-19th of 2017.
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As we could see from the individual’s personal account above, the ruling coalition even
treated the buildings as possessions of their particular owners while the land such buildings are
erected as the government’s. In general, the implementation of such policies would have far reaching consequences of creating new winners and losers in the EPRDF era. However, the impact of
the polices at a greater level in the economy had also improved agricultural yields although that
would not be substitute for the suffering that had also come to exist as a result of those same
policies.
Here, it is important to note that what I attempted to show in the discussion above was that
the regime’s intentions of promotion of group rights came at a cost of violations directed against
individuals’ rights. Moreover, keeping the notion of what has strengthened EPRDF’s chances of
survival in mind, the regime’s owning of the land provided a situation where the political elite who
are on top of party owned businesses and on board of directors of state enterprises ease of using
state owned land for expanding such ventures to their liking. Regardless of that however, coming
back to analyzing the successes of the economic policies in EPRDF’s revolutionary democracy
era, we see that agricultural yield improved and investment on agriculture grew substantially at the
back of a relative political stability in the first decade. Nonetheless, two contradictory evaluations
of the agricultural led policy is discussed.
The first perspective is that such a policy had not faced problems because its logics were
profoundly consistent with the leaders’ ambitions and hard work and that had helped the country
to transform itself from the old rent-seeking culture of economic development paradigms (Ohno
2009). And the other perspective counters that despite meagre level of success in productivity and
development of capacity building programs that could better serve the long term economic agenda,
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the policies have come short of their predetermined goals such as food-sufficiency and that the
fact that the growth in productivity were immediately followed by abrupt decreases should alarm
that the policies should not be recognized as overall successes (Zewdie 2015). These two diverging
insights however, agree in principle, that the notion that agricultural policies that had focused on
small-holding farmers was the right plot and that greater levels of lack of technological and institutional capacities were to blame for most of the failures.
Here, I argue that the main shortcoming of the assessments of such scholarly works that
focused on the Agriculture Led Industrialization scheme is that the authors failed to consider the
political climate and conduciveness for such programs to succeed. And that the assessments also
took the political leaders’ speeches as well as party programs and writing pieces on face value.
Here, I would like to stress that my attempt is not to discredit such assessments in any way. Rather,
as interviewee number-thirteen stated, “the regime’s successes in certain measurable areas are attributed to the level of certain autonomy that few regional states had enjoyed in the implementation
of such policies. In certain regions, where the ruling coalition had heavy handedly interfered, the
results were utter failures. The level of decline in agricultural productivity that was seen in later
years of the ADLI era was also a good example of the result of a growing party structure that
effectively overshadowed the Ministry of Agriculture’s bureaucracy at all levels and the growing
involvement of party endowments that started to sell farmers fertilizers and scientifically improved
seeds in exaggerated prices resulting in dissatisfaction and low motivations in the part of farmers.”138 Of course, in the later sections of the chapter, I will explain the role of party owned en-

The interview with interviewee number-thirteen occurred on June 24th, 2017, over telephone conversation and the location is withheld per agreement.
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dowments’ businesses in the country’s economy, but as the primary information from the individual interviewee indicated when the interference of party officials and the party structure is significantly less, the policy implementation process yields better results and when the interferences are
to the contrary, results show different outcomes.
In that regard, I reiterate that the political climate in general matters most and the magnitude of EPRDF dominance in the economic sphere shows that each and every aspect of policy
formulation and implementation process starts with the ruling coalition and ends within itself. In
that respect, the scenario in which the federal structure that comprises the four regional states that
are administered by four member parties of the EPRDF coalition, along side what I refer as the ‘so
called developing states’ that are run by the ruling coalition’s affiliate parties’ bureaucracies are
growingly dominated by the party structure are important to consider. Because, bureaucratic patrons of the regime serving the interests of such a centralist party organization, have led to
EPRDF’s dominance of the economic sphere just as the political one in a more efficient fashion
resulting in the ruling elites’ increasing success in the creation of a conducive and solid ground for
their survivalist ambitions.
In the advent of the new millennia, much of the ruling coalition’s rhetoric and propaganda
in selling the ideals of revolutionary democracy and its successive policies that were based on the
original ADLI economic scheme slowed down. Much of the successive economic plans that one
after another by building from each other’s successes and lessons of their failures had to be transformed. Prime Minister Zenawi, who was the chief ideologue, propagandist in chief and strong
and well respected and feared leader of the ruling coalition, started to make rounds about the need
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to transform the country’s economy and the lives of its citizens via the adaptation of the developmental state economic growth and development paradigm. Recalling the earlier interview that I
presented of (interviewee number-two) from my field work, the transition from revolutionary democracy towards developmental stateness was seamless because nothing significant actually
evolved in terms of EPRDF’s economic ideology.
Interviewee number-two has a point in that the successive programs under ADLI had also
prepared the regime to move towards its plan of adopting developmental state economic goals that
are more demanding of the government’s interference in all aspects of the economic sector. To
mention the most notable of the policies that followed the ADLI strategy, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) that served as the first five year plan and the
Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) which was then
set out by the EPRDF to meet the donor nations’ demands according to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were partly successful in driving the country’s economy towards double digit
economic growth.139 However, in fairness to my assessment of the ruling coalition’s new economic master plan that the political elite would eventually refer as Growth and Transformation
Plans (GTPs), the new economic direction comes calling for increased spending in infrastructural
development and expansion of industrialization schemes via the formation of new industrial villages and dry ports across the main trade routes of the nation, to mention few of the examples.
Hence, such new economic directions while led to the emergence of mega projects mainly in the
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EPRDF’s as well as international Organizations’ (Mainly WB and IMF) touting of double digit growth
have also been met different alternative facts that put the whole growth into question. However, as most of
the MDGs’ indicators have shown, the growth in the economic sphere cannot be debated regardless of the
failures on predetermined goals such as, ‘ending poverty’?
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energy sector, the rehabilitation of rail roads, increase in thousands of kilometers of road construction, and the construction and rea estate sector, they also led to new and critical challenges that put
in to further questions of the growing role of the party apparatus in further growing the party endowments, the military’s arrival in the economic sector by taking responsibility of managing some
of the state enterprises. Moreover, the further strengthening of clientelistic relations as well as
emergence of corporatist elements that have now seized greater influence as they embarked on
working with the government with the creation of joint ventures. What is also essential to bear in
mind is however, the regime’s declared commitment towards democratic development though
such developmental state paradigm that they mostly refer as democratic developmentalism.
In the first of the GTP that the government announced, the plan states that:
“The country’s long term vision, achievements of PASDEP and lessons drawn from
its implementation are the bases for conceiving the next five-year Growth and Transformation Plan. The plan has also been prepared considering growth constraining factors that
emerged in the course of implementation and external shocks. Ethiopia’s long-term vision
is “to become a country where democratic rule, good-governance and social justice reigns,
upon the involvement and free will of its peoples; and once extricating itself from poverty
and becomes a middle-income economy.” Its vision in the economic sector is “to build an
economy which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology
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and an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy; to sustain economic development and secure social justice; and, increase per capita income of citizens so that it
reaches at the level of those in middle-income countries” (page 7).140
As clearly indicated in the mission and vision of the country’s policy direction, the regime
still discusses the need of building the necessary ingredients for democratic development while as
I stated earlier, the coalition is freely roaming with its domination of the country’s politics with a
highly strained and incapable opposition offering no challenge whatsoever. Regardless of that, the
regime kept its focus on agriculture as a driving force behind the new industrialization scheme and
the country would sustain its registration of double digit economic growth for continuing years.
With its explanations of the lessons drawn from the implementation of GTP-1, the regime further
declares why the government needs to increase its commitment to devote public resources in owning and spending on the infrastructures of the state thereby owning the economy and coming in
against the liberalization of the economic sector that was promised in the first decade. In explaining
the GTP-2, the government’s documents states that:
“The positive achievements of GTP I and lesson drawn from its implementation
have been taken as input in the formulation of the Second Growth and Transformation Plan
(GTPII). The national vision; existing national and sectoral policies, strategies and programs; performance under GTPI; commitment to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and regional and international economic collaboration initiatives were the basis for the formulation the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTPII) through high level political
leadership, public participation & ownership. The formulation of the GTPII has also passed
140

The first GTP is available at: http://www.ethiopians.com/Ethiopia_GTP_2015.pdf.
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through broad based consultation processes with relevant stakeholders at both regional &
federal levels to enrich its content & forge national ownership of the Plan. Subsequently,
the final version of the plan was approved by the council of ministers endorsed the Parliament to guide development endeavors in the country during the next five years, 2015/162019/20. The major objective of GTP II is to serve as a spring board towards realizing the
national vision of becoming a low middle-income country by 2025, through sustaining the
rapid, broad based and inclusive economic growth, which accelerates economic transformation and the journey towards the country’s renaissance” (page ix).141
While GTP-2 decreased expectations in terms of reaching levels of middle income countries, by stating now that “reaching low middle-income country level by 2025”, as I indicated
earlier, the deficiencies, per the chapter’s goals, of such programs impact as transpired in the implementation process, must be addressed. In that regard the next section of the chapter focuses on
three important issues. Firstly, I address how such programs impacted the rights issues in the country. Secondly, I assess how the growing involvement of the state in the economy could be explained
in terms of the party endowments ever-growing dominance of the economy. And lastly, I present
the issue and challenges of management of state enterprises and growing corporatist pressure. All
in all, such points will at the end serve the same purposes, i.e., a further assessment of the federal
arrangement and economic relations between various sectors and how such aggregated factors
weigh in the explanations of authoritarian survival in broad terms.
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The GTP-2 plan can be accessed at: http://dagethiopia.org/new/images/DAG_DOCS/GTP2_English_Translation_Final_June_21_2016.pdf.
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9.6

EPRDF’s Economic Programs and their impact on People’ Rights
From much of my discussions thus far in part-two of the dissertation, and goals of assessing

how the institutional design of ethnic federalism and its practical unveiling over time assisted the
success of survivalist programs of the regime, I have attempted to show that all of such programs
of the TPLF-EPRDF regime start with their declared goals of the promotion of group rights. What
is puzzling however, is that we see such promotions of group rights agenda not only fail to materialize in practical terms, but also witnessed that the rights agenda seems to have been purposely
used by the regime to curtail opposing interests that are perceived as threats against the ruling
coalition. According to interviewee number-seven, who works in one of the state-owned printing
presses, the ruling coalition arranges series of panels for journalists who work for state owned
medias, training sessions that are primarily designed to indoctrinate them with the ruling coalition’s political and economic programs while simultaneously instructing them that critics of such
programs should be considered anti-development. For instance, when I pressed the individual,
about the reactions of the fellow journalists that work for the state media agencies, the interviewee
responds that, “the regime in general and the party-member bureaucrats who manage such media
institutions in particular, praise those individuals who keenly accept the ‘reform’ training and consider them developmental-journalists. However, at the same time, they look at those who question
the importance of such training sessions conducted by the regime as restriction of press freedom,
as potential enemies that must be replaced or fired at some point after the training sessions.”142
The individual’s account in fact aligns with what I had discussed in chapter seven where I detailed
the methods of the ruling coalition that are used in subverting the bureaucracy’s independence
The conversation with interviewee number-seven took place in Amsterdam, the Netherlands in July 1st,
2017.
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while turning the bureaucrats into regime patrons. The methods of rewards used and the threats
indicated with regards to those who work for the state media agencies also fall along the lines that
we saw in the discussion of EPRDF’s manipulation of the state bureaucracy.
I believe that the above explanation in terms of how the regime uses the government owned
media, which is administered by key party leaders, via effective manipulation of the journalists is
very essential to our understandings of the party programs’ impact on the issue of rights in general.
Because, my understanding of how such rights violations across the board are suppressed and
hence not addressed mainly starts with either the lack of reporting of such violations or the underreporting of them. The news production in the state owned and party administered Ethiopian
Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), according to interviewee number-seven’s further account, we
could see that rights violations by the regime would remain unknown unless and otherwise reported by independent journalists, opposition media outlets and the international media. In that
regard, interviewee number seven states that, “every news item that we prepare must pass through
extreme levels of censorship and approved by politicians of the ruling coalition. Even at times,
someone from EPRDF leadership would actually call the news desk and demands for news broadcast readers to read over the prepared news items over the telephone and the politician further
instructs the reader to make final corrections to the news item, which might also include an order
to cancel the broadcasting of a certain news or two altogether. This mainly happens when the
international media or opposition media discuss rights violations that mostly appear when the government violently evicts minority ethnic groups from their habitats. And again, at times, when such
indigenous locals resist the government’s instructions of vacating the areas that are needed for
certain development projects, the military would burn villages and commits massacres. Hence, the
regime’s ruling elites’ make sure that the state owned media agencies across all print or digital
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platforms, provide coordinated responses that not only attempt to legitimize the regime’s actions
but also in ensuring such reports paint those who resisted orders as partners of anti-peace and
development elements.”143 The overall implication of the above interview respondent’s account, I
argue, is that the EPRDF sets certain political and economic programs or policies, implements
them the EPRDF way by co-opting the regional state and federal bureaucracies, and the successes
and failures of any of such programs will be prepared and announced by the EPRDF propaganda
machines in a way that only portray the successes of the regime.
Listing the regime’s rights violations here would not serve much to the goals of the chapter
as the mere fact that such violations exist could suffice. However, most of the types of violations
of the regime against the group and individuals’ rights, occur in two most important ways, among
possible many others. The first challenges as a result of these new economic programs mostly in
the second decade resulted in forced evictions of many citizens without any prior consultations or
agreements and at times even without notice. Many small ethnic groups have lost their entire livelihoods as a result. Small holding farmers who lived nearby urban centers were also forced to leave
their homes and farm lands without proper compensation or at times when they ask questions, they
will be thrown out to jails or face the fortunes of exile and extreme poverty. The second challenge,
while similar in its impact is however, unique and that concerns the phenomenon of land grab,
which deprived many groups’ rights to farm lands, restricted investment opportunities for the citizenry, considerable environmental impact and again resulted in many forced evictions. As indicated above, those organizations and organized societies that question such state sponsored programs are extremely suppressed. As David Turton (?), who studied the state owned projects of
The conversation with interviewee number-seven took place in Amsterdam, the Netherlands in July 1st,
2017.
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hydro-electric dams in the Lower Omo Valley of Southern Ethiopia and the impacts of such projects on groups of ethnicities in the area states, such projects, despite look well intentioned, are
understated and their ecological and societal impacts are extremely damaging.144 By also relying,
in part on the seminal arguments by James Scott (1984), Turton captures the general picture of
such development programs in his elaborated statement that reads:
“There is no doubt that the leaders of the Ethiopian state are sincere believers in the
‘civilizational discourse’ of state expansion: they genuinely believe that their plans for river
basin development in the lower Omo will improve the human condition of its residents. It
therefore becomes relevant to ask, as Scott does in Seeing like a state, why ‘so many wellintended schemes to improve the human condition have gone so tragically awry’ (1998: 4).
His answer is that ‘the most tragic episodes of state initiated social engineering’ have resulted from a combination of four elements, two of which are present in all modern nationstates: the ‘administrative ordering of nature and society’ and a belief that the growing
satisfaction of human needs can be achieved through scientific and technological progress…. The two crucial additional elements are, first ‘an authoritarian state that is willing
and able to use the full weight of its coercive power’ and, second, ‘a prostrate civil society’.
It is not difficult to recognize the presence of both these elements in the history of Ethiopian
state-building in the southwest, from the first incursions of Abyssinian armies at the end of
the nineteenth century, to the present government’s efforts to curb the activity of civil society organizations in the areas of social justice and human rights (page 12).
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See page 12 of Turton’s article on: http://www.coolground.org/data%20for%20archive/In_the_Shadow_of_Leviathan.pdf.
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What Turton eloquently described above, in my view, serves two important purposes in
our overall understanding of the Ethiopian state. Firstly, the author indicates that such groups in
Southern Ethiopia, that are impacted by the development programs of the EPRDF coalition under
its developmental state paradigm, had also experienced similar situations even going back hundreds of years ago when Menelik II’s army invaded the area through his expansionist policy in his
state-building agenda. I argue that despite the EPRDF’s political and economic programs calling
for the promotion of group rights, their actions in practical terms however, tell a different story.
This in effect makes the ruling elite not any different from the previous regimes. Secondly, the
author’s argument also concurs what I had already described above in terms of the regime’s suppression of those who either flat out protest or demand explanations. Such rights’ violations as a
result of the economic development programs of the ruling coalition are too many to list here. As
Turton mentioned above, I cannot also deny that the regime’s actions could also emanate from
their very desire of embarking on the successes of the programs they envisioned and implemented.
However, the fact that we see the regime avoids its commitment towards the rights issues for the
sake of such programs without consulting the locals, or when they do, without addressing the demands of the people remains very much a problem.
Here, it is also vital to bring back the discussions of how the EPRDF effectively uses the
federal ethnic setting in terms of the development programs stated in its grandiose visions in the
GTP-I and GTP-II. The EPRDF led government, mostly controls the developmental programs using the regional state bureaucracy’s capacities for the implementation of such programs. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture would disseminate guidelines in the implementation of certain
programs to each of the Departments of Agriculture of the regional states. Of course, different
circumstances across many of the regional states might require different guidelines. For the
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EPRDF, however, that matters less than its successes in development ambitions resulting in regional states’ implementation of such programs. In that respect, successes of such programs happen to vary from a regional state to another.
In that regard, according to interviewee number-six, who worked for the Oromia Regional
State and traveled across many regional states for work, “the level of political autonomy that the
regional states enjoy within the post-1991 federal setting does not in any way resemble to how it
was supposed to look per what is written in the federal constitution. We have always been aware
of the discrepancies of what the rules say and how they are practiced and had remained content
with it. The problem however, is that the government’s Growth and Transformation Plan and its
implementation strategies had further stripped the powers of the regional states in the economic
schemes the country.”145 As it is appropriate, one might ask, ‘why the regime fails to abide by the
its own rule books?’, and the explanation, to my understanding remains simple. Because, as I stated
time and again, I reiterate that the regime’s political elites are fixated on the need to acquire further
legitimacy from the populace by showcasing the successes of their economic development programs regardless of at what costs were such achievements become realities.
I have also asked my interviewee about the regional political elites’ views of the violations
of the rights of groups in their respective regional administrations. Interviewee number-six states
that, “in the world of EPRDF, one major rule stands above everything and that is what they refer
as party-discipline. Keep in mind that whatever economic programs and guidelines are distributed
to the regional states, the messages are not considered as if they are arriving from the federal

My interview with interviewee number-six was conducted on June 17th, 2017 in Atlanta, GA, United
States and a follow-up interview was also conducted on June 18th, 2017.
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government. Instead, given the party structure is deeply rooted across all levels of government, we
all understand that such messages are coming from EPRDF’s headquarters in Addis Ababa. Therefore, not abiding by such guidelines, regardless of the questions we have on how some of the
programs would impact our citizens, is out of the question.”146 What we see from the individual’s
account indeed shows that regardless of the consequences of the programs on the people’s rights
or the varying circumstances under which such programs had to be implemented across regions,
the regional elites and the bureaucracies they oversee are there to only to serve the party interest.
Thus far, my discussions on how the EPRDF’s economic programs evolved in spite of the
fact that they are marred by rights violations could also be consistently seen with regards to what
I earlier described as the other challenge, i.e., the issue of land grab. The overall impact of such a
challenge across both the rights issues as well as in further diminishing the role of the regional
states that are the owners of the land within their respective states is quite massive. The federal
government, effectively controlled by the ruling coalition has asserted its rights of using any land
at any regional state for the purposes of federally initiated economic development programs. In
other words, that also indicates that when the EPRDF decides to provide investment land for a
foreign or domestic economic partner, it can do so without any restrictions given its rights of
claiming any land for development purposes. Interviewee number-two, who has worked for the
regime for over two decades and provided me with extensive interview however, do not see any
problem as such. In that regard, the individual agrees with the frequently mentioned reasoning for
the EPRDF’s unrestricted use of regional state resources. The interviewee states that, “the areas
that the federal government had already indicated for development projects are mostly located
My interview with interviewee number-six was conducted on June 17th, 2017 in Atlanta, GA, United
States and a follow-up interview was also conducted on June 18th, 2017.
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within the territories of under-developed regions where the administrative capacities of their respective bureaucracy are limited. Therefore, the government perceives that since the federal government has such a capacity it becomes the regime’s responsibility to make sure such areas are not
left far behind the development schemes mainly in comparison with other regional states where
their bureaucracies are well established.”147 To the contrary, interviewee number-six disagrees by
saying that, “even in the Oromia Regional State, where I worked for many years, the EPRDF’s
approach in processes of the implementation of its programs is very much similar.” Of course,
despite such differing opinions from both of the interviews, reaching a certain conclusion would
not be challenging given where much of the discussion presented leads us to.
In general, the take away remains that despite how much the economic development programs based on EPRDF’s economic paradigms are well intentioned, the regime’s successes in its
interests, in terms of gaining the positive acknowledgment of the public on the accomplishments
of such programs is not to be debated. The level of legitimacy acquired through the development
programs and implemented through the effective utilization of the party structure across all levels
of the federal setting therefore undoubtedly has put the EPRDF in much better position for political
survival. Henceforth, in the next section, I present how the EPRDF coalition’s member political
parties emerged as major forces in the economy via their management of the party endowments.
Moreover, I also assess the role the state enterprises play in the economy and the ruling coalition’s
management of the said enterprises that further continue to put the incumbent political elite dominating both the political and economic spheres.
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9.7

EPRDF’s Party-Endowments and State Enterprises: The New Challenges
Whether through the economic policies that made agricultural productivity a central focus,

or the economic programs designed to attract foreign investors to increase food production, which
is now considered nothing but ‘land-grab’, the ruling coalition has failed to meet its predetermined
goals (Lavers 2012). At the center of everything however, as I clearly indicated early on, the country’s land policy and the fact that it is nationalized leaves the property of land as the sole possession
of the regime. And this fact remains the greater challenge in impacting the farmers’ productivity
mainly due to insecurity in property rights. If property rights are considered part of the group rights
promotion package, as one should, we could definitely use that in the larger narrative of that the
dissertation tackles. On a flip side however, the regime’s land policy has created an opportunity of
greater wealth creation for the party owned endowments that happen to enjoy unrestricted levels
of freedom that private entrepreneurs or investors do not. For EPRDF, therefore, issues with regards to the policy of land are non-negotiable. As Devereux et al (2005), who analyzed economic
stagnation in the Ethiopian state and land policies across the previous regimes stated, although the
regime has outlined ways to protect the peasant owned small-holding farms, it also seems very
much rigid with regards to even correcting the flaws of some of the policies on the topic. By
mentioning the words of the Prime Minister, who ruled the state and the EPRDF for over two
decades, the authors clearly stated that:
“Prime Minister Meles argues that allowing land to become a tradable commodity
would inevitably result in an ‘urbanization of rural poverty’. When the next major drought
strikes, hungry families with nothing else to exchange for food will be forced to sell their
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land and, being displaced, will then migrate in enormous numbers to cities like Addis Ababa, where they will survive in squalor in squatter camps, with little prospect of securing
formal employment. This is related to the “land as safety net” argument: even if tiny farms
are inadequate for self-sufficiency, the family plot does provide some proportion of subsistence needs, and this safety net would be removed if land can be sold. Ideologically, the
EPRDF shares the Derg’s opposition to large landowners, and they believe that commercializing land will inexorably concentrate ownership in the hands of a minority. In his endof-year report to Parliament in June 2004, Meles announced that the privatization of land
in Ethiopia would take place only ‘over EPRDF’s dead body’” (page 122).
The ruling coalition’s notion that the privatization of land could lead to exodus of farmers
into cities and then rural poverty transforming into urban poverty could may very well hold water,
if their fears are to happen in reality, especially in absence of ways to protecting as well as transforming the lives of such farmers that are utilizing very backward ploughing mechanisms and
dependent on rain-fed farming practices. As we could see from the above quote, the problem however, is that the regime considers correcting the flaws of its policies not only as unnecessary but
more than dangerous to their political existence. The language of the late Prime Minster, Meles
Zenawi proves just that. The question now becomes why is it privatization of land could be considered a danger to the survivalist political and economic programs of the EPRDF? And is it just
only on the issue of land that the regime forbids privatization or the scope could even encompass
other economic sectors? The answers to both, I argue could be attributed to the presence of political
party run endowments and state enterprises that are also run by the political elites in the ruling
coalition and the protection of such party run entities would become priorities to the regime. As
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Berhanu Abegaz (2011) explains, the issue of privatization of land and the private sectors’ involvement in the economy could very well impact the survivalist ambitions of the incumbents. The
author states:
“… the impact of Party Owned Businesses on long-term wealth creation and distribution revolves around four empirically measurable variables: regime insecurity, its organizational capacity and discipline, its ideology, and the degree of centralization of the state
it inherited. Monoparties in formerly socialist countries, which peddled universalistic classbased ideologies and faced no organized opposition from private business elite, needed
only to focus on national defense, economic growth and the provision of basic needs to all
in order to earn legitimacy to rule. Similarly, vanguard but narrowly based parties in market-led economies, on the other hand, are compelled to stand on multiple economic legs
(private, party, state) to mitigate deep-seated political insecurity. Furthermore, the nexus
of the four factors noted above suggest three possible paths of evolution: a paragonist path
favoring a competitive politico-economic system, a parasitic path of entrenchment of organized interests that results in a poverty-tyranny trap, or an unstable mutualist path of
coexistence of state, party, and private actors” (page 3).
Indeed, as the author makes it clear, insecure regimes rely on such mechanisms like party
businesses and state enterprises through which they not only seek the blessings of the ruled, but
also rely to avert existential threats that could come from privatization schemes. The fact that the
most dominant party within the ruling coalition, TPLF has not completely left its socialists roots
could also be an indication that its political elites might have learned from the mistakes of the old
socialist republics. It was within that respect that in post-1991 Ethiopia, the EPRDF created party
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endowments by directly assigning unaudited government finances but also strengthened them
throughout the last two decades to the level of becoming the heavy weights in the economic sphere
all together (Legesse 2016). Such party businesses are led by party appointed politicians. And
such leaders of party endowments have effectively used the party structure to grow their political
party’s influence in the Ethiopian economy. Moreover, they have also effectively continued to
make acquisitions of formerly state owned enterprises and exploited the absence of fair economic
competition to their favor. And when some level of completion occurs, the political parties undoubtedly would eliminate it by using the coercive powers of the state (Legesse 2016).
The level of unfair economic competition that the presence of such political party owned
endowments would create were even discussed among the political elites in few of EPRDF’s retreat camps that are also used for training and brainstorming sessions for new political programs.
According to Ermias Legesse (2016), a former EPRDF member who also served as a deputy minister, in one of those retreats, the Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi was asked by fellow EPRDF
leaders about one of those endowment that now has greater share of the Ethiopian economy and
administered by his wife, former First Lady and member of parliament, Ms. Azeb Mesfin. However, not only the Prime Minister downplayed the issue but also stated that EFFORT (Endowment
for the Rehabilitation of Tigray) is actually facing huge problems that would endanger its existence
in the long term. Therefore, according to Meles, the political leaders that were asking such questions should not be concerned about a ‘failing organization’s’ potential impact in the economy.
His responses, according to the author, were extremely untrue and all the participants in the meeting were quite aware of that. But, the usual problem in the EPRDF camp is that, none of them
would have the courage to confront or even question the Prime Minister, who was the chairman of
both the TPLF and EPRDF in all the twenty-one years that he served as the head of state. Because,
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for such elites, confronting TPLF’s highly revered leader would result in unwanted consequences.
Today, such party endowments are growing tremendously and now are economic forces that have
effectively dominated the competition.
One major aspect that is also missing in much of the discussion on the problems associated
with the party owned businesses is how much negative impact they would incur on the group rights
promotion agenda. A university professor, who had taught courses in both the public and private
colleges in the capital Addis Ababa, interviewee number-eighteen, argues that, “when it comes to
the increasing economic influence and dominance of the endowments, one particular issue ignored
by both the regime and critics alike is that of how such party owned businesses that belong four of
the EPRDF member parties impact different ethnic groups’ economic rights. Besides the four regions, the remaining regional states that are considered developing are run by EPRDF affiliate
political parties that do not have any role in the economy”148. According to the interviewee, this is
extremely significant because, according to him, “if the endowments run by EPRDF’s four parties
are primarily designed to aid the development efforts of those four regions, their affiliate parties’
in other regions lacking such economic capacity would leave them to continue to depend on the
blessings of the EPRDF in their development efforts.” Indeed, the point raised by the individual
shows that such regions that are being administered by the affiliate parties in fact depend solely on
EPRDF’S party structure in receiving goods and services that they could have obtained from the
private sector. Because, according to the interviewee, whether a given economic sector is dominated by party endowments or state enterprises that the ruling elites administer as board chairmen
The interview with interviewee number-eighteen was conducted in June 14th, 2017 in Atlanta, United
States.
148
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or directors, the delivery of goods and services across all levels of the federal setting must pass
through the party structure. Hence, we further see that the party structure is not only about ensuring
the continuity of the ruling coalition’s political dominance, but also the economic aspect.
In a vital example provided by one of my interviews, interviewee number twenty-four, who
had worked for Amhara Regional State’s Bureau of Agriculture, stated that when Tiret Corporate
(endowment owned by ANDM) involves in the business of distributing fertilizers and seeds to the
farmers, the endowment uses warehouses and offices that belong to the regional administration.
The point however, is that the endowment never pays rents for using such facilities or for its use
of the regional state bureaucrats in selling its products149. Here, what is important to note is that
distinguishing what the state owns from what the party owns is a difficult task. As we saw in earlier
chapters, the lines that differentiate the state from the ruling coalition party are very much blurred.
The problems that we saw in the discussion above with regards to the endowments could
also be attributed to state owned enterprises. With EPRDF’s promises of liberalization of the economy curbed by its adoption of developmental state economic growth and development strategies,
the ruling elites control of state enterprises has grown enormously. The state (EPRDF), with its
ownership of land and the absence of bureaucratic hurdles would also mean that the growth of
such enterprises have essentially become boundless. All of the state enterprises in the country,
which includes among others, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EPCO), Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC), Ethiopian Roads Authority, Ethiopian Airlines and soon are run
by board of directors headed by senior political elites within the EPRDF coalition (Legesse 2016).
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The interview with interviewee number twenty-four was conducted in a telephone interview conducted
on June 16th, 2017.
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Per what a former minister (interviewee number twenty-three) that had also had the responsibility
of closely monitoring and controlling certain state enterprises, but currently lives in exile informed
me, although the board that administers a given state enterprise had to provide quarterly reports
directly to the minister’s office, that has never occurred to him even once150. According to the
individual, all such reports are directly delivered to the Prime Minster’s office all while bypassing
other authorities in the chain of command. Even after the death of Meles Zenawi, according to the
interviewee, TPLF had become effective in installing its influential political leaders. And such
leaders who are now serving as advisors to Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn are the ones
that are receiving such reports from the state enterprises. This indeed shows that the situation is
even worse than before given the Prime Minster, who is now the head of state of the country, does
not have a clear understanding of how such huge economic cash-cows of the state are actually
operating. In fact, I believe that no further evidence should be needed to understand the magnitude
of political power the ruling coalition and most importantly, the TPLF holds in the Ethiopian state.
Interviewee number two, how is one the most senior elites in the ruling coalition, disagrees
with the assessment of other interviewees, especially when it comes to endowments. According to
him, it is unfortunate that the endowments are actually referred as party-owned while the real
owners are the peoples of the regionals states. However, from my preliminary research of the party
owned endowments in Ethiopia based on the secondary research data and my extended conversations with former bureaucrats, interviewee number-two’s accounts are found to be far from truth
but attempts to elude.

I conducted the interview with number twenty-three on Saturday, July 8th, 2017. The interview location
could not be indicated, per agreement.
150
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The ruling coalition’s dominance of the economic sphere that ranges from the party endowments to its control of state enterprises, has actually grown in the last decade even further with
the emergence of the Ethiopian military as another economic power. Given the scope of the chapter, discussing the process to show how the military also emerged as an economic giant, could very
much be a daunting task, thus understanding its ramifications should be left for another project.
However, such dominance of the ruling coalition in the economic sphere and the regime’s boundless intervention in the economy, its take-over of the properties of various groups in the name of
further urbanization and industrializations schemes have led to the emergence of popular resentment especially in two of the economically and political important regions i.e., Oromia and Amhara regional states. Especially, the massive protest that broke out in the regional state of Oromia
in summer of 2016, protesting the expansion of the city limits of Addis Ababa, which would have
evicted Oromo farmers from their historical lands were too big that the regime had to use its trusted
military and police forces to crush them. Many peaceful protesters were met with live ammunition
and hundreds were murdered. As I stated at the end of last chapter, such new popular resentments,
although now effectively crushed, still remain as time-bomb situations that could further tantalize
and challenge EPRDF’s authoritarian rule. In that regard, I believe that the growing role of the
military and its commanders in the economy might signal that the regime’s intentions in pushing
the military in administering some of the most important state enterprises and its use of the military
owned factories in taking over vital state projects emanated from its sole desire to gain the support
of the army in the event of the rise of popular uprisings. Of course, the fact that the military’s top
echelons are highly dominated by ethnic Tigrayans that keep the interests of the TPLF in mind at
all times could make one to believe the military’s involvement in the economy does not mean
much any way. However, I argue that given instances of military’s control of economic engines in
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other countries have led to the survival of the regimes in power in those states, it would not be
suspiring to argue EPRDF might also see in its military as last resort to ensure its survival ambitions.
In general, in this chapter, I have tried to show that besides the ruling coalition’s political
dominance through its manipulation of the federal arrangement, it has also designed effective ways
that led to its dominance of the economic sphere. From its economic ideologies that evolved from
revolutionary democracy to developmental state growth strategies, and its efforts to control the
economy via its endowments and its skilful management of state enterprises, the ruling coalition
have indeed created a well functioning deep state. However, we have also witnessed that the
regime’s actions are not representative of its political and economic promises given the failure of
its group rights agenda, that was indicated via the instances I discussed in terms of the rise of
popular anger. Therefore, I argue that as the discussions in this the chapter clearly indicate, for the
EPRDF’s ruling coalition, its survival ambitions and its ceaseless efforts to acquire further legitimacy to its rule outweighs citizens’ varying economic and political interests. For the regime, if the
people are to enjoy their economic and political rights, then EPRDF has to remain with its grips
of political power. That would be the only option so it provides the answers needed for such popular demands.

10 CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
Earlier in part-one of the dissertation, and the theoretical explanation presented, I argued
that while the debate that centered on individual rights versus group rights was a healthy part of
the discussions in the political discourse of the Ethiopian state. Nonetheless, the fact that the promotion of group rights somehow emerged as a ‘winning idea’ later paved the path to the creation
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of winners and losers. The institutional solutions established to help that cause, as clearly presented
throughout the project, came to reward regime loyalists and supporters and punish those perceived
opposition and critics, as that becomes evident from the explanations in part-two of the dissertation. As I stated in my theoretical explanations, the elites’ maneuver of the very institutional solutions they provided for their survivalist agenda have achieved those very elites some level of political stability they aspired and most importantly provided them a platform to succeed in their
political survival ambitions through the mechanisms of co-optation prevalently seen across all levels of the federal structure.
Whether ethnic federalism is what exists in Ethiopian state, given the discussions presented
until this point, could also be put into a question. Indeed, what I have presented thus far could
effectively nullify the notion of its existence. What we saw from the extended discussions I presented throughout part-two of the dissertation, the situation indicates form of a federal setting and
regional state-central government relations might just be in name only. However, it is very important to note that the fact that the regional states are designed along ethnic lines (regardless of
the very small levels of administrative autonomy those regions enjoy), the issue of rights violations
directed against minorities in different regional states (despite addressing the rights issues was the
main drive behind such an institutional solution), and the fact that such a design was implemented
with the impression that it could help the ruling elite’s survivalist ambitions all could also validate
why the system of governance and structure still remains embedded in the ethnic federal setting
and why I argue that it needs to be studied in such a way. Moreover, even if the discussions could
imply that federalism is only in name and that the centralist party structure is what is evidently
there to see, I argue that the federal setting still must be considered as the most integral part of
understanding contemporary Ethiopian politics in general and our efforts to understand the EPRDF
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coalition’s success in its survivalist ambitions in particular. Ethnic federalism as a government
structure in the country, therefore is the enabling mechanisms for such an explanation of authoritarian survival. In that respect, in the last substantive chapters of part-two of the dissertation, I
have addressed how the remaking of the Ethiopian state in post-1991 political era effectively safeguarded the ruling political elite even from the most pivotal challenges that they had to endure and
survive mainly in the first two decades of their political rule. Indeed, I have also showed that that
was possible as a result of the mechanisms implemented along the federal setting in place and the
party structure that outmaneuvers the political structure at large.
To that end, I have presented how the Ethiopian state evolved under EPRDF’s rule and
how the regime under this ruling coalition used the country’s political history as an important
narrative. In such discussions of the historical narrative, we saw that the emergence of legitimate
grievances as a result of political and economic inequality in the past were legitimized. However,
remains critical to reiterate that the ruling coalition had seized such a fact as a greater opportunity
to exploit for its survivalist ambitions. The fact that correcting the historical injustices were what
led to the emergence of rebellion that carried what are referred as ethnic questions and grievances
indeed makes the introduction of the institutional solutions from both political and economic
realms less surprising even if the fact that such solutions were quite a departure from the pannationalist Ethiopian state of the old political regimes. Furthermore, I argued that explanations that
centered among others on the persistence of political culture we see throughout the Ethiopian state,
the strategic interests of the political elite and institutional approaches used by such elites all matter
in equal measure. Hence, in this dissertation, I believe that the discussions presented are able to
demonstrate just that through the use of various approaches in the study of democratization and
authoritarian survival.
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From the rights perspective, when looking at how the TPLF led EPRDF regime utilized
what it introduced as an institutional solution to the historically challenging problems through its
agenda of the promotion of group rights, we see that the coalition has even failed to deliver its own
predetermined goals. As could be seen from different angles that I examined in part two of the
dissertation in terms of the oppression of individuals and the impact on minority rights in the
federal setting, the flaws in the electoral landscape, the fact that the line between the bureaucracy
and the party structure is highly blurred, and the existence of patronage systems across all levels
of the political spectrum, we can infer that the institutional solution of ethnic federalism has also
failed to deliver the promises from the rights perspectives. Instead, what such an institutional solution accomplished was to reinforce the survivalist approaches of the ruling coalition while the
country and its diverse groups remain at cross roads and attempting to foresee the future is an
extremely difficult task.
As clearly seen from the extended discussions in the chapters presented, the ruling coalition, that has been ruling the nation since the post-1991 period has effectively utilized the ethnic
federal arrangement for its survivalist political strategies. The fact that the TPLF, which is one
member of the ruling coalition, controls the military and security apparatus of the state has also
overshadowed any prospects of real and tangible reforms. As Christopher Clapham (2009) explains of how the challenges of the country at large could now be understood:
“The deeper problem facing Ethiopia is that it is now too complex and diverse a
society to be managed without the extremely adept deployment of the political skills - of
discussion, bargaining, compromise and simultaneous recognition of alternative sources of
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authority - that are needed to create some kind of workable synthesis of the different elements of which it is composed” (page 191).
Clapham’s observation in fact shows that unless political dialogues become the norm and
the EPRDF coalition understands the current ways of doing things are not sustainable in rapidly
changing political climate both at home and at the international level, the repercussions of lacking
a genuine political reform could further be very damaging. The country’s political actors both in
opposition and within the ruling coalition have diverging views and reconciling the two is quite an
extremely difficult task. This does not mean however, that no consensus on many politically relevant but sensitive issues could not be reachable. As long as every individual political actor or group
seeks a common goal of building democratic institutions, work towards the promise of democracy
and focus on the process of democratization, I do not see why the statuesque we are witnessing
today remain the challenge with out a solution. As I have presented throughout the dissertation,
the persistent nature of patterns of elite interaction within the Ethiopian state could in fact remain
a problem. However, I am still adamant that by incorporating democratic values to their political
party platforms with genuine intent, by employing tactics of political reconciliation embedded
within the framework of give and takes, chances that such political actors can revive the democratic fortunes of the state moving forward. That is also what exactly the author quoted above
transpired. One particular issue that explains the problem of lack of understanding among the elites
when it comes to the future of the country is this notion of ‘we have to agree on everything’. Thus,
the elites must also come to an understanding that most of the difficult issues that divide public
opinion need to be left for the citizenry to decide. Periodic elections, besides their service in determining who takes particular offices, must also be considered as a platform for the people to vote
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on series of important issues that remain challenging problems for the elites to reach certain level
of agreements.
I reiterate that the Ethiopian state remains poor, unequal, and its political sphere demonstrates a ticking time-bomb that endangers the future of the country unless the most needed reforms
are arriving anytime soon. Moreover, the issues I discussed in terms of the new developments that
are now challenging the viability of federal model, that are mostly concerns in the evolving questions of identity and demands of equality and fairness that were heard across the greater Oromia
and Amhara regions should also become the focus on the future of the federal model and how such
developments play out would have a lot to say about how comparative politics researchers would
look at the Ethiopian case moving forward. Because, such new challenges probable far-reaching
consequences are yet to be determined.
However, such recent political developments also present two important junctures in the
current state of politics in the country and that should not be overlooked. Firstly, the ethnic federal
arrangement and the subsequent emergence of institutional maneuvering of the EPRDF elite has
succeeded in terms of the coalition’s survivalist goals. In that regard, such a structural solution
created some level of stability and delivered authoritarian survival. Secondly, however, it is now
clear that both the diverse groups in the country (especially, the Amharas and Oromos) and the
ruling elite have now understood that such status quo is not sustainable, which provides the important story of the dissertation. And the takeaway becomes that the regime’s understanding of the
problems within the federal setting and the reemergence of questions of the political and economic
inequality and questions of identity requires, (undoubtedly from the side of the regime), the need
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to adopt new and creative political solutions that would enable the continuity of the ruling coalition’s dominance. In that regard, the political elites had to make sure their domination of the economy through the regime’s developmental state inspired economic programs. Moreover, the coming
into fold of the country’s military (which is loyal to the regime and dominated by TPLF leadership)
into playing a vital role in the economy indicates that the regime indeed is cognizant to such changing political climate and remains in the mold of devising new tactics that further safeguard its
political rule. From the political direction, the regime is also inviting further division and animosity
as it’s been evident throughout the political violence that erupted across the boarder villages and
districts between the Ethiopian-Somali regional state and Oromia, which is the most populated
region as well as the economic engine of the country. This of course, is without delving into exploring what is been happening across all other regional states. For now, it seems succeeding in
terms of helping the incumbent EPRDF coalition buy much needed time. The problem, again, is
however, whether this would just end up as another critical juncture that would show yet another
survival of the regime. In my view, that could not be a possibility given the country is experiencing
ethnic strife and violence that we had not been the case in the past. In that regard, the only solution
could be in available in the hands of the regime and its ability to come to terms with reality and
understand that genuinely tangible reforms are needed.
In general, unless equal levels of representation across the political landscape emerges (perthe ruling coalition’s initial promises), and the citizens whether belonging to the majority groups
of the Amhara and Oromo or minorities across the nation feel part of the ownership of the state,
the domination of minority ethnic group over ninety percent of the population, I reiterate would
never be sustainable but dangerous to the existence of a cohesive state. The absence of genuine
reforms would definitely continue to leave traces of issues that could even endanger the existence
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of the second most populous nation in all of Africa. This dissertation, in that regard, I believe has
achieved its objectives of understanding why a political regime, with minority support base and
domination was able to survive political opposition and its unpopularity through the means of its
co-optation mechanisms, systems of patron-client relations that it created, its overall political and
economic dominance, and the loyalty of the security apparatus (military and intelligence) that it
enjoys.
Overall, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of two crucial points. Firstly,
through the use of comparative historical analysis across time, it shows how the persistence of
political culture, in terms of patterns of interaction among the political elite across different regimes, helps explain the continuity of the clientelistic and survivalist regime types in Ethiopia.
Through the primary information gathered from several knowledgeable individuals, this project
has also elucidated how the ethnic federal arrangement as an institutional solution evolved in post1991 Ethiopian state ensured some level of political stability but most importantly, political survival to the very elite that designed such an institutional solution. Such were of course, the goals
of the project. Secondly, however, the main contribution of this work becomes that given ethnic
federal attempts from diverse historical cases were proven to have emerged for not the ideals of
democratic promotion, the question then centers on how such an institutional solution help us understand authoritarian survival. It is my belief that the dissertation has effectively achieved that.
Moreover, the discussions at the end of the dissertation also indicates that the new political developments that have now emerged are worthy of extended study, which could even lead to the need
to part-three of explanations in a future research project.

291

The limitations of the project need to be addressed as well. As we recall, the introduction
to this project mentioned the many attributes that many of the sub-Saharan African states share in
common. Additions of some other federal and unitary states could therefore have helped our
broader understanding of authoritarian survival in the continent. Therefore, this could be another
path that might have to be explored in future projects. Besides the diverse qualitative methodological avenues used in the dissertation, I also believe that some use of quantitative methodology
could help in bringing to our attention some of the impacts of the political and economic solutions
provided via the institutional solutions on authoritarian survival.
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